Bell v. Young et al

Filing 7

Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's Motion to reopen case (Related doc # 6 ) is granted. Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration (Related doc # 5 ) is denied as moot. Plaintiff's procedural due process, substantive due process an d Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed against all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. His retaliation claims are dismissed against Defendants Husty, McCrae, Haynes, Dean, Roque, Benson, Rose and Granson. All claims pertaining to events occurring prior to 5/12/2014 are dismissed. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This action shall proceed solely on Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Defendant Young pertaining to Young's alleged conduct after 5/12/2014. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 9/19/2016. (H,CM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER BELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID YOUNG, et al.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:16 CV 1135
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:

On May 12, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Christopher Bell, an inmate in the Toledo Correctional
Institution (“ToCI”), filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Richland Correctional
Institution (“RCI”) Property Officer David Young, RCI Institutional Inspector Kelly Rose, RCI
Mailroom Employees Adrienne Husty and Jane Doe McCrae, RCI Mailroom Supervisor
Lieutenant Jose Roque, RCI Corrections Officers John Doe Haynes and P. Dean, RCI Rules
Infraction Board Chairman Lieutenant Tony Benson, and RCI Chief Medical Officer Dr. A
Granson. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, corrections officers confiscated his
personal property, the medical department removed his bottom bunk restriction and he was
placed in a housing unit with smokers. He contends in 2014, a false conduct report was filed
against him, he was unfairly charged with fighting and his medical file was lost when he was
transferred to ToCI on June 25, 2014. He asserts violations of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and seeks monetary relief.

Initially, Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee for this action nor did he file an Application
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Because Plaintiff filed more than three previous actions that
were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the “three strike” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
applied and Plaintiff could not proceed In Forma Pauperis with this action. On May 18, 2016,
the Court dismissed this action without prejudice and instructed Plaintiff that he could pay the
full filing fee and file a Motion to Reopen the action within thirty days of the day of the Order.
Plaintiff paid the filing fee on June 14, 2016. He filed a Motion to Reopen on June 27, 2016
(ECF No. 6). That Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently a prisoner in the Toledo Correctional Institution. The events giving
rise to his Complaint, however, occurred while he was incarcerated in RCI from December 19,
2013 until June 25, 2014.
December 19, 2013 to May 12, 2014
Plaintiff contends that on his arrival at RCI, Property Officer Young confiscated a large
amount of his personal property, including legal materials. Young told him he would have to
send it home or have it destroyed. On December 23, 2013, he discovered RCI medical
personnel removed his bottom bunk restriction. Plaintiff claims he was moved to the
disciplinary dorm on December 27, 2013 where he was exposed repeatedly to environmental
tobacco smoke. He contends he received a favorable grievance decision with respect to his
property in April 2014 and was told he would be reimbursed for the property destroyed. He
states that Young refused to give him headphones and an adaptor he had confiscated from

-2-

Plaintiff, saying they were altered or damaged. Plaintiff went to his unit counselor on May 8,
2014 and complained that Young had damaged the property to keep it from him.
May 12, 2014 to the present
Plaintiff contends Young, Husty, McCrae and Roque brought disciplinary charges
against him. He does not describe the nature of the charges. He indicates he was brought to
segregation on May 12, 2014 and assigned to a top bunk. He contends he fell from the top bunk
later that night and sustained injuries. He states he received a hearing on the charges on May 20,
2014 and was found not guilty. He states he was released from segregation back to the
disciplinary dorm. His unit counselor took him to retrieve his personal property and he
discovered his typewriter, CD Player, headphones and other items were in a garbage bag sitting
in a pool of water.
On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff got into a physical altercation with an inmate assigned to
another dorm. Plaintiff claims the other inmate was out of place. He states corrections officers
broke up the fight and moved him to segregation. He was charged with fighting on May 27,
2014. The Rules Infraction Board found him guilty of the charge, sentenced him to local control
and transferred him to another institution. He contends his personal property and medical
records were lost in the transfer.
Legal Claims
Plaintiff asserts the Defendants violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. He contends they retaliated against him by initiating disciplinary procedures. He asserts
Young retaliated against him by confiscating his property. He claims the Defendants denied him
procedural and substantive due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment.
-3-

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
A District Court is expressly authorized to dismiss any civil action filed by a prisoner
seeking relief from a governmental entity, as soon as possible after docketing, if the Court
concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if the
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§1915A; Siller v. Dean, No. 99-5323, 2000 WL 145167, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000); see
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the
proposition that attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the District Court of jurisdiction); In re
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question
jurisdiction is divested by unsubstantial claims).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than
“an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the

