Moore v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.,

Filing 62

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/15/18. The Court grants plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss and dismisses his complaint without prejudice provided that - should he refile the complaint or a similar complaint base d on the same facts against the named defendants - he shall pay to any defendants named in that second complaint reasonable fees and costs as set forth in this entry. Plaintiff should file any objections to these dismissal conditions within five wor king days of this order. The Court denies defendant Gallagher Sharp's and defendant Safeguarad Properties' motions for sanctions. The Court denies as moot all other pending motions in this matter, provided that plaintiff does not file objections by 6/22/18. (Related Docs. 15 , 16 , 17 , 20 , 24 , 52 , 57 , 58 , and 59 ) (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
----------------------------------------------------------------------CARL L. MOORE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:18-cv-394
OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Docs. 15, 16, 17, 20, 24, 52, 57,
58, 59]

----------------------------------------------------------------------JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Carl Moore sues a variety of defendants alleging that they fraudulently induced him
to enter a mortgage contract knowing he would default.1 He now moves to voluntarily dismiss his
complaint.2 Defendants Gallagher Sharp, LLP, and Safeguard Properties Management, LLC, oppose
that motion.3 They argue that they will be prejudiced if Plaintiff Moore is allowed to dismiss his
complaint and later refiles it.4
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss
his complaint without the consent of the opposing party after that party has answered “only by court
order, on terms that the [C]ourt considers proper.” “[T]he purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the
nonmovant, here the defendants, from unfair treatment.” 5 “A Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal may be
conditioned on whatever terms the district court deems necessary to offset the prejudice the
defendant may suffer from a dismissal without prejudice.”6 Those terms can include requiring the
plaintiff to pay a defendant’s costs and attorney’s fees.7
In this case, the Court does not believe that it would be proper to require Plaintiff Moore to

1

See generally Doc. 1.

2

Doc. 59.
Doc. 60; Doc. 61.
4
See Doc. 60 at 3–5; Doc. 61 at 3–5.
3

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 954.
7
See id. at 954–55.
5
6

Case No. 1:18-cv-394
Gwin, J.
pay the Defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees at this time. After all, the Defendants have largely
obtained what they sought through their answers and motions: the dismissal of Moore’s complaint.
That said, if Plaintiff Moore later refiles his complaint (or one containing similar allegations
based on the same facts), the expenses incurred defending this case will have been wasted.
The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff Moore’s motion to voluntarily dismiss and DISMISSES
his complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE, provided that—should he refile the complaint or a similar
complaint based on the same facts against the named defendants—he shall pay to any defendants
named in that second complaint:
1. Reasonable attorney’s fees they incurred in defending this case; and
2. Reasonable costs they incurred defending this case.
Proof of costs and fees incurred should be submitted to the court with jurisdiction over the refiled
complaint. Plaintiff Moore should file any objections to these dismissal conditions within five
working days of this Order.
As for Defendant Gallagher Sharp’s and Defendant Safeguard Properties’ motions for
sanctions under Rule 11,8 the Court DENIES those motions. While the complaint in this case is
undeniably poorly drafted and fails to make clear how some defendants are related to Plaintiff
Moore’s claims, the Court does not (at this time) see any basis for concluding that Moore’s attorney
lacked a factual basis for suing the Defendants named in the complaint.
The Court DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions in this matter, provided that Plaintiff
Moore does not file objections by June 22, 2018.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 15, 2018

s/

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8

Doc. 15; Doc. 16.

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