Kistner v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 16

Memorandum Opinion and Order that the Commissioner's final decision is VACATED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Magistrate Judge David A. Ruiz on 9/28/2018. (G,CA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ANDREA KISTNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:17-cv-01914

MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Andrea Kistner (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), challenges the final decision of
Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter
“Commissioner”), denying her applications for a Period of Disability (“POD”), Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. (“Act”). This court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case is before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to the consent of the parties. (R. 10 & 12). For the reasons set forth
below, the Commissioner’s final decision is VACATED and REMANDED for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. Procedural History
On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed her applications for POD, DIB, and SSI, alleging a
disability onset date of August 5, 2007. (Transcript (“Tr.”) 290-302). The application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 117-162, 203-218). Plaintiff received a first hearing on July 2, 2014,
resulting in an adverse decision. (Tr. 163-182). The Appeals Council ordered a new hearing,
which was held on June 14, 2018. (Tr. 51-75). Plaintiff participated in the hearing, was
represented by counsel, and testified. Id. A vocational expert (“VE”) also participated and
testified. Id. On August 3, 2016, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 20). On August 18,
2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 1-5). On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff
filed a complaint challenging the Commissioner’s final decision. (R. 1). The parties have
completed briefing in this case. (R. 14 & 15).
Plaintiff asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ erred by violating the
treating physician rule, and (2) the ALJ erred by assigning the claimant a residual functional
capacity that is not supported by the medical opinion of any treating or consulting physician. (R.
14).
II. Evidence
A. Relevant Evidence1
1. Treatment Records
On June 3, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by Ashok Ramadugu, M.D. She had a history of
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD) and chronic back pain. She had a 20-year
history of smoking. (Tr. 406).
On March 14, 2013, Plaintiff underwent a pulmonary function study. Khalid Darr, M.D.,

