Anderson v. Gaul et al

Filing 5

Opinion and Order. Action is dismissed under section 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 3/8/2018. (H,CM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WILFRED L. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE DANIEL GAUL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:17 CV 2451
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

On November 22, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Wilfred S. Anderson filed this in forma pauperis
action against Defendants Judge Daniel Gaul and Judge Peter J. Corrigan. Plaintiff alleges
Defendants were responsible for his being improperly determined to be a vexatious litigator under
Ohio law. He asserts this violates this First Amendment rights and seeks injunctive and monetary
relief.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if
it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact.1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010).
United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions even
if the request to reverse the state court judgment is based on an allegation that the state court’s action
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An in forma pauperis claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice
to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court
explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)]
and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 915 (6th Cir. 2007); Gibson v.
R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 261 (6th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d
222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986).

was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).
Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court,
by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this principle, generally referred to as the RookerFeldman Doctrine, a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based on the party’s claim
that the state judgment itself violates federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir.
2012).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).2 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct.
149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). This statute was enacted to prevent “end-runs around state court
judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that judgment to file a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. The doctrine is based on the negative inference that, if appellate court
review of state judgments is vested in the United States Supreme Court, then such review may not
occur in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283-84; Kovacic v. Cuyahoga
County Dep't of Children and Family Services, 606 F.3d 301, 308-311 (6th Cir. 2010); Lawrence
v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008).
To determine whether Rooker–Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to the “source of
the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382,

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28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of
any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held
or authority exercised under, the United States.
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393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 310. If the source of the
plaintiff's injury is the state-court judgment itself, then the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars the federal
claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's
actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368–69. In
conducting this inquiry, the court should also consider the plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v.
Cordray, No. 09–3998, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1 (6th Cir. May 27, 2011)
Plaintiff seeks to directly attack a state court decision. Any review of the federal claims
asserted in this context would require the court to review the specific issues addressed in the state
court proceedings. This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review or grant the
relief requested. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16; Catz, 142 F.3d at 293.
Further, judicial officers are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money
damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir.
1997). This far-reaching protection is needed to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise
of judgment is not impaired by the exposure of potential damages. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For
this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only in two situations: (1) when the conduct alleged is
not performed in the judge’s judicial capacity; or (2) when the conduct alleged, although judicial in
nature, is taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d
at 1116. Plaintiff alleges no facts reasonably suggesting either of these criteria has been met in this
case.
Accordingly, this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: March 8, 2018

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