Mason v. Polster et al

Filing 7

Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Related doc #2 ) is granted. Action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 1/24/2017. (H,CM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

VALERIE MASON,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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HONORABLE DAN A POLSTER, et al., )
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1: 16 CV 2924
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:
Seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, pro se Plaintiff Valerie Mason has filed a
Complaint in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, asserting “Violation of Constitutional
Rights” against United States District Court Judge Dan A. Polster, TAP Pharmaceutical
Products, Inc. (“TAP”), and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (“Kaiser”) (Doc. No. 1). To
the extent it is comprehensible, the Complaint complains of the final decision and rulings
made by Judge Polster in a previous action the Plaintiff filed against TAP, Kaiser, and Takeda
Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. See Mason v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., et al., Case

No. 1: 15 CV 1283. The Plaintiff originally filed Case No. 1: 15 CV 1283 in state court,
alleging she was injured in 1995 after receiving injections of Lupron without iron therapy or
proper monitoring of her blood levels. After the Defendants removed the case to federal
court, Judge Polster dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations,
among other reasons.
The Plaintiff appealed the District Court’s dismissal of her action and asserted that
Judge Polster should have recused himself in her case. After she filed her Notice of Appeal,
she also filed Motions in the District Court for Reconsideration and Recusal, both of which
Judge Polster denied. The Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed Judge Polster’s judgment
dismissing her Complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds. It declined to address her claim
regarding recusal because she filed her motion for recusal in the District Court only after she
had filed her Notice of Appeal.
In her current Complaint, the Plaintiff asks that “Judge Polster be recused and all
orders he has ruled upon” in Case No. 1: 15 CV 1283 “be vacated and reversed” and that she
be awarded “court costs.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3.)
Although filings by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), federal district courts are required, under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B), to screen all in forma pauperis actions and dismiss before service any such
action that the Court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from the relief sought.
See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010). A complaint
“is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
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490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
This action is frivolous and must be dismissed.
To the extent the Plaintiff is asking the Court to re-litigate matters already decided in
Case No 1: 15 CV 1283, her action is barred by res judicata. See Kane v. Magna Mixer, 71
F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 1995) (under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from re-litigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action). Further, this Court has no authority to review or reverse rulings or
decisions of another District Court, which must be challenged through appeal. See Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. The Plaintiff has already pursued an appeal of the matters
she raises in this action, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of her
prior action. This Court has no authority or jurisdiction to review any decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is
granted, and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
United States District Judge
Dated: January 24, 2017

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