Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 16

Memorandum and Order that the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Magistrate Judge David A. Ruiz on 9/20/2018. (G,CA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JEROME HARRIS,

Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:17CV1854
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jerome Harris (“Harris” or “claimant”) challenges the final decision
of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. (“Act”). This court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The issue before the court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, conclusive. For the reasons set
forth below, the Commissioner’s final decision is affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 19, 2014, Harris filed an application for SSI benefits, alleging
disability beginning July 15, 2010. (R. 9, Transcript (“Tr.”) at 30, 149-152, 165-167,

178-191.) Harris listed his physical or mental conditions that limit his ability to
work as: “diabetes, alcoholism, knee problems, migraine headaches; diabetes;
mental; alcoholism; physical, legs and hands, sharp pains; high blood pressure.” Id.
at 179. Harris’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at
81-91, 92-103, 104-106. Thereafter, Harris filed a request for a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Id. at 117-118.
The ALJ held the hearing on May 10, 2016. (R. 9, Tr. at 53-80.) Harris
appeared at the hearing, was represented by counsel, and testified. (Id. at 55, 5875.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also attended the hearing and provided testimony.
(Id. at 55, 76-79.) On June 8, 2016, the ALJ issued the decision, applying the
standard five-step sequential analysis to determine whether Harris was disabled.
(R. 9, Tr. at 30-40; see generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).) The ALJ concluded Harris
was not disabled. Id. at 30, 40. The Appeals Council denied Harris’s request for
review, thus rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(R. 9, Tr. at 1-4.)
Harris seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have completed briefing in this case. Harris
presents the following legal issues for the court’s review:
1. Whether substantial evidence supports the residual functional
capacity assessment as determined by the administrative law judge, in
particular manipulative function.
2. Whether the administrative law judge erred by failing to perform a
proper pain analysis.
2

(R. 14, PageID #: 950.)

II. PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Harris was born on ***, 1964, and was 50 years old, which is defined as an
individual closely approaching advanced age, on the application date. (R. 9, Tr. at
38, 58, 149.) Harris has a limited education, and is able to communicate in English.
(R. 9, Tr. at 38, 58-59, 178, 180.) Harris had past work as a roofer, dishwasher, and
packer. (R. 9, Tr. at 60-61, 78, 181.)

III. ALJ’s DECISION
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in his
June 8, 2016, decision:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
July 19, 2014, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative
disc disease of the cervical spine with cord compression and alcohol
abuse-related seizure disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
CFR 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined 20 CFR 416.967(b) except never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; never reach overhead bilaterally; must avoid all
exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights, moving machinery,
and commercial driving.
3

5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR
416.965).
6. The claimant was born on March 13, 1964, and was 50 years old,
which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on
the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in
English (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the
claimant’s past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, since July 19, 2014, the date the application was
filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
(R. 9, Tr. at 32-33, 35, 37-39.)

IV. DISABILITY STANDARD
A claimant is entitled to receive SSI benefits only when he establishes
disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381.
A claimant is considered disabled when he cannot perform “substantial gainful
employment by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.905(a).

4

Social Security Administration regulations require an ALJ to follow a fivestep sequential analysis in making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a); Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir.
2001). The Sixth Circuit has outlined the five steps as follows:
First, the claimant must demonstrate that he has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the period of disability. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must show that he suffers
from a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, if the claimant shows
that his impairment meets or medically equals one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, he is
deemed disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, the ALJ
determines whether, based on the claimant's residual functional
capacity, the claimant can perform his past relevant work, in which
case the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, the
ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant's residual functional
capacity, as well as his age, education, and work experience, the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work, in which case the
claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps, but
the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Walters v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).
Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s benefits decision is limited to a
determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and whether
the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Blakley v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); Richardson v.
5

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Courts have defined “substantial evidence” as
more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance of the evidence.
Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003); Kirk v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). Thus, if the record evidence is of
such a nature that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate support for the
Commissioner’s final benefits determination, then that determination must be
affirmed. Wright, 321 F.3d at 614; Kirk, 667 F.2d at 535.
The Commissioner’s determination must stand if supported by substantial
evidence, regardless of whether this court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute
differently, or substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Bass v.
McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986). This court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, or decide questions of credibility. Wright, 321 F.3d at 614; Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). The court, however, may examine all the
evidence in the record, regardless of whether such evidence was cited in the
Commissioner’s final decision. See Walker v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 884
F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989); Hubbard v. Commissioner, No. 11-11140, 2012 WL
883612, at *5 (E.D. Mich Feb. 27, 2012) (quoting Heston, 245 F.3d at 535).

