Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 18

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; the case is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice (Related document 1 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert on 8/8/18. (S,AA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
EDITH MARTIN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL1,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
)
)
Defendant.
)

CASE NO. 1:17CV944
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Edith Martin (“Plaintiff”) requests judicial review of the Commissioner of Social
Security Administration’s (“Defendant”) decision denying her application for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”).2 ECF Dkt. #1. In her brief on the merits, filed on September 21, 2017, Plaintiff
asserts that: (A) the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to adequately evaluate the findings of
the examining psychologists when making the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding; (B) the
ALJ issued an RFC finding that is not supported by substantial evidence; and (C) that new and
material evidence warrants remand. ECF Dkt. #15. Defendant filed a brief on the merits on October
20, 2017. ECF Dkt. #17. Plaintiff did not file a reply.
For the following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ and dismisses the
instant case in its entirety with prejudice.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1

On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill became the acting Commissioner of Social Security,
replacing Carolyn W. Colvin.
2

At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to August 13, 2014, and withdrew her claim
for disability insurance benefits. ECF Dkt. #9 at 40-41, 250.

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and SSI, alleging
disability beginning on December 31, 2007. ECF Dkt. #9 (“Tr.”) at 18.3 The claims were denied
initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 127, 160. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an
ALJ, which was held on March 16, 2016. Id. at 36. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged
onset date to August, 13, 2014, and withdrew her claim for DIB. Id. at 40-41, 250. On April 26,
2016, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 15. Subsequently,
the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Id. at 1. Accordingly, the decision issued
by the ALJ on April 26, 2016, stands as the final decision.
The instant suit was filed by Plaintiff on May 4, 2017. ECF Dkt. #1. Plaintiff filed a brief
on the merits on September 21, 2017. ECF Dkt. #15. Defendant filed a response brief on October
20, 2017. ECF Dkt. #17. Plaintiff did not filed a reply brief.
II.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
On April 26, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. at

15. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 13,
2014, the application date. Id. at 20. Continuing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: morbid obesity; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine;
depressive disorder; bipolar disorder; obstructive sleep apnea; severe tendinosis and partial tear of
the subcapularis tendon on the left; personality disorder; and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at
21. The ALJ then stated that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 22.
After consideration of the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c) with the following additional limitations:
occasionally lift and carry fifty pounds; frequently lift and carry twenty-five pounds; sit for six

3

All citations to the Transcript refer to the page numbers assigned when the Transcript was filed in
the CM/ECF system rather than the page numbers assigned when the Transcript was compiled. This allows
the Court and the parties to easily reference the Transcript as the page numbers of the .PDF file containing
the Transcript correspond to the page numbers assigned when the Transcript was filed in the CM/ECF system.

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hours; walk for six hours; push and pull as much as she could lift or carry; occasionally reach
overhead on the left; frequently reach in all other directions on the left; frequently climb ramps and
stairs; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally stoop; frequently crouch, kneel,
balance, and crawl; occasional exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or moving
mechanical parts; occasionally operate a motor vehicle; simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but not
at a production rate pace (i.e., assembly line work); simple work-related decisions using her
judgment and dealing with changes in work setting; frequently interact with supervisors; and
occasionally interact with co-workers and the public. Id. at 23-24.
The ALJ then stated that Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work, was an
individual closely approaching advanced age on the date the application was filed, had a limited
education, and was able to communicate in English. Tr. at 28. Next, the ALJ indicated that the
transferability of job skills was not material to the determination because the Medical-Vocational
Rules supported a finding of not disabled. Id. Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ stated that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform. Id. For these reasons, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since August 13, 2014, the date the
application was filed. Id. at 29.
III.

STEPS TO EVALUATE ENTITLEMENT TO SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
An ALJ must proceed through the required sequential steps for evaluating entitlement to

social security benefits. These steps are:
1.

An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity
will not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b) (1992));

2.

An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found to
be “disabled” (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) (1992));

3.

If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment
which meets the duration requirement, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 and
416.909 (1992), and which meets or is equivalent to a listed impairment in
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, a finding of disabled will be made
without consideration of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and
416.920(d) (1992));

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4.

If an individual is capable of performing the kind of work he or she has done
in the past, a finding of “not disabled” must be made (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e) and 416.920(e) (1992));

5.

