Robinson v. Peck
Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 4/19/17 granting plaintiff's motion and dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in this order. (Related Doc. 5 ) (D,MA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
MR. JAMES M. PECK, C.E.O.,
CASE NO. 1:17-CV-223
OPINION & ORDER
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This action was originally filed by pro se plaintiff Phillip Robinson in the Cleveland
Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, against defendant James M. Peck (“Mr. Peck” or
“defendant”), Chief Executive Officer of the consumer reporting agency Trans Union, LLC.
(Trans Union). The complaint alleges claims “for negligence and willful failure to reinvestigate
the disputed entries on [his] credit report” in “violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,”
“Defamation,” and “Negligent Enablement of identity fraud.” (See ECF No. 1-2 at 2.) The
defendant removed the action to federal court on the basis of the federal claim, and has filed
motion to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 5.) The plaintiff has not opposed the motion.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A complaint is subject to dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if it fails to state claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a
dismissal, a complaint “must present ‘enough facts to state claim to relief that is plausible on its
face’” when its factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). Although pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are “liberally
construed” and held to a less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading
requirements and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See Erwin v.
Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff’s complaint is purely conclusory and does not contain factual allegations
reasonably suggesting a plausible claim against, or any conduct by, the defendant. The
complaint does not allege facts suggesting Mr. Peck had any personal involvement in handling
disputes the plaintiff may have had with Trans Union regarding entries on his credit report, and
“individual defendants cannot be held liable [under the FCRA] solely because they are the chief
executive officers” of a consumer reporting agency. Sloan v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 10-10356,
2010 WL 1949621, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No.
10-10356, 2010 WL 1949622 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss FCRA
claim against former Trans Union CEO). See also McNack v. Smith, et al., No. 2:14-CV-04810,
2015 WL 7302218, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) (dismissing FCRA claims against chief
executive officers). Likewise, the complaint does not allege any facts suggesting Mr. Peck
made or participated in defamatory statements or engaged in any negligent conduct that enabled
identify fraud. Given the absence of factual allegations in the complaint, the Court finds the
defendant’s motion well-taken.
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint is granted, and
this action is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 19, 2017
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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