6

VI. ANALYSIS
A. RFC: Manipulative Function
Harris contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, in particular the lack of
manipulative limitations. 1 (R. 14, PageID #: 950, 959-961.) Harris asserts that
substantial evidence provides a basis for both gross and fine manipulative
limitations. Id. at 960.
The ALJ has the responsibility for reviewing all the evidence in making the
RFC determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2). The ALJ evaluates every medical
opinion received in evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). The ALJ will consider any
statements that have been provided by medical sources, whether or not based on
formal medical examinations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). State agency doctors are
considered highly-qualified experts in disability evaluation, and the ALJ must
consider their evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.913a(b)(1); 416.927(e). Although the ALJ
reviews and considers all the evidence in the record, the responsibility for assessing
the claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ. 20 C.F.R.
§416.946(c).
A determination of disability requires evidence of more than merely the
presence or diagnosis of an impairment; some evidence of the resulting limitation(s)
must also be provided. The mere diagnosis of a condition, for example, does not
The RFC’s sole manipulative limitation provided that Harris could “never
reach overhead bilaterally.” (R. 9, Tr. at 35; see also id. at 77, 99.)
7
1

establish either the condition’s severity or, more importantly, its effect on the
claimant’s functional limitations. Kennedy v. Astrue, No. 06-6582, 2007 WL
2669153, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2007); Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.
1988) (citing cases).
It is the claimant’s burden to prove that he is disabled within the meaning of
the Act, and to establish that his impairments render him unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity. Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990);
Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990); Hubbard v. Commissioner, No.
11-11140, 2012 WL 883612, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL
858636 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2012) (quoting Jones v. Commissioner, 336 F.3d 469,
474 (6th Cir. 2003)); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). Ultimately,
the claimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits. Hubbard,
2012 WL 883612, at *5 (quoting Boyes v. Secretary, HHS, 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir.
1994)).
Harris argues that substantial evidence provides a basis for both gross and
fine manipulative limitations, and the ALJ failed to include any such limitations,
despite objective evidence and examinations which were consistent with the
claimant’s allegations. (R. 14, PageID #: 960.) In support, Harris states that he
reported as early as June 2014 that he felt weak in his hands, and “had pins and
needles sensations in both hands; this sensation continued throughout the record.”
Id. at 961, citing R. 9, Tr. at 257. Harris also states that he had consistent
complaints of numbness, tingling, and pain in his hands, as well as arm pain. Id. at
8

961, citing MER. He had complaints of his hands “locking up,” which was helped at
times by therapy. Id. at 961; see also R. 9, Tr. at 68-70 (hearing testimony). Harris
also reported difficulty writing, using a computer, and holding onto objects, at times
dropping them. Id. at 961; see also R. 9, Tr. at 69-70.
The medical evidence of record cited by Harris shows he had consistent
complaints of shooting pains, tingling, and numbness in his arms and hands. See,
e.g., R. 9, Tr. at 755, 799, 820, 834. At a June 12, 2014, initial visit with Leela
Kolluru, M.D., Harris complained of neck and shoulder pain, weakness in both
hands, as well as chronic pins and needles in fingers of both hands and toes. Id. at
257. Harris also reported a history of alcohol dependence, diabetes mellitus,
hypertension, seizures, and chronic bilateral knee pain. Id. At that appointment,
Harris reported he “drinks around 12 cans of beer a day.” Id.
An EMG performed on March 17, 2015 revealed “evidence of peripheral
polyneuropathy” bilaterally, and “evidence of right ulnar mononeuropathy” at the
elbow (cubital tunnel syndrome), but no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome
(“CTS”). (R. 9, Tr. at 776, 860.) On examination on several occasions in the spring
and summer of 2015, Harris exhibited motor strength of 5/5 in both arms and
hands, but weak grip strength. Id. at 799, 820, 834, 884.
In a March 26, 2015, visit to a Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
(“PM&R”) clinic, Harris’ chief complaint was reported as “neck pain and bilateral
knee pain.” (R. 9, Tr. at 772-773.) His chief complaint was again recorded as “neck
pain and bilateral knee pain” at a subsequent visit to the PM&R clinic on May 27,
9