If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of
the kind of work he or she has done in the past, other factors including age,
education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be
considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f) and 416.920(f) (1992)).

Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1992). The claimant has the burden to go forward
with the evidence in the first four steps and the Commissioner has the burden in the fifth step. Moon
v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990).
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ weighs the evidence, resolves any conflicts, and

makes a determination of disability. This Court’s review of such a determination is limited in scope
by § 205 of the Act, which states that the “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Therefore, this
Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings
of the Commissioner and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Abbott v.
Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990).
The substantial-evidence standard requires the Court to affirm the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937, citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (internal citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.
2007). Accordingly, when substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding
must be affirmed, even if a preponderance of the evidence exists in the record upon which the ALJ
could have found plaintiff disabled. The substantial evidence standard creates a “‘zone of choice’
within which [an ALJ] can act without the fear of court interference.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d
762, 773 (6th Cir.2001). However, an ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations “denotes
a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon

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the record.” Cole, supra, citing Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir.2009)
(internal citations omitted).
V.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Mental RFC

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “failed to utilize appropriate standards and adequately evaluate
the findings and opinion of Social Security’s examining consultants.” ECF Dkr. #15 at 10. First,
Plaintiff states that the ALJ erred in giving only partial weight to the opinion of Michael Faust,
Ph.D., a consultative psychologist. Id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s rationale that Dr. Faust
“did not specifically opine to what extent that limitations apply and was inconsistent with
[Plaintiff’s] testimony” was erroneous. Id. Continuing, Plaintiff asserts that this analysis was
superficial and that it included the ALJ’s medical conclusions and did not incorporate the
appropriate standards, and thus the ALJ did not provide a legally sufficient basis for the weight
assigned to the opinion of Dr. Faust. Id.
Next, Plaintiff states “[i]n weighing opinions of non-treating sources, Social Security
regulations require the ALJ to apply the same level of scrutiny as afforded to treating source
opinions.” ECF Dkt. #15 at 11 (citing Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir.
2013)). Plaintiff also avers that an ALJ may not make medical judgments and that the ALJ
improperly exercised medical expertise by interpreting raw data to determine Plaintiff’s RFC, which
was not supported by a “treating physical [RFC] assessment.” Id. at 12. Continuing, Plaintiff states
that the ALJ only assigned partial weight to the opinion from Dr. Faust and that this was error. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC was “primarily based on [the ALJ’s]
own interpretation of medical examination findings and test results” as prohibited by the Sixth
Circuit.

Id. at 12-13 (citing Messe v. Barnhart, 192 F. App’x 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 13.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ assigned great weight to the opinion of David V.
House, Ph.D., a consultative psychologist, but failed to credit the limitations identified by Dr. House.
ECF Dkt. #15 at 13. Plaintiff states that the Sixth Circuit has made clear that ALJs may not “cherry
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pick” from the record. Id. (citing Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 724 (6th Cir. 2014)
(internal citations omitted)). Continuing, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “purportedly gave great
weight to Dr. House’s opinion, yet the ALJ’s finding regarding [Plaintiff’s] mental [RFC] does not
address [Plaintiff’s] dysfunction and disruption in a work environment and her poor prognosis.” Id.
at 14. According to Plaintiff, this selective parsing of the record requires remand. Id.
Defendant contends that the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence and other
evidence of record when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. ECF Dkt. #17 at 17. Specifically, Defendant
asserts that the ALJ considered Dr. Faust’s opinion in the context of the record as a whole and
properly assigned it partial weight, noting that it was partially consistent with the record. Id. at 18.
Defendant states that the ALJ considered Dr. Faust’s examination report and findings, and ultimately
assigned the opinion partial weight since the opinion was partially consistent with the examination
findings and the record as a whole and some of Dr. Faust’s findings were inconsistent with evidence
in the treating records. Id. at 19. Further, Defendant indicates that the ALJ stated that Dr. Faust’s
opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own representations that she: worked as a cook and planned
to attend culinary school; visited with family; socialized with others; watched football with friends;
walked to the corner store; used a mobile library; used public transportation; left her apartment to
visit her mother daily; attended high-school equivalency classes two days per week; performed
court-ordered community service three days per week; and attended church weekly. Id.
Defendant also states that Plaintiff’s criticism of the ALJ’s analysis on the basis of Gayheart
is misplaced and that although the factors for consideration are the same, the level of deference
assigned to the opinion and the requirements for explaining the weight assigned to a treating source
versus a non-treating source are not the same. ECF Dkt. #17 at 20. Defendant also asserts that the
ALJ did not interpret raw medical data when referring to findings made by a physician and that it
is the ALJ’s job to evaluate the medical opinion evidence based on its consistency with the record
as a whole. Id. Additionally, Defendant avers that the ALJ explained the weight assigned to Dr.
House’s opinion and assigned the limitations that were found to be supported by the evidence in the
RFC finding. Id. at 21.

