Farris v. Communicare Health Services, Inc. et al

Filing 21

Order. This record is devoid of the demonstrated compelling interest necessary to consider sealing either the agreement or the motion requesting approval. Accordingly, the parties' 18 motion to file the Confidential Settlement Agreemen t under seal is DENIED as submitted. If the parties believe that they are able, on resubmission, to fully satisfy the requirements imposed by the Sixth Circuit on requests to seal a request for approval and settlement agreement, they may resubmit the request, but are cautioned to do so only if the motion is narrowly tailored to address compelling interests recognized by the Circuit. See Order for details. Judge John R. Adams on 12/14/2016.(M,TL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARVIS FARRIS,

Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMUNICARE HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., et al.,

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Case No. 1:16 CV 1055

JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

ORDER

Defendants.

The parties now jointly seek leave to file their Confidential Settlement Agreement and
Joint Motion for Court Approval of Settlement and Dismissal under seal. The only ground for
sealing the documents offered by the parties is their agreement that the terms of settlement
include confidentiality.
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has long held that the “public has a
strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record” and that the public
interest is focused not only on the result of litigation but also on the “conduct giving rise to the
case;” as such, the Circuit Court finds, “secrecy” may “[insulate] the participants, masking
impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption.” Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) citing Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983). According to the Sixth Circuit,
“the public is entitled to assess for itself the merits of judicial decisions” and in so doing “the
public has an interest in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court and this Court

have relied upon in reaching our decisions.” Id., citing Brown at 1181. The Sixth Circuit
concludes that it is due to this “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to court records”
that “only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records. Id.
Where, as here, parties seek to cloak their settlement agreement under seal, the parties
must overcome the strong presumption in favor of openness by demonstrating a compelling
reason justifying non-disclosure. Id. citing In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476
(6th Cir. 1983). “Even where a party can show a compelling reason why certain documents or
portions thereof should be sealed, the seal itself must be narrowly tailored to serve that reason.”
Id.

To satisfy the burden established by the Sixth Circuit the proponent of sealing must

“‘analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal
citations.’” Id. citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002).
The parties in this matter have made no such showing. The only justification for seal
offered by the parties has long been rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which holds a “confidentiality
agreement between the parties does not bind the court in any way” and admonishes that courts
“should not seal records unless public access would reveal legitimate trade secrets, a recognized
exception to the right of public access to judicial records.” Brown 710 F.2d at 1180; see also
Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Const. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 594 (6th Cir. 2016)
“In determining the appropriateness of sealing court records . . . we consider, among other things
the competing interests of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the privacy rights of participants or
third parties, trade secrets, and national security.”) According to the Sixth Circuit, this Court’s
obligation to seal only where specific findings and conclusions will justify nondisclosure
continues “even if neither party objects to the motion to seal.” Shane, 825 F.3d at 306. The
entry of a seal in the absence of a full analysis explaining “why the interests in support of

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nondisclosure are compelling, why the interests supporting access are less so, and why the seal
itself is no broader than necessary—is itself grounds to vacate an order to seal. Id. Moreover,
although this Court’s decision to seal would be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,
the Sixth Circuit holds “in light of the important rights involved, the district court’s decision is
not accorded the deference that standard normally brings. Id. at 306 citing In re Knoxville, 723
F.2d at 476.
Separate and apart from the emphasis on public interest in disclosure inherent in the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s requirement that settlements be submitted for court approval, this record
is devoid of the demonstrated compelling interest necessary to consider sealing either the
agreement or the motion requesting approval. Accordingly, the parties’ motion is DENIED as
submitted.

If the parties believe that they are able, on resubmission, to fully satisfy the

requirements imposed by the Sixth Circuit on requests to seal a request for approval and
settlement agreement, they may resubmit the request, but are cautioned to do so only if the
motion is narrowly tailored to address compelling interests recognized by the Circuit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ John R. Adams
_______________________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Dated: December 14, 2016

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