2015. Id. at 794; see also id. at 880 (Sept. 17, 2015, same). The treatment plan for
Harris at that time “for improvement of function and decrease in symptoms/pain”
was to have a consult for possible “spine surgery for cervical spinal cord
compression,” and a course of medication, including Elavil (commonly prescribed for
depression and anxiety), Gabapentin (for seizure disorders), Tramadol for severe
pain, as needed, and capsacin cream (to relieve neuralgia pain). Id. at 799. No
limitations were placed on Harris’ ability to work, nor on his capacity to handle or
finger. Id.
During a follow-up appointment on June 29, 2015, a prescription for Lyrica
was added, and the Gabapentin was discontinued. (R. 9, Tr. at 821.) No limitations
were placed on Harris’ ability to work, nor on his capacity to handle or finger. Id. at
820-821. At a follow-up appointment on July 29, 2015, the treatment plan
remained the same, to continue the medications prescribed. Id. at 833-834; see also
id. at 884 (same, Sept. 17, 2015).)
In March 2016, Harris visited a physical therapist to address cervical
radiculitis and cervical stenosis of the spine. (R. 9, Tr. at 850.) The therapist noted
complaints of neck pain, and bilateral numbness and shooting pains in Harris’
hands and arms. Id. at 852. The therapist also noted that Harris was independent
in his self-care and activities of daily living. Id. The PT predicted a good prognosis
with a course of physical therapy. Id. at 854.
Opinion evidence in the record is limited. Bradley J. Lewis, M.D., an agency
medical consultant, reviewed claimant’s medical records on September 9, 2014, and
10

completed a physical RFC assessment. (R. 9, Tr. at 86-88.) The doctor found that
claimant had no exertional limitations, but a postural limitation that he could never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, because of a history of seizures. Id. at 86-87. Dr.
Lewis assessed that Harris had no manipulative limitations. Id. at 87. 2
On reconsideration, William Bolz, M.D., completed a physical RFC
assessment on December 3, 2014. (R. 9, Tr. at 97-100.) Dr. Bolz assessed that
claimant has the RFC to perform light work, along with a postural limitation that
he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, because of a history of seizures. Id.
at 98. Dr. Bolz found that claimant had manipulative limitations, but only limited
as to overhead reaching bilaterally, because of degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine. Id. at 99. Dr. Bolz assessed that claimant was unlimited as to gross
manipulation (handling) and fine manipulation (fingering). Id. 3
The ALJ gave “great weight” to the state agency consultants’ physical RFC
assessments “because they are generally consistent with the claimant’s documented
functioning” as found in the record medical evidence. (R. 9, Tr. at 83.)
Harris does not provide any medical opinion that placed any limitations on
his capacity to work, or any limitations on his ability to handle or finger. See
generally R. 14, PageID #: 959-961. Moreover, at the hearing counsel did not ask for

The record indicates that “[t]here is no indication that there is opinion
evidence from any source.” Id. at 88.
2

Again, the record notes that there was no opinion evidence from any source.
Id. at 100.
11
3

a hypothetical question based on manipulative limitations. (R. 9, Tr. at 79.) Harris,
however, asserts that the evidence and his own testimony prove that he has a
significant degree of restriction in handling and fingering. The claimant contends:
Mr. Harris’ nerve conduction study/ electromyogram provided an
objective basis for a limitation in handling. The examinations have
consistently demonstrat[ed] weak grip strength which again provided a
basis for limitations with respect to gross manipulation. Mr. Harris
also reported problems with fine manipulation which again the
polyneuropathy supported by the objective testing which would provide
a basis for limitations in fine manipulations. Moreover, right ulnar
neuropathy would result in some arm limitations.
(R. 14, PageID #: 961.) Counsel, however, cannot provide a medical opinion. 4
Harris has not identified any medical opinion which placed limitations on his gross
manipulation or fine manipulation, nor does he identify any medical opinion which
would support a finding that Harris could not perform any substantial gainful
employment by reason of a medically determined limitation on fingering or
handling. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), (c) (claimant’s burden to furnish
medical and other evidence).
Dr. Lewis and Dr. Bolz both assessed that Harris was unlimited in gross
manipulation and fine manipulation. See R. 9, Tr. at 87 (no manipulative
limitations), 99 (only manipulative limitation concerned overhead reaching). There
was no medical opinion evidence that placed any limitations on claimant’s capacity
“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or
other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,
what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2).
12
4