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Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s argument that
Gayheart supports the proposition that “[i]n weighing the opinions of treating sources, Social
Security regulations require the ALJ to apply the same level of scrutiny as afforded to treating
source opinions” is not supported by that case. ECF Dkt. #15 at 11. The ALJ was not procedurally
required to provided “good reasons” for discounting the weight assigned to non-treating sources.
See Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376; Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514-15 (6th Cir. 2010);
Smith v. Comm’r or Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007).
Regarding the opinion of Dr. Faust, the ALJ supported the assignment of partial weight with
substantial evidence. After explaining that the global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score
provided by Dr. Faust was assigned little weight since it was a highly subjective rating, as were all
GAF scores in the record, the ALJ stated the following:
Regarding the remainder of Dr. Faust’s opinion, the undersigned gives it partial
weight, because it is partially consistent with the record as a whole. For example, his
opinion that [Plaintiff] may have difficulty recalling tasks is consistent with
[Plaintiff’s] difficulty in performing serial 7s during her consultative examination.
His opinion that she would have difficulty responding to others is consistent with
[Plaintiff’s] testimony that she feels paranoid and uncomfortable around people.
However, Dr. Faust did not specifically opine to what extent these limitations apply.
Based on [Plaintiff] additional testimony that she gets together with family for the
holidays and socializes with friends in her apartment building and from time-to-time
as well as utilizes public transportation, the undersigned more specifically find that
[Plaintiff] could occasionally interact with co-workers and the public and that she can
occasionally deal with changes in the work setting. Overall, however, the
undersigned gives this opinion partial weight. [sic]
Tr. at 26 (internal citation omitted). As for Dr. House’s opinion, the ALJ stated the following:
The undersigned gives Dr. House’s opinion great weight, because it is generally
consistent with the record as a whole. For example, his opinion that [Plaintiff] can
follow simple, multi-step tasks is consistent with [Plaintiff’s] ability to read books
and also with her aspiration of attending culinary school. His opinion that [Plaintiff]
can interact with authorities on a short-term basis is consistent with her ability to
occasionally interact with friends and family as well as use public transportation.
Finally, the undersigned has also considered Dr. House’s program knowledge when
assessing this opinion with great weight.
Id. at 27 (internal citation omitted).
As stated above, the substantial-evidence standard requires the Court to affirm the
Commissioner’s findings if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cole, 661 F.3d at 937 (internal citation omitted).

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Accordingly, when substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding must be
affirmed, even if a preponderance of the evidence exists in the record upon which the ALJ could
have found plaintiff disabled. In the instant case, the ALJ cited substantial evidence to support the
weight assigned to the opinions of Dr. Faust and Dr. House. The ALJ explained why partial weight
was assigned to Dr. Faust’s opinion, namely, that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the
limitations opined by Dr. Faust as to her ability to interact with and feel comfortable around others.
Tr. at 26. Further, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ improperly supplanted the medical evidence
is unconvincing because the ALJ summarized Dr. Faust’s opinion and then properly indicated which
parts of that opinion were contradicted by Plaintiff’s testimony. These findings did not supplant any
medical evidence. Rather than supersede the opinion of a medical source, the ALJ simply compared
a medical source opinion with Plaintiff’s own statements and found the opinion was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s testimony. This is not cause for remand.
Moving to Dr. House’s opinion, the ALJ stated that great weight was assigned to this opinion
because it was generally consistent with the record as a whole. Tr. at 27. Plaintiff asserts that
despite assigning great weight to Dr. Faust’s opinion, the ALJ “cherry picked” portions of the
opinion. ECF Dkt. #15 at 13. Dr. House was a psychological consultant and the ALJ was under no
special duty to adopt each of the findings contained in this opinion. Plaintiff fails to cite any
precedent supporting the position that the ALJ was required to meet any standard other than
substantial evidence regarding the weight assigned to Dr. House’s opinion, or that the ALJ was
required to adopt all of Dr. House’s findings after assigning the opinion great weight. The ALJ
indicated that Dr. House’s opinion was generally consistent with the record as a whole and provided
examples of these consistencies, as stated above. Accordingly, the ALJ was not obligated to address
each portion of Dr. House’s opinion and supported the assignment of great weight to Dr. House’s
opinion with substantial evidence. For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision
regarding the opinions of Dr. Faust and Dr. House is supported by substantial evidence.
B.

