Wolfe v. Mohr et al

Filing 6

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/11/17 dismissing plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Plaintiff's remaining pending motions are denied as moot. The Courtfurther certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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JASON PAUL WOLFE,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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GARY MOHR, et al.,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:17-CV-595

OPINION & ORDER

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pro se plaintiff Jason Paul Wolfe, has filed a complaint pursuant to “42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
85, 86, and 88” against multiple Ohio prison officials and employees and medical staff. (Doc.
No. 1.) With his complaint, he filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which has
been granted by separate order, and motions for leave to attach copies of summons and
complaints (Doc. No. 3) and for appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 4). For the reasons stated
below, the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed and his remaining pending motions are denied.
Allegations
Plaintiff alleges he is an Ohio prisoner incarcerated in the Lake Erie Correctional
Institution, serving an eighteen year sentence for aggravated robbery and receiving stolen
property. He contends the defendant prison officials, employees and various medical staff have
“conspired together” to deprive him of constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Although his
allegations are disjointed and unclear, he contends he was improperly placed on suicide

prevention protocol while incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Institution rather than being
properly treated for complaints of abdominal pain. The alleged basis for his action is that
“[p]eople acting under color of law” took him to an outside hospital (Marion General Hospital)
for medical attention ostensibly for complaints of abdominal pain, but defrauded him into
signing medical consent forms and then injected him with “caustic chemicals, used to kill
animals and [for] death penalty type of treatments” as well as “other substances,” such as
“naturally occur[r]ing biological weapons.” (Id. at ¶ 66.) He contends this was done, and he
was injected with these substances, maliciously and intentionally to cause him serious and
irreparable harm and deprive him of life. (Id. at ¶ 22.) He further alleges that defendants
“[f]alsified documentation to the BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS” to make it
appear “as if [he were] dead, and as if it happened by self inflicted hanging.” (Id. at ¶ 66.) He
alleges that after he was injected with caustic chemicals, he was taken back into the care of the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, transferred “through two facilities off the
record, though [he] was listed as dead and in state agencies[’] files and records,” and that
“[n]obody did any thing to help [him],” but instead, “took active steps to conceal and cover up
what had occur[r]ed.” (Id.)
Asserting constitutional and other violations, plaintiff seeks damages and various
declaratory and injunctive relief.
Law and Analysis
When a plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, the court is required to
construe his complaint indulgently and hold it to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d

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708, 715 (6th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, even pro se complaints must satisfy basic pleading
requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Federal district courts are required, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to
screen all in forma pauperis actions and actions in which prisoners seek redress from
governmental officials or employees, and to dismiss any such action that the court determines is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A).
A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The “term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a
complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual
allegation.” Id. In other words, dismissal for frivolousness is appropriate where the alleged
“claims describ[e] fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are
all too familiar.” Id. at 328. See also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (dismissal is
appropriate when the “facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”).
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint – premised on allegations that he
was defrauded into signing medical consent forms so that he could be injected with caustic
euthanasia drugs, and that public and medical records were falsified to indicate he was dead as a
result of a self-inflicted hanging – falls within the realm of frivolousness. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Ralles, No. 2:14-CV-259, 2015 WL 566687 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2015) (dismissing complaint

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alleging that prison doctors and employees awakened him from his sleep by administering
injections of unknown substances which altered his heart rate and mind set); Henry v. Caruso,
No. 13-12881, 2014 WL 525032 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2014) (dismissing complaint premised on
allegations that prison officials surgically implanted transmission devices into plaintiff’s neck).
Conclusion
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. His remaining pending motions are denied as moot. The Court
further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not
be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2017

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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