to work, or any limitations on his ability to handle or finger. It would have been
impermissible for the ALJ to “play doctor” and make his own independent medical
findings. Foss v. Commissioner, No. 1:16CV1907, 2017 WL 2912524, at *8 (N.D.
Ohio June 20, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 2908857 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2017) (citing
Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996), and other cases); see also McCain
v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, No. 01-4074, 2003 WL 932431, at *9 (6th
Cir. Mar. 6, 2003) (citing Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985)).
The ALJ reasonably relied on the state agency consultants’ physical RFC
assessments, which are the only opinion evidence found in the medical evidence of
record. (R. 9, Tr. at 83.) The court finds that the ALJ’s decision on this issue is
supported by substantial evidence.
B. Analysis of Pain
Harris also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to perform a “proper pain
analysis.” (R. 14, PageID #: 950, 962-964.) He argues that the ALJ’s decision does
not include a thorough analysis that considered Harris’ complaints of pain. (R. 14,
PageID #: 964.)
The claimant’s statements regarding “pain or other symptoms will not alone
establish that [he is] disabled....” Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(a)). The Sixth Circuit has established a two-part test to evaluate
complaints of disabling pain when the pain forms a basis of the claimant’s disability
claim. Rogers v. Commissioner, 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007); see also SSR 16-

13

3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-*4 (Oct. 25, 2017). 5 First, the ALJ must determine
whether there is “an underlying medically determinable physical impairment that
could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms.” Id. (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.929(a)).
If the first test is satisfied, the ALJ must then evaluate “the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the individual’s ability to do
basic work activities.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247. Social Security Ruling 16-3p lists
the factors relevant to the ALJ’s determination at this step. These factors include:
the individual’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of
the individual’s pain or other symptoms; any medication the individual takes or has
taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment, other than medication, the
individual has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; any measures other
than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve pain, and, “[a]ny other
factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain
or other symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-*8. Whenever a
claimant’s complaints regarding symptoms, or their intensity and persistence, are
not supported by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a determination of
the credibility of the claimant’s allegations of pain “based on a consideration of the
entire case record.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247.
Social Security Ruling 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p, and is to be used by
ALJs when making determinations and decisions on or after March 28, 2016. SSR
16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1. The decision here was dated June 8, 2016. (R. 9,
Tr. at 40.)
14
5

Harris states that the ALJ failed to perform either prong of the analysis. (R.
14, PageID #: 962-963.) That is incorrect; regarding the first prong, the ALJ
determined that Harris had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of
the cervical spine with cord compression, and alcohol abuse-related seizure
disorder. (R. 9, Tr. at 32.) The ALJ also determined that Harris had non-severe
physical impairments of mild degenerative arthritis of both knees, with possible
meniscal tear; hypertension; and, diabetes mellitus. Id. at 32-33. The decision
stated:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this
decision.
(R. 9, Tr. at 36.) The court finds that the ALJ properly applied the first prong of the
two-part test. See Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247; SSR 16-3p.
Harris also contends that the ALJ failed to consider several factors of the
second prong of the test. (R. 14, PageID #: 963.) Specifically, Harris asserts that
the ALJ did not consider the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the
claimant’s pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; and, the
type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication. (R. 14, PageID #:
962-963, citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 10381040 (6th Cir. 1994).)

15

An ALJ is not required to expressly address all the factors listed in SSR 163p, but should sufficiently articulate the assessment of the evidence to assure the
court that the ALJ considered all relevant evidence. Cross v. Commissioner, 373 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (citing Blom v. Barnhart, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1055 (E.D. Wis. 2005)); see also Williams v. Astrue, No. CIV.A.3:07-CV-0965-N, 2008
WL 4490792, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2008). Although Harris contends that the
ALJ’s analysis was limited to his ability to live alone without assistance (R. 14,
PageID #: 963), a review of the underlying decision demonstrates that the ALJ’s
analysis was more thorough than alleged by Harris. The ALJ, for example,
discussed the location, frequency, and duration of Harris’ pain, particularly those
areas which claimant repeatedly characterized in the medical record as his “chief
complaints.” (R. 9, Tr. at 32 (“bilateral knee pain”), 34 (“mechanical neck pain,
severe numbness and tingling in the bilateral upper extremities”); see generally R.
9, Tr. at 772-773 (chief complaint reported as “neck pain and bilateral knee pain”),
794 (same), 880 (same); see also SSR 16-3p.) The ALJ also discussed the results of
Harris’ March 17, 2015, EMG. (R. 9, Tr. at 32 (“diagnosed with peripheral
neuropathy in bilateral upper extremities, right ulnar mononeuropathy at the elbow
consistent with cubital tunnel syndrome), but no evidence of bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome in his hand-wrist joints”); see generally R. 9, Tr. at 776, 860.)
Further, the ALJ considered the medications and other treatment that
Harris received for his symptoms of pain. (R. 9, Tr. at 32 (“conservative nonnarcotic pain relievers” for knee pain; 34 (treatment by pain management specialist
16