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The recitation of the evidence is not intended to be exhaustive. Because the issue of the weight
assigned to Plaintiff’s treating sources is dispositive, the recitation of the medical evidence and
hearing testimony is limited.
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interpreted the study and concluded Plaintiff had mild COPD. (Tr. 503).
On March 20, 2013, Plaintiff was seen at the Pain Relief Center by Ronald B. Casselberry,
M.D., and her pain was rated as 7 of 10 and described as a toothache. Her chief complaints were
right shoulder pain and bilateral pain in her hips and knees. She was prescribed Oxycodone. She
stated her medication was effective. (Tr. 506). Treatment notes from April and May of 2013
were largely unchanged. (Tr. 504-505).
On October 14, 2014, another pulmonary function test was interpreted by Dr. Ramadugu as
revealing moderately sever airflow obstruction, but with excellent response to bronchodilator.
(Tr. 572).
On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Casselberry, and her pain was rated as 5 of 10.
It was noted that her function/activity was good with medication, as were her activities of daily
living. (Tr. 621).
2. Medical Opinions Concerning Plaintiff’s Functional Limitations
On October 17, 2014, Dr. Casselberry completed a Medical Source Statement regarding
Plaintiff’s physical capacity. (Tr. 525-526). Dr. Casselberry stated that Plaintiff could lift objects
weighing up to 10 pounds occasionally and lift objects weighing up to 5 pounds frequently, as
well as stand/walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday in one hour increments. (Tr. 525). Dr.
Casselberry indicated that Plaintiff had no sitting limitations, and could rarely perform postural
activities. Id. All of the above limitations were attributed to right sciatica, decreased range of
motion of the back, and degenerative disc disease. Id. He opined that Plaintiff could frequently
perform gross and fine manipulation, but only occasionally reach and push/pull. (Tr. 526). No
explanation was given for these limitations. Id. Dr. Casselberry stated that environmental
limitations are affected due to Plaintiff’s risk of losing balance, cold aggravating her pain, and a
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history of COPD. (Tr. 526). He further indicated that Plaintiff had not been prescribed any
device to assist with walking or breathing, but that Plaintiff required a sit/stand/walk at will
option. Id. Dr. Casselberry rated Plaintiff’s pain as moderate, which would result in interference
with concentration, take her off task, and cause absenteeism. (Tr. 526). Finally, Dr. Casselberry
indicated that Plaintiff required four additional fifteen minute breaks per day. Id.
On October 23, 2014, Ashok Ramadugu, M.D., wrote a one sentence letter stating in its
entirety that “[Plaintiff] is unable to work due to her severe COPD.” (Tr. 528).
On June 10, 2016, Dr. Casselberry completed a second and nearly identical Medical Source
Statement regarding Plaintiff’s physical capacity. (Tr. 611-612). Dr. Casselberry again stated that
Plaintiff could lift objects weighing up to 10 pounds occasionally and lift objects weighing up to
5 pounds frequently, as well as stand/walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday in one hour
increments. (Tr. 611). Dr. Casselberry indicated that Plaintiff had no sitting limitations, and
could rarely perform postural activities. Id. All of the above limitations were attributed to right
sciatica, decreased range of motion of the back, and degenerative disc disease. Id. He again
opined that Plaintiff could frequently perform gross and fine manipulation, but only occasionally
reach and push/pull. (Tr. 612). No explanation was given for these limitations. Id. Dr.
Casselberry stated that environmental limitations are affected due to Plaintiff’s risk of losing
balance, cold aggravating her pain, and a history of COPD. (Tr. 612). He further indicated that
Plaintiff had not been prescribed any device to assist with walking or breathing, but that Plaintiff
required a sit/stand/walk at will option. Id. Dr. Casselberry again rated Plaintiff’s pain as
moderate, which would result in interference with concentration, take her off task, and cause
absenteeism. (Tr. 612). Finally, Dr. Casselberry indicated that Plaintiff required additional,
unscheduled breaks beyond those normally allowed, but did not specify the length or frequency
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of these breaks. Id.
3. Relevant Hearing Testimony
At the June 14, 2016 hearing, Plaintiff testified as follows:
 She has been using oxygen 24 hours a day since March or April of 2010. (Tr. 58). She quit
smoking in 2007. (Tr. 59). She experiences shortness of breath with minimal activity, such as
showering, walking to the bathroom, or microwaving meals. (Tr. 60-61). She uses a nebulizer
four times a day in addition to using oxygen. (Tr. 66).
 She can walk 5 to 10 minutes before needing oxygen. She can stand for about 15 minutes
before needing oxygen. (Tr. 62).
 She can sit for about thirty minutes before needing to stand or move around due to her
sciatica. (Tr. 62-63).
 She said her back has been “pretty good” with medication, but she needed to talk to her
pain doctor due to a burning sensation in her lower back with prolonged sitting or standing.
(Tr. 63).
 Her medications include Oxycodone for pain and Zanaflex, a muscle relaxer. She had no
side effects from these medications. (Tr. 64).
 She sees Dr. Casselberry once a month, and began seeing him in 2009. (Tr. 64).
 She does not cook, clean or do laundry, and has her aunt help her with those chores. (Tr.
65).
 She is 5’2” tall and weighs 242 pounds, gaining 40 pounds in less than a year. (Tr. 67).
III. Disability Standard
A claimant is entitled to receive benefits under the Social Security Act when she establishes
disability within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 and 416.905; Kirk v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). A claimant is considered disabled when
she cannot perform “substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §§

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404.1505(a) and 416.905(a); 404.1509 and 416.909(a).
The Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-stage
process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First,
the claimant must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity”
at the time she seeks disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). Second, the
claimant must show that she suffers from a medically determinable “severe impairment” or
combination of impairments in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)
and 416.920(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits ... physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” Abbott, 905 F.2d at 923. Third, if the claimant is not
performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment (or combination of impairments)
that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment(s) meets a listed
impairment, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment(s)
does not prevent her from doing past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e)-(f) and 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s
impairment(s) does prevent her from doing past relevant work, if other work exists in the
national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g) and 416.920(g), 404.1560(c).
IV. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through September 30, 2011.

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
December 18, 2010, the earliest onset date available to the claimant (20
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CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3.

The claimant has the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD), obesity, low back pain (LBP), anxiety
disorder, depressive disorder, and alcohol abuse in sustained full remission
(20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can
frequently climb ramps/stairs. She can never climb ladder/ropes/scaffolds.
She must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and
poor ventilation. The claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry
out short and simple instructions. She is able to maintain
attention/concentration for extended periods on simple tasks. The claimant
is able to occasionally interact and/or have superficial contact with the
general public and occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors.
The claimant would require continuous oxygen.

6.

The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).

7.

The claimant was born on ***, 1972 and was 38 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the earliest onset date
available to her (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8.

The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9.

Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10.

Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569,
404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

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11.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from December 18, 2010, through the date of this decision
(20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 14-19).
V. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. Ealy v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). Review must be based on the record as a
whole. Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The court may look
into any evidence in the record to determine if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, regardless of whether it has actually been cited by the ALJ. (Id.) However, the court
does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence.
Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner's conclusions must be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ
failed to apply the correct legal standards or made findings of fact unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record. White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681. A decision supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned
even though substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy, 594 F.3d at 512.
B. Plaintiff’s Assignments of Error- Treating Physician Rule
In the first assignment of error, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by violating the treating
physician rule with respect to the weight assigned to the opinions from Drs. Casselberry and
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Ramadugu. (R. 14, PageID# 702-708). The Commissioner does not directly challenge the
assertion that either Dr. Casselberry or Dr. Ramadugu were treating sources at the time they
rendered their respective opinions. (R. 151, PageID# 725-731). The Commissioner does,
however, argue that the ALJ reasonably and properly weighed the opinions in question. Id.
“Provided that they are based on sufficient medical data, ‘the medical opinions and
diagnoses of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial deference, and if the opinions
are uncontradicted, complete deference.’” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240
(6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985)). In other words,
“[a]n ALJ must give the opinion of a treating source controlling weight if he finds the opinion
‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and ‘not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). If an ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion
controlling weight, then the ALJ must give good reasons for doing so that are “sufficiently
specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating
source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5). The “clear elaboration
requirement” is “imposed explicitly by the regulations,” Bowie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d
395, 400 (6th Cir. 2008), and its purpose is “in part, to let claimants understand the disposition of
their cases, particularly in situations where a claimant knows that [her] physician has deemed
[her] disabled and therefore might be especially bewildered when told by an administrative
bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Wilson,
378 F.3d at 544 (quoting Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Johnson v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (“The requirement also ensures
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that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's
application of the rule.”) (Polster, J.)
It is well-established that administrative law judges may not make medical judgments. See
Meece v. Barnhart, 192 Fed. App’x 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) (“But judges, including
administrative law judges of the Social Security Administration, must be careful not to succumb
to the temptation to play doctor.”) (quoting Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir.
1990)). Although an ALJ may not substitute his or her opinions for that of a physician, “an ALJ
does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and nonmedical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.” Poe v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 342 Fed. App'x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009). If fully explained with appropriate citations to the
record, a good reason for discounting a treating physician’s opinion is a finding that it is
“unsupported by sufficient clinical findings and is inconsistent with the rest of the evidence.”
Conner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 Fed. App’x 248, 253-254 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Morr v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 616 Fed. App’x 210, 211 (6th Cir. 2015)); see also Keeler v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 511 Fed. App'x 472, 473 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that an ALJ properly discounted the
subjective evidence contained in a treating physician’s opinion because it too heavily relied on
the patient’s complaints).
The ALJ’s decision provides little discussion of Dr. Casselberry’s actual treatment of
Plaintiff, but the doctor’s opinions were addressed as follows:
The claimant’s pain management specialist is Dr. Casselberry. At Exhibits B11F
and B18F, he opines the claimant is limited to significantly less than sedentary
work and is at danger of losing her balance. The undersigned finds these opinions
are inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. Therefore, they are
not entitled to controlling weight (SSR 96-2p). Specifically, Dr. Casselberry has
treated the claimant’s pain with medications. On May 13, 2016, Dr. Casselberry
reported the claimant’s function/activity are “good with medications” and that her
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activities of daily living are “good with medications” (Ex. B19F page 7). At the
hearing, she testified she has no adverse side effects from her medications. The
claimant is neurologically intact and requires no assistive devices for ambulation
(Exs. B4F page 3, Ex. B5F page 18, and Ex. B8F).
(Tr. 17-18).
Although the ALJ is under no obligation to accept the limitations assessed by Dr.
Casselberry, the ALJ’s decisions must set forth good reasons for rejecting those opinions. By
finding Plaintiff was capable of light work, the ALJ plainly rejected Dr. Casselberry’s opinion
that she could only lift 10 pounds occasionally and 5 pounds frequently, as well the limitation to
only standing/walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday.2 The ALJ’s characterization of
the opinion as “inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record” is a mere conclusion
rather than an explanation that, on its own, fails to satisfy the treating physician rule.
The ALJ essentially gave the following reasons for rejecting Dr. Casselberry’s assessed
physical limitations. First, the ALJ noted Plaintiff was treated with medications. It is unclear
whether this is merely an observation, or a basis for rejecting Dr. Casselberry’s opinion (i.e. a
finding that Plaintiff received only conservative treatment). If it is the former, it is insufficient on
its own to reject Dr. Casselberry’s opinion. If it is the latter, the ALJ fails to discuss any evidence
of record suggesting other treatment options were available or why treating pain with medication
rendered Dr. Casselberry’s opinion inconsistent with the evidence of record.