-4-

pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
Statute of Limitations
As an initial matter, any of Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to events that took place prior to
May 12, 2014 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Ohio’s two year statute of
limitations for bodily injury applies to §1983 claims. LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing
Authority, 55 F. 3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995). The actions alleged in the Complaint took place
between December 19, 2013 and June 25, 2014. This action was filed on May 12, 2016. Any
claims pertaining to events that took place prior to May 12, 2014 are beyond the expiration of
the two-year statute of limitations period. There would be no purpose in allowing those claims
to go forward in view of the fact that they are clearly time-barred. See Fraley v. Ohio Gallia
County, No. 97-3564, 1998 WL 789385, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998)(affirming sua sponte
dismissal of pro se §1983 action filed after two year statute of limitations for bringing such an
action had expired).
The expiration of the statute of limitations period is an affirmative defense that generally
must be raised by the Defendants in a responsive pleading. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c)(1). If, however, it
is clear from the face of the Plaintiff’s Complaint that relief is barred, the claims may be
dismissed, sua sponte, at the screening stage. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Because
it is apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that claims pertaining to events that
occurred prior to May 12, 2014 are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, they are
dismissed.
Defendants Rose and Granson
-5-

In addition, Plaintiff does not allege any specific conduct by Granson or Rose that
occurred after May 12, 2014. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a
clear showing that the Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis
of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v.
Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Plaintiff does not allege
what actions Granson personally performed which violated any of the constitutional rights
Plaintiff specified in his Complaint. His allegations against Rose all pertain to incidents that
occurred prior to May 12, 2014. The claims against these Defendants must be dismissed.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims against Rose concern his responses to
Plaintiff’s grievances, he fails to state a claim against this Defendant. Responding to a grievance
or otherwise participating in the grievance procedure is insufficient to trigger liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d. 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
Retaliation
The Court now shifts its attention to the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. First, he
contends the Defendants retaliated against him. Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred
to in the Constitution, is actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill an individual’s
exercise of First Amendment rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). To state a
prima facie case for retaliation prohibited by the First Amendment, Plaintiff must establish: 1)
he engaged in protected conduct; 2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and 3) that a causal
connection exists between the first two elements. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th
Cir. 1999).
-6-

1. Protected Conduct
The first element that Plaintiff must establish for his retaliation claim is that he was
engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 394-95. Plaintiff does not specify
in what protected conduct he engaged. In the Complaint he indicates he filed a grievance with
respect to personal property confiscated and destroyed by Young. He received a favorable ruling
on his grievance. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is possible that he is referring to
this conduct with regard to his retaliation claim. Filing a grievance against prison officials is
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010);
Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000). To the extent he was referring to other
conduct, it is not apparent on the face of the Complaint.
2. Adverse Action
The second element that Plaintiff must establish for his retaliation claim is that the
Defendants took an adverse action against him. Thaddeus–X, 175 F.3d at 396. An adverse
action is one that is “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising the
constitutional right in question. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff
does not have to show actual deterrence. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir.
2005). Even the threat of an adverse action can satisfy this element if the threat is capable of
deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in the protected conduct. Hill, 630 F.3d
at 472; Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398. While this element is not an overly difficult one for the
Plaintiff to meet, certain threats or deprivations are so de minimis that they do not rise to the
level of being constitutional violations. Id.

-7-

Much of Plaintiff’s Complaint is written in passive voice, meaning that many specific
actions are not attributed to any particular Defendant. He simply alleges in general that someone
committed the act. His factual allegations against particular Defendants are brief. He claims
Young, Husty, McCrae and Roque filed a conduct report with false allegations. He does not
allege what conduct he was alleged to have committed or how the allegations against him were
false. He claims Roque asked corrections officers to escort Plaintiff to segregation. Filing
conduct reports against a prisoner can be an adverse action capable of deterring a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights. See Thaddeus–X, 175 F.3d at 396. The
other allegations are not as obviously adverse. He contends Benson was the Rules Infraction
Board hearing officer who found him not guilty of the conduct charges. This action is not
adverse to Plaintiff. He contends Haynes and Dean intervened to break up a fight between him
and another inmate. While Plaintiff would have preferred that the other inmate be handcuffed, it
also is not clear that this action was adverse to Plaintiff.
3. Motivation for Adverse Action
The third element that Plaintiff must establish for his retaliation claim to survive
dismissal is that the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by his participation in
protected conduct. Siggers–El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2005). This element
addresses whether the Defendants’ subjective motivation for taking the adverse action was at
least in part to retaliate against the prisoner for engaging in protected conduct. Thaddeus–X, 175
F.3d at 399. If the prisoner can show that the Defendants’ adverse actions were at least partially
motivated by the prisoner’s protected conduct, then the burden shifts to the Defendants to show
that they would have taken the same action even absent such protected conduct. Id. at 399.
-8-