included steroid injections, Gabapentin, Lyrica and Elavil, plus physical therapy.)
The ALJ stated that the physical therapist’s “notes from 2015 indicate that
claimant’s bilateral knee pain resolved after one session, indicating conservative
treatment was helpful for his symptoms.” (R. 9, Tr. at 32, citing R. 9, Tr. at 639.)
Moreover, the ALJ found that recent notes from the pain management specialist
indicated that “claimant was given home exercises to help with his ranges of motion
but he has been non-compliant.” Id. at 34, citing R. 9, Tr. at 772-773. In addition,
although physical therapy was helping, Harris stopped attending after three
sessions “due to transportation.” Id. at 34, citing R. 9, Tr. at 630. The ALJ noted
that: “No other aggressive form of medical treatment has been prescribed to date for
these impairments.” Id. A treatment regimen consisting mostly of pain medication
is inconsistent with a finding of total disability. See, e.g., Helm v. Commissioner,
No. 10-5025, 2011 WL 13918, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
One of the relevant factors considered under SSR 16-3p is the individual’s
daily activities. SSR 16-3p; see, e.g., Walters, 127 F.3d at 532 (ALJ may properly
consider household and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating a
claimant’s assertions of pain). The ALJ stated that
The medical evidence suggests that the claimant has had a partiallyimproved response to conservative treatment modalities because he
lives alone without any reported assistance with personal hygiene and
other essential activities of daily living, such as household chores and
grocery shopping.
(R. 9, Tr. at 36.) Harris argues that the ALJ improperly focused on his ability to
live alone without assistance. (R. 14, PageID #: 963.) Harris cites his hearing
17

testimony and contests the ALJ’s finding that the he did not require any assistance.
(R. 14, PageID #: 964.) Harris did testify that he lives alone. (R. 9, Tr. at 59.) But
Harris also testified at the hearing that his girlfriend did grocery shopping, and
cooked and cleaned for him. Id. at 64-65.
The Commissioner argues that it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude
that, since Harris lived alone, he was able to perform his activities when necessary.
(R. 15, PageID #: 983.) Moreover, the Commissioner points out that “the treatment
notes continually show that Plaintiff independently performed his self-care and
other activities of daily living.” Id. This court’s review must be based on the record
as a whole, and the court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of
whether it has been cited by the ALJ. See Heston, 245 F.3d at 535 (citing Walker,
884 F.2d at 245).
The record shows that, at an October 6, 2011, appointment with Huma Rizvi,
M.D., Harris reported that he lived alone, and managed all his activities of daily
living without difficulty. (R. 9, Tr. at 315.) At a March 23, 2012, appointment with
Dr. Rizvi, Harris reported the same. Id. at 309. At a January 17, 2014,
appointment with a physical therapist, Harris reported that he lived alone, and was
independent with his self-care and his activities of daily living. Id. at 268. About
six weeks prior to the hearing, during an appointment with another physical
therapist on March 30, 2016, Harris reported that he lived alone, he was
independent with his self-care and his activities of daily living, although his

18

girlfriend helped with chores and daily activities “if he is having a bad day.” Id. at
852.
Where the evidence regarding a claimant’s activities of daily living is
“plausibly contradictory,” an ALJ’s adverse inference is justified. Amir v.
Commissioner, No. 17-1134, 2017 WL 4570577, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2017) (citing
Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (“Discounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate
where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony,
and other evidence.”)); see generally Masters v. Commissioner, No. 17-5561, 2017
WL 5508536, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017) (“The ALJ reasonably noted that despite
her symptoms, [claimant] remains able to perform routine, daily tasks that he
viewed as inconsistent with her allegations that her pain and symptoms were
completely debilitating.”).
The ALJ reasonably determined that the claimant is capable of making a
successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. (R. 9, Tr. at 39.) An individual is not required to be pain-free or
experiencing no discomfort to be found employable. Byrd v. Commissioner, No.
5:12CV0828, 2013 WL 1150138, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2013), adopted by 2013
WL 1154295 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2013) (citing Qantu v. Barnhart, No. 02-1314,
2003 WL 21921404, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2003). The ALJ addressed Harris’ pain
by limiting him to a range of light work.
The court finds that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
decision concerning Harris’ reported pain and its impact.
19

VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. The record evidence as
discussed in the ALJ’s decision is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as
adequate support for the Commissioner’s final benefits determination. The decision
of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Ruiz
David A. Ruiz
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: September 20, 2018

20