Noll v. Club Fit, Ltd.

Filing 20

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/24/17 denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's gender discrimination claim for the reasons set forth in this order. (Related Docs. 8 , 10 , and 19 ) (D,MA)

Case: 1:17-cv-00886-JG Doc #: 20 Filed: 08/24/17 1 of 7. PageID #: 207

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
------------------------------------------------------:
COURTNEY NOLL,
:
Case No. 1:17-CV-886
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION & ORDER
:
[Resolving Doc. 8, 10, 19]
CLUB FIT, LTD.,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
------------------------------------------------------JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Courtney Noll brings gender discrimination and Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) claims against her former employer, Defendant Club Fit, LTD.1 Defendant Club Fit
moves to dismiss Plaintiff Noll’s gender discrimination claim for failure to state a claim.2
For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This case concerns whether Plaintiff Courtney Noll’s supervisor, Club Fit CEO Phillip
Stotter, fired Noll because of her gender, her engagement to be married, and her plans to have
children.
Plaintiff Noll worked at Club Fit from June 7, 2016 through January 4, 2017 as an
Operations Manager.3 During that time, she reported to Club Fit’s CEO Phillip Stotter.4
Plaintiff Noll alleges that Stotter “became aware that Noll had a serious boyfriend and the
couple was close to be engaged.”5 In November 2016, Noll says Stotter “confront[ed] her about

1

Doc. 1.
Doc. 8. Plaintiff Noll opposes. Doc 10. Defendant replies. Doc. 19.
3
Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17.
4
Id. at ¶ 18.
5
Id. at ¶ 34.
2

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Case No. 1:17-CV-886
Gwin, J.
the relationship.”6 He “pulled Noll into his office and questioned her about her future with the
company.”7 Specifically, Stotter asked Noll if her job at Club Fit was “just a bridge until [she got]
married and ha[d] kids.”8 According to Noll, Stotter said if Noll viewed her job that way, he
“d[id]n’t think it is the right fit.”9 Noll says she responded to Stotter that she “did not plan on
leaving the company.”10
Noll says she was “extremely offended by Stotter interrogating her about whether she was
going to get married and have children and equating her starting a family with her not being a
committed employee.”11 Further, Noll “felt that Stotter’s questions would never be asked of a male
employee in her situation.”12
On December 30, 2016, Noll became engaged to be married.13 On January 2, 2017, Stotter
became aware of Noll’s engagement and sent Noll a text message congratulating her.14
The next day, Stotter again pulled Noll into his office and “berated her about her future
with Club Fit.”15 Stotter again asked if Noll planned to stay at Club Fit and accused her of seeming
“miserable” at work.16 Noll says she again told Stotter that she planned to stay at Club Fit despite
her recent engagement.17

6

Id. at ¶ 35.
Id. at ¶ 36.
8
Id. at ¶ 37.
9
Id.
10
Id. at ¶ 38.
11
Id. at ¶ 39.
12
Id. at ¶ 40.
13
Id. at ¶ 41.
14
Id. at ¶ 42.
15
Id. at ¶ 43.
16
Id. at ¶ 44.
17
Id. at ¶ 45.
7

2

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Gwin, J.
The following day, January 4, 2017, Stotter fired Noll.18 Plaintiff Noll notes Stotter fired
her one month after “Stotter threatened Noll’s employment if she was planning on getting married
and having children, and two days after he found out she was engaged to be married.”19
On April 26, 2017, Noll filed a complaint against Defendant Club Fit, LTD, for gender
discrimination under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02 and overtime compensation under the FLSA.20
On June 26, 2017, Defendant Club Fit filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Noll’s gender
discrimination claim for failure to state a claim.21 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion. 22
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”23 The plausibility
requirement is not a “probability requirement.”24 The Plaintiff need not try to prove her case in the
complaint. But there must be “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted
unlawfully.”25
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides the general pleading standard and only requires
that a complaint “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”26 “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions.”27 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

Noll alleges Stotter said: “This just isn’t working out. Give me your keys and we are done here.” Id. at ¶ 46.
Id.
20
Doc. 1.
21
Doc. 8.
22
Doc. 10.
23
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
24
Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556).
25
Id.
26
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
27
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citations omitted).
18
19