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“The regulations define light work as lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted in a
particular light job may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of
walking or standing—the primary difference between sedentary and most light jobs…. Since
frequent lifting or carrying requires being on one’s feet up to two-thirds of a workday, the full
range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours
of an 8-hour workday.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (S.S.A.
1983).
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The ALJ also identifies a single treatment note from May of 2016 indicating that Plaintiff’s
function/activity was “good with medication,” as were her activities of daily living. (Tr. 17,
citing Tr. 621, Exh. B19F at 7). See, e.g., Mathias v. Berryhill, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140956,
*1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2017) (Limbert, M.J.) (finding the ALJ’s “reliance on a sole instance of
hospitalization is questionable as there is no further explanation provided in the decision as to
why this fact conflicts with [a treating source’s] opinion). The court finds that identifying a
singular alleged inconsistency fails to constitute a “good reason.” The ALJ’s scant discussion of
the medical treatment records compounds this problem. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the
record is replete with such findings, it is not altogether clear that such a finding was inconsistent
with Dr. Casselberry’s assessed limitations. The statements that Plaintiff’s function/activity and
activities of daily living (“ADLs”) were “good” with medication are entirely unexplained, and
therefore, it is conjecture that these statements conflict with Dr. Casselberry’s assessed
limitations. Based on her testimony, Plaintiff did not perform even the most minimal household
chores, and it is unclear how ADLs such as dressing or bathing would be inconsistent with an
inability, for example, to stand no more than four hours in an 8-hour workday.3 The same
treatment note also indicated that Plaintiff’s pain remained 5 of 10 despite the effectiveness of
her pain medication. While the ALJ is correct that “a treating source’s medical opinion on what
an individual can still do despite his or her impairment (s) will not be entitled to controlling
weight if substantial, nonmedical evidence shows that the individual’s actual activities are

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The court does not imply that the ALJ was required to treat Plaintiff’s testimony as credible or
as supported by the evidence. However, the ALJ basically nullified a treating source’s opinion
based on the premise that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were “good with medications”
without any discussion or analysis as to what constituted Plaintiff’s ADLs.

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greater than those provided in the treating source’s opinion,” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, *4
(S.S.A. July 2, 1996),4 the ALJ’s decision makes no attempt to identify Plaintiff’s ADLs or
explain how those activities were greater than the limitations assessed by Dr. Casselberry. The
ALJ’s observation, that Plaintiff reported no adverse side effects from her medications, is
irrelevant if the medications did not restore her ability to engage in activity greater than those
assessed by Dr. Casselberry.
Finally, the ALJ’s statements that Plaintiff is neurologically intact and did not have an
assistive device strays into the prohibited territory of making medical judgments. Without
making a medical judgment, it is not at all clear, for example, that an obese individual with
COPD and low back pain could not be both limited to four hours of standing/walking and yet not
need an assistive device or have neurological deficits.
Courts routinely find that perfunctory assessments of treating source opinions do not
constitute “good reasons” for their rejection. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d
234, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding an ALJ failed to give “good reasons” for rejecting the
limitations contained in a treating source’s opinion where the ALJ merely concluded, without
explanation, that the evidence of record did not support the severity of the assessed limitations);
Patterson v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2232309 at *14 (N.D. Ohio June 2, 2010) (remanding where the
“ALJ did not provide any rationale beyond his conclusory statement that [the treating
physician's] opinion is inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and appears to be based
solely on [claimant's] subjective performance.”) (Vecchiarelli, M.J.); Fuston v. Comm'r of Soc.

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SSR 96-2p was rescinded “effective for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.” Rescission of
Soc. Sec. Rulings 96-2p, 96-5p, and 06-3p, 2017 WL 3928298, *1 (S.S.A. Mar. 27, 2017). The
ALJ’s decision however, was rendered August 3, 2016, prior to the effective date of the
rescission, and the filing date was even earlier.
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Sec., No. 1:11-CV-224, 2012 WL 1413097 at *9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1831578 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 2012) (“To facilitate
meaningful judicial review the ALJ must state the evidence considered which supports his
conclusion.”)
Because the court concludes that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for rejecting the
opinions of a treating source, Dr. Casselberry, this matter is remanded for a new decision that
comports with the requirements of the treating physician rule. In the interests of judicial
economy, the court foregoes addressing Plaintiffs’ remaining assignments of error.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is VACATED and
REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
s/ David A. Ruiz
David A. Ruiz
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: September 28, 2018

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