Physical RFC

Next, Plaintiff asserts that “the ALJ’s determination that she had the RFC for medium work
is not supported by substantial evidence and the opinion of Social Security’s examining consultant.”
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ECF Dkt. #15 at 14. Plaintiff states that the ALJ’s determination that she could perform medium
work with additional limitations is inconsistent with the opinion of Dorothy A. Bradford, M.D., a
consultative examining physician. Id. at 15. Specifically, Plaintiff avers:
The ALJ’s assumption that Dr. Bradford’s opinion was premised on [Plaintiff’s]
testimony, without application of Social Security’s own regulations, is reversible
error requiring remand, particularly since a sedentary [RFC], as found by Dr.
Bradford, entitles [Plaintiff] to a finding of disability pursuant to the medicalvocational rules.
Id. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC finding also lacked the support of substantial evidence, and
cites evidence that she believes contradicts the ALJ’s RFC finding. Id. at 15-17. Continuing,
Plaintiff states that “[r]ather than obtain an updated medical opinion regarding [Plaintiff’s RFC], the
ALJ relied on the opinions of reviewing physicians who did not have the opportunity to review the
majority of the medical evidence.” Id. at 17 (citing Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:13CV1253,
2014 WL 1874055 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2014)). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ also erred
in failing to address a treatment note from Shanail R. Berry, M.D., indicating that Plaintiff had
difficulty walking for more than fifteen to twenty minutes, as a medical opinion. Id. at 17-18 (citing
Craddock v. Colvin, No. 1:14CV1328, 2015 WL 4664006, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2015)).
Defendant contends that the ALJ properly assigned Dr. Bradford’s opinion little weight and
explained that the opinion was not supported by Dr. Bradford’s own examination record and
appeared to be based on Plaintiff’s subjective allegations rather than objective evidence. ECF Dkt.
#17 at 21. Continuing, Defendant states that Dr. Bradford opined that Plaintiff was limited to
sedentary activity without an explanation or support from objective findings, and that the ALJ
recognized this inconsistency. Id. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff: does not explain how
the relevant factors for consideration would warrant assigning greater weight to Dr. Bradford’s
opinion; fails to offer any explanation of how the treatment records she cites are inconsistent with
medium work; and fails to identify any objective medical findings or medical opinions indicating
Plaintiff could not perform medium work. Id. at 22. Defendant avers that the ALJ’s RFC finding
was based on the record as a whole and that the ALJ properly considered the abundance of evidence
showing that Plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with her allegations of disability. Finally,
Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence.
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Plaintiff’s argument fails. The ALJ stated the following, in relevant part, regarding
Plaintiff’s physical RFC:
On June 13, 2013, [Plaintiff] had an examination with Dorothy Bradford, M.D.
During that examination, [Plaintiff] stated that she has pain after walking one block.
She estimated that she could stand for 5 minutes and lift 5 pounds. Dr. Bradford
opined that [Plaintiff] should be limited to sedentary work.
The undersigned gives Dr. Bradford’s opinion little weight. The doctor’s own
examination of [Plaintiff] stated that [Plaintiff] had normal gait. The doctor also
noted that [Plaintiff[ had full range of motion in her lumbar spine. Accordingly, it
appears that Dr. Bradford’s quite restrictive opinion of [Plaintiff] is contrary to her
own treatment notes indicating a normal evaluation of [Plaintiff]. The doctor relied
on [Plaintiff’s] allegations rather than objective medical evidence when opining
sedentary work. Therefore, the undersigned give Dr. Bradford’s opinion little
weight. . .
Overall, the undersigned has not found [Plaintiff’s] allegations fully consistent with
the evidence. [Plaintiff] testified that she cannot stand for more than 5 or 6 minutes.
However, she also testified that she is able to walk to and from the store. Although
she testified that the store is only one block away, it is highly likely that she would
need to stand or walk more than 5 or 6 minutes to walk to and from the store.
Additionally, there are other records, which show that [Plaintiff] walks 30 minutes
per day 3 days per week. This is not consistent with [Plaintiff’s] testimony that she
can only stand for 5 or 6 minutes. Furthermore, at hearing [sic], she described
performing community service 3 days per week in 4 hour shifts as a condition of her
probation and that she babysat a baby for a friend last year, working 2-3 days per
week for 4-5 hours each day. This evidence is not consistent with her allegation of
disability.
Tr. at 26-27 (internal citations omitted).
The ALJ supported the decision to assign little weight to Dr. Bradford’s opinion with
substantial evidence. Specifically, the ALJ explained that Dr. Bradford’s own treatment notes were
inconsistent with the opined limitations. Further, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Bradford relied on
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which closely resembled Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her
limitations, when forming the opinion. As stated by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s testimony was also
inconsistent with her daily activities. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ assumed that Dr. Bradford’s
opinion “was premised on [Plaintiff’s] testimony, without application of Social Security’s own
regulations” is likewise unpersuasive. ECF Dkt. #15 at 15. The ALJ provided a thorough analysis
of the inconsistencies between Dr. Bradford’s opinion and her treatment notes, and the opinion and
the other evidence of record. See Tr. at 26-27. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Bradford’s opinion.