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court should assume the[] veracity” of “well-pleaded factual allegations,” but need not accept a
plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.28
III. DISCUSSION
A. Gender Discrimination Claim
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff Noll brings a gender-plus claim.
Defendant Club Fit argues Plaintiff brings a “gender-plus claim,” meaning Plaintiff was
discriminated against not solely based on gender, but based on her gender coupled with another
characteristic.29 Defendant reads Plaintiff’s claim to be that she was discriminated against because
she was engaged.30
Plaintiff Noll responds that Defendant’s motion ignores a central part of her claim. In her
Complaint, Plaintiff said that Defendant discriminated against her not only for her engagement,
but also for her future plans to have children.31 Plaintiff says that discriminating against a female
for plans to have children is gender discrimination, not “gender-plus” discrimination.32
Ohio’s employment discrimination statute prohibits discrimination based on a person’s
sex.33 In Ohio, “federal case law interpreting Title VII . . . is generally applicable to cases involving
alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.”34
With respect to Title VII, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that gender
discrimination claims based on childbearing capacity fall under [the statute’s] protection.” 35

28

Id. at 679.
Doc. 8 at 1.
30
Id.
31
Doc. 10 at 4.
32
Id.
33
Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A).
34
See, e.g., Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 575 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ohio 1991).
35
See Ingarra v. Ross Educ., LLC, No. 13-CV-10882, 2014 WL 688185, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2014) (citing
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1991)).
29

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In Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court considered whether a “fetal
protection policy” excluding women from jobs because they were capable of pregnancy
constituted sex discrimination.36 The policy classified people on the basis of childbearing capacity
rather than fertility. Because only women possess the former characteristic, the Court found that
the policy “must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex
discrimination.”37
Courts of Appeals across the country have read Johnson Controls to mean that “classifying
employees on the basis of childbearing capacity, whether or not they were already pregnant, ‘must
be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex discrimination.’”38
Therefore, where a woman “alleges that she was targeted for her intent to become
pregnant,” she brings a sex discrimination claim, not a gender-plus claim.39
To successfully plead a sex discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing she
is a member of a protected class; suffered an adverse employment action; was qualified for the
position; and that a similarly-situated person outside of the protected class was treated more
favorably than she was.40
Plaintiff’s allegations make out a gender discrimination claim on the basis of childbearing
capacity. Stotter’s alleged comments concern Plaintiff Noll’s plans to have children. Plaintiff
Noll also alleges she is a woman who was fired from a job she was otherwise qualified for, and

36

Int'l Union, 499 U.S. at 191-92.
Id. at 199.
38
In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 946 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Int'l Union, 499 U.S.
at 199); Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Because adverse employment action based
on childbearing capacity will always result in ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would
be different,’ [the allegation] present[s] a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII”) (internal citation
omitted).
39
See Ingarra, 2014 WL 688185, at *4.
40
Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2010).
37

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felt that a male in her situation would not have suffered the same fate. These allegations support
a prima facie case for gender discrimination.
B. Sufficiency of Allegations
The Court next addresses Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged
a gender discrimination claim. Defendant’s arguments misconstrue Plaintiff’s pleading burden.
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not provided any “direct evidence” of
discrimination as a matter of law.41 Defendant argues that Stotter’s statements to Noll “could only
be construed to relate to childbearing if taken out of context.”42 However, the requirement to bring
“direct evidence” concerns Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, not her pleading burden.43 In Title VII
discrimination cases, “the ordinary rules of notice pleading apply.”44
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations actually demonstrate that Defendant was
not discriminating based on her gender.45 These arguments are not persuasive because, on a motion
to dismiss, the Court views the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.46
Lastly, Defendant’s citation to two lengthy complaints to support its arguments have no
bearing on this case.47 Neither of those cases involved allegations of gender discrimination based
on child-bearing capacity.48
Rather, Plaintiff has alleged that Stotter made specific statements regarding her
childbearing capacity before firing her. Thus, assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true and viewing

41

Doc. 19 at 14-15.
Id. at 14.
43
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002); see also Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir.
2012).
44
Keys, 684 F.3d at 609.
45
Defendant argues that Stotter provided a nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Doc. 19 at 14-15.
Defendant also argues that the close proximity between Stotter’s knowledge of Noll’s engagement and Noll’s
termination illustrates that Stotter terminated Noll for “gender-neutral reasons associated with being engaged.” Id.
46
See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006).
47
Doc. 8 at 8-12.
48
See Doc. 8-1 (concerning gender and race discrimination based on being an Asian American male); Doc. 8-2
(concerning discrimination based on Fair Housing Act violation).
42

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them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
a gender discrimination claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendant Club Fit’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2017

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7