Gray v. McCormick et al

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order For the reasons stated in the Order, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2 ) is granted and this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Related document 1 . Signed by Judge Dan Aaron Polster on 7/14/2016. (K,K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

SIR RICHARD ERIN GRAY, SR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEAN EILEEN MCCORMICK, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:16 CV 1719
Judge Dan Aaron Polster

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Sir Richard Erin Gray, Sr., of Warner Robins, Georgia, filed this action
against the following residents and entities of Tennessee: Jean Eileen McCormick, Bradley T.
Bracey, W.H. Taylor Harrold Russell Taylor, the Center for Disease Control in Nashville,
Tennessee, Marc. C. Scriggs, the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department, the CJC, the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Department, the State of Tennessee, the City of Nashville, Mark
Fishburn, William Faimon, Gale Robinson, Diane Turner, William Higgins, and Cheryl
Blackburn. He asserts, without explanation, that the Defendants violated 51 criminal statutes, 8
securities and exchange statutes, the Privacy Act, and committed copyright infringement. He
seeks monetary damages.
Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2). That
Application is granted.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains very few factual allegations. He contends he moved to
Tennessee to attend college, “unaware of his presence in special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He indicates he recently discovered the
Defendants “solicited, victimized and caused great harm and mayhem to [him], his family,
children and any other well-wishers.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). He alleges the Defendants “broke
every constitution protection of Plaintiff as an agenda to lead and [unintelligible] him and future
generations into peonage and slavery.” (ECF NO. 1 at 2). He states he was not the only person
affected by the Defendants’ actions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a
Defendant is immune from suit or when a Plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U .S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when
the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough
-2-

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). The Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986).
The Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a Defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing Court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, this Court does not appear to be the proper venue for this case. The
Plaintiff is a resident of Georgia suing individuals and entities from Tennessee for actions that
appear to have occurred in Tennessee. This case has no apparent connection to the Northern
District of Ohio.
A civil action may be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where any Defendant
resides, if all Defendants reside in the District in which the Court is located, (2) a judicial
-3-

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided by this
section, any judicial district in which any Defendant is subject to the Court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the action brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Based on these criteria, the
only plausible District where this action could be brought is the Middle District of Tennessee.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that an improperly venued action shall be dismissed
unless it is “in the interest of justice” that it be transferred to a district or division in which it
could have been brought. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not meet the basic pleading
requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8, the Court finds that it would not be in the
interest of justice to transfer this matter, and this action is therefore dismissed.
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.1991), the Court is not required to conjure
up unpled allegations. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th
Cir. 2008). The Complaint must give the Defendants fair notice of what the Plaintiff’s claims
are and the grounds upon which they rest. Plaintiff does not indicate what any of the
Defendants did to violate the numerous statutes he cites. At best, his claims are stated solely as
legal conclusions, unsupported by factual allegations. The Complaint does not satisfy the
minimum pleading requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is
granted and this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies,
-4-

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Dan Aaron Polster
7/14/2016
Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge

1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
-5-