If the protected conduct to which Plaintiff is referring is the grievance he filed with
respect to his property, he may meet the basic pleading requirements for a retaliation claim
against Young. There are, however, no allegations in the Complaint reasonably suggesting the
other Defendants were motivated in their conduct by a grievance filed against Young. Husty,
McCrae and Roque work in the mailroom. Husty dispenses legal mail. McCrae retrieves mail
from prisoners for delivery outside of the prison. Roque is the lieutenant supervisor of the
mailroom. Plaintiff fails to include any facts to suggest how they may have been connected to
the grievance concerning his personal property. Benson is the Rules Infraction Board Chairman
and ruled in his favor on a grievance. Haynes and Dean are corrections officers assigned to the
housing units. They broke up a fight between Plaintiff and another inmate. Plaintiff does not
suggest how that action is connected to his property grievance. His retaliation claims against
Husty, McCrae, Roque, Benson, Haynes and Dean are dismissed.
Due Process
Plaintiff next claims that he was denied procedural and substantive due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In addition to setting the
procedural minimum for deprivations of life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause bars
“certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). It does not prohibit every deprivation by
the government of a person’s life, liberty or property. Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396,
1401 (6th Cir. 1994). Only those deprivations which are conducted without due process are
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
-9-

The Due Process Clause has a procedural component and a substantive one. The two
components are distinct from each other because each has different objectives and each imposes
different constitutional limitations on government power. A procedural due process limitation,
unlike its substantive counterpart, does not require that the government refrain from making a
choice to infringe upon a person’s life, liberty, or property interest. It simply requires that the
government provide “due process” before making such a decision. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d
1343, 1349 -1353 (6th Cir. 1996). The goal is to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation, to
assure fairness in the decision-making process and to assure that the individual affected has a
participatory role in the process. Id. Procedural due process requires that an individual be given
the opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful manner.” See Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir. 1983). These claims do not consider the egregiousness of the
deprivation itself, but only question whether the process accorded prior to the deprivation was
constitutionally sufficient. Howard, 82 F.3d at 1350. Although the existence of a protected
liberty or property interest is the threshold determination, the focus of this inquiry centers on the
process provided, rather than on the nature of the right.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, serves the goal of preventing “governmental
power from being used for purposes of oppression,” regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Substantive due process serves as a
vehicle to limit various aspects of potentially oppressive government action. Id. It serves as a
check on legislation that infringes on fundamental rights otherwise not explicitly protected by
the Bill of Rights; or as a check on official misconduct which infringes on a “fundamental
right;” or as a limitation on official misconduct, which although not infringing on a fundamental
-10-

right, is so literally “shocking to the conscious,” as to rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Howard, 82 F.3d at 1349.
Procedural Due Process - Disciplinary Procedures
The initial inquiry in a due process claim is whether Plaintiff was deprived of a protected
liberty or property interest. Prisoners have narrower liberty and property interests than other
citizens as “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). The Due Process Clause, standing alone, confers
no liberty or property interest in freedom from government action taken within the sentence
imposed. Id. at 480. Actions by prison officials do not give rise to a protected liberty interest
unless the restrictions imposed constitute an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. The question of what process is due
is answered only if the inmate establishes a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
Plaintiff refers to two disciplinary proceedings. He does not describe the charges
brought against him in the first proceeding; however, those charges were dismissed. The second
charges were brought against him for fighting. He contends he was found guilty of these
charges, was placed in local control and was transferred from the institution. Generally, unless
the disciplinary action is accompanied by a withdrawal of good time credits or is for a
significant period of time that presents an unusual hardship on the inmate, no liberty or property
interest will be found in the case. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. “Discipline by prison officials in
response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence
-11-