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Finally, Plaintiff briefly asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to analyze a treatment note
prepared by Dr. Berry reporting that Plaintiff had difficulty standing and walking for more then
fifteen to twenty minutes as an opinion. ECF Dkt. #15 at 18 (citing Craddock, 2015 WL 4664006,
at *2). The case cited by Plaintiff dues not support her apparent contention that every treatment
note should be considered an opinion, but rather supports the proposition that medical records may
contain professional opinions that should be addressed by the ALJ. See Craddock, 2015 WL
4664006, at *2. The portion of the treatment notes now cited by Plaintiff is titled “Progress Notes”
rather than “Impression” or a similar section indicating that Dr. Berry opined that Plaintiff could
only walk for fifteen to twenty minutes. Tr. at 306. In fact, the “Impression” section of the
treatment notes does not limit standing or walking, and Dr. Berry included an activity plan
recommending that Plaintiff keep an “activity log thirty minutes a day and 4 days a week . . . 2 days
of resistence/strengthening exercises per week.” Id. at 311. For these reasons, the undersigned finds
that the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence.
C.

New and Material Evidence

Finally, Plaintiff claims that new evidence, including an updated functional capacity
assessment and a new favorable decision granting disability benefits, proves that this case should
be remanded for additional proceedings. ECF Dkt. #15 at 18. The new evidence proffered by
Plaintiff consists of an RFC assessment dated June 30, 2017, and a notice that SSI benefits had been
granted to Plaintiff dated August 2, 2017. ECF Dkt. #15 at 19; ECF Dkt. #15-1; ECF Dkt. #15-2.
Plaintiff asserts that this new evidence is material and relevant to her disability at the time of the
hearing held on March 16, 2016. ECF Dkt. #15 at 19.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to explain how this evidence relates to the time period
considered in this case. ECF Dkt. #17 at 24. Continuing, Defendant states that, to warrant remand,
there must be a reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have reached a different
disposition of the disability claim if presented with the new evidence. Id. (citing Salyers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 574 F. App’x 595, 597 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted)). Defendant notes that
Plaintiff recognizes that evidence is material only if it concerns a condition during the relevant
period of time. Id. In conclusion, Defendant asserts that the proposed new evidence does not relate
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to the period at issue, August 13, 2014, the amended alleged onset date, through April 26, 2016, the
date of the ALJ’s decision, and therefore is not relevant.
Plaintiff fails to show how the new evidence is material to her alleged disability at the time
the ALJ issued the decision. The new evidence proffered by Plaintiff was created over a year after
the ALJ issued the decision and therefore does not reveal further information about Plaintiff’s ability
to work at the time the ALJ’s decision was issued. See Oliver v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs.,
804 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the evidence now proffered
by Plaintiff is not material to ALJ’s decision that is subject to review in this case and declines to
remand this case for further proceedings.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ and dismisses the

instant case in its entirety with prejudice.

Date: August 8, 2018

/s/George J. Limbert
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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