Walker v. Miller et al

Filing 3

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2 ) is granted. This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 2/6/18. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Robert Walker,
Plaintiff,
v.
Tom Miller, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:17 CV 2447
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Robert Walker filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Medina
County Sheriff Tom Miller and Medina County Sheriff’s Office Employees Dean Lesak,
Kenneth Baca, Gail Houk, and John Doe #1; Heartland Behavioral Healthcare (“Heartland”)
Chief Executive Officer David Colletti, Chief Clinical Officer Syed Ahmed, and Treating
Physician John Doe #2; and Medina Metropolitan Housing Authority (“MMHA”) Provider Jane
Doe #3, and Executive Director Skip Sipos. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants
failed to diagnose him with stage four colon cancer. He asserts they were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs, and seeks monetary damages.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a resident of Texas who was charged with misdemeanor theft in Medina,
Ohio on May 26, 2015. Plaintiff returned to Texas and failed to appear for trial resulting in a

warrant being issued for his arrest. He moved to Ohio later in the year, and was arrested on the
outstanding warrant on November 30, 2015. At his arraignment, the court set bond at
$15,000.00 and scheduled the trial for December 16, 2015. Plaintiff could not post bond and
remained incarcerated. During this time, Plaintiff informed the jail medical staff that he was ill,
in constant pain and bleeding internally. He alleges he was seen only once by a doctor who
failed to diagnose his medical problem. Instead, medical staff at the jail determined his problem
was psychosomatic and referred him for mental health treatment. Plaintiff’s attorney withdrew
and his new attorney asked the court to order a psychiatric evaluation to determine Plaintiff’s
competence to stand trial. The court granted that motion and when the evaluator indicated
Plaintiff was not competent to stand trial, the court ordered him to be transferred to Heartland
for treatment on February 17, 2016. Plaintiff repeated his medical complaints to Heartland
physicians with results similar to those he experienced at the jail. He states the doctor finally
took stool samples, but altered the results to conceal the fact that he was bleeding internally.
Plaintiff was deemed to be competent on April 25, 2016. The court set a trial date for
May 2, 2016; however, the prosecutor dismissed the charges without prejudice on May 4, 2016.
He was released from custody, but had nowhere to go because he had lost his residence due to
his detention and hospitalization. He contends MMHA arranged for him to live at the
Townmotel until he could find a place that would accept his housing voucher. He indicates he
also found it difficult to obtain medical care. He alleges he complained to his case manager
about medical symptoms he was experiencing and the case manager called the police to escort
him to Marymount Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. He claims he attempted to obtain
medical care again in August 2016. He states that after a series of referrals, he was informed on
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March 1, 2017 that he had stage four colon cancer. Plaintiff claims the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than
“an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the

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pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs arise in the context of the
Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Eighth Amendment’s protections, however, apply specifically to
post-conviction inmates. See Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir.1992).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends those same protections to
pretrial detainees. Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir.1994).
Although they are based on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the claims of pretrial
detainees are analyzed under the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought by
prisoners. See Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A Plaintiff must first plead facts
which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine
discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the
protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A Plaintiff must also establish a subjective
element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.
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Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good
faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). This state of mind is shown “where
‘the official knows of and disregards’” the substantial risk of serious harm facing the prisoner.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id. A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are
met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff was not incarcerated or detained when the incidents giving
rise to his claims against the MMHA Executive Director and MMHA housing provider arose.
The Eighth Amendment protects those individuals held in custody because incarceration
necessarily “strip[s] [inmates] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclose[s] their
access to outside aid.” Id. at 833. Because individuals detained in jails experience
substantially similar limitations, those protections are extended to pretrial detainees through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Individuals who are not in a custodial situation are not presented with
those same limitations. Eighth Amendment protections, therefore, are not extended to
individuals who are not being detained or incarcerated. Because Plaintiff was not a pretrial
detainee when his interactions with MMHA occurred, he has not stated a claim against the
MMHA Executive Director or MMHA housing provider for deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.
With respect to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff failed to allege facts to satisfy the
subjective component. Plaintiff does not mention the Medina County Sheriff or Medina County
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Sheriff’s Office Employees Lesak, Baca, or Houk in his Complaint. There is no suggestion that
they were personally aware of his symptoms, appreciated their severity, and refused to provide
Plaintiff with necessary medical care. Likewise, he does not allege the CEO of Heartland or the
Chief Clinical Officer of Heartland knew of Plaintiff’s medical complaints and disregarded
them. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a clear showing that the
Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged
unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth,
No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Plaintiff does not allege facts
indicating these Defendants were personally engaged in activities that plausibly could be
considered deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Finally, Plaintiff contends jail physician John Doe #1 and Heartland Physician John Doe
#2 treated him for psychiatric illnesses but failed to diagnose and treat his medical condition.
Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not equate to deliberate
indifference. Consequently, allegations of medical malpractice, negligent diagnosis, or
negligent treatment fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. At best,
the allegations against these Defendants, if true, suggest they may have been negligent. Plaintiff
has not alleged sufficient facts, however, to suggest they were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted.
This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Chief Judge
Dated: 2/6/18

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