imposed by a court of law.” Id. at 485. “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty
interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at
221. Plaintiff does not indicate that good time credits were implicated or that he was held in
segregation for a significant period of time.
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not suggest that any of the Defendants were involved in the
disciplinary proceeding resulting in a finding of guilt. The first conduct report was dismissed by
Benson. Plaintiff was found guilty of the second conduct report; however, he does not connect
any of the Defendants to that hearing. He contends “a Hearing Officer served the Plaintiff
[with] two conduct reports.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). He does not allege facts indicating that any of
the named Defendants was this Hearing Officer.
Procedural Due Process - Personal Property
Plaintiff also alleges that his personal property was misplaced during his transfer. He
claims it was left behind after two John Doe officers from Mansfield placed it on the ground.
The transport officer alerted Plaintiff to the error and indicated the property would be picked up
the following day; however, he never received it. Again, Plaintiff fails to connect any of the
Defendants to this action.
Furthermore, to prevail on a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must plead and
prove either that the Defendants deprived him of his property as a result of an established state
procedure that itself violates due process rights; or that the Defendants deprived him of property
pursuant to a random and unauthorized act and available state remedies would not be adequate
to redress the deprivation. Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir 1991); see Vicory
v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff does not raise a specific challenge to
-12-

an established state procedure. Instead, he claims that his property was left behind due to
unauthorized acts of prison personnel. He therefore must also plead and prove that state
remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate. Macene, 951 F.2d at 706; Vicory, 721 F.2d at
1064. A remedy is available in the Ohio Court of Claims. See Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d
700, 704 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not indicated that he has pursued this remedy nor does he
give any indication that the state remedy available to him would be inadequate. His procedural
due process claims must be dismissed.
Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is also subject to dismissal. Due process claims
of this nature involve official acts which cause a deprivation of a substantive fundamental right,
or “shock the conscience.” Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353,1367 (6th Cir. 1993). These
actions are unconstitutional regardless of the procedural protections provided. Parate v. Isibor,
868 F.2d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 1989). A citizen, however, does not suffer a constitutional
deprivation every time he is subjected to some form of harassment by a government agent. Id. at
833. The conduct asserted must be “so severe, so disproportionate to the need presented, and
such an abuse of authority as to transcend the bounds of ordinary tort law and establish a
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.
Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting any of the Defendants deprived him of a
fundamental right. His substantive due process claim must therefore be based on conduct
alleged to be so severe that it shocks the conscience. Where a specific Amendment provides an
explicit source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of governmental conduct,
“that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the
-13-

guide for analyzing these claims.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Plaintiff
asserted substantially similar claims under the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment. His
substantive due process claim is dismissed as duplicative of those claims. Furthermore, none of
the conduct alleged by Plaintiff shocks the conscience. He fails to state a claim against these
Defendants for denial of substantive due process.
Eighth Amendment
Finally, Plaintiff alleges Young, Husty, McCrae, Haynes, Dean, Roque and Benson
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional
limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not
be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that
“prison officials ... ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and ... ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825. 832 (1994)(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
This, however, does not mandate that a prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience
during his or her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to the medical
treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect
the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232,
1235 (7th Cir.1988); see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). In sum, the
Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional minimum protection against conditions of
confinement which constitute health threats, but does not address those conditions which cause
-14-

the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9-10 (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A Plaintiff must first plead facts
which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine
discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the
protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A Plaintiff must also establish a subjective
element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.
Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good
faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely
on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the
objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Plaintiff fails to allege facts to suggest that the Defendants subjected him to objectively
harsh conditions of confinement. He contends Young, Husty, McCrae and Roque falsely
accused him of misconduct. He alleges Young made antagonistic remarks to him. He alleges
Haynes and Dean broke up a fight and handcuffed him and not the other inmate. He claims
Benson presided over his first conduct hearing and dismissed the charges against him. These
conditions may be annoying or uncomfortable, but they did not endanger Plaintiff’s immediate

-15-

health or safety. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against the remaining Defendants are
dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen (ECF No. 6) is granted. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration (ECF No. 5) of the Court’s denial of his request for additional time to pay the
filing fee is denied as moot. Plaintiff paid the filing fee on June 14, 2016.
The Court has screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s procedural due process, substantive due process and Eighth Amendment claims are
dismissed against all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. His retaliation claims are
dismissed against Husty, McCrae, Haynes, Dean, Roque, Benson, Rose and Granson. All
claims pertaining to events occurring prior to May 12, 2014 are dismissed. The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.1 This action shall proceed solely on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Young pertaining
to Young’s alleged conduct after May 12, 2014. The Clerk’s Office is directed to forward the
appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process on Young and shall include a
copy of this Order in the documents to be served upon that Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: September 19, 2016
1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
-16-