Williams-Starr v. Normaher Shelter et al

Filing 3

Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Related doc # 2 ) is granted. Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 5/9/2018. (H,CM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

SECUNDA WILLIAMS-STARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORMAHER SHELTER, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1: 18 CV 428
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:

Pro Se Plaintiff Secunda Williams-Starr has filed this civil action against “Normaher
Shelter” and “Community Shelter.” (Doc. No. 1.) Although she appears to contest some sort
of eviction, her Complaint does not set forth coherent factual allegations or cogent legal
claims against the Defendants. Rather, her Complaint consists largely of unclear legal
rhetoric. The only relief she appears to seek is for the Court “to surrender [her] payment and
free [her] of squatters and the Rico Act Law.” (Doc. No. 1-2.)

Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous
construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th
Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not
required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 2001
WL 1556573 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001). Federal district courts are required, under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court and to dismiss
before service any such action the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim on which relief
may be granted, a complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Additionally, they must be sufficient to give the defendants “fair notice of what [the
plaintiff’s] claims are and the grounds upon which they rest.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
Even according the Plaintiff’s Complaint the deference to which a pro se pleading is
entitled, it does not meet basic requirements or state a claim on which relief may be granted
and must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). The unclear and conclusory statements
and sentence fragments set forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint are insufficient to suggest she
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has any plausible federal claim against any Defendant in the case. See Lillard v. Shelby Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to accept summary
allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for
relief).
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is
granted, and her Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
United States District Judge
Dated: May 9, 2018

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