Goff v. Eppinger et al

Filing 18

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/12/18. The Court, for the reasons set forth in this order, dismisses the § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and dismisses without prejudice the § 1983 Fir st Amendment free exercise claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claims, the Court dismisses the substantive due process claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and dismisses without prejudice the procedural due process and equal protection claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds. The Court therefore need not consider whether granting the permanent injunction is appropriate, and dismisses the action. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (Related Docs. 1 and 10 ) (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
----------------------------------------------------------:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
vs.
:
:
WARDEN LASHAUNN
:
EPPINGER, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
-----------------------------------------------------------JOHN THOMAS GOFF,

CASE NO. 1:18-cv-671

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Docs. 1, 10]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff John Thomas Goff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims against Defendant Ronald Smith who is the Grafton Correctional Institution
Chaplain, seeking injunctive relief for religious accommodations.1 Defendant filed an unopposed
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).2
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Smith’s motion to dismiss the First
Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Accordingly, the Court need not consider whether the
requested permanent injunction is proper, and dismisses the action.
I. Legal Standard
A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. To survive dismissal, a complaint “must present ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face’” when its factual allegations are presumed true and all

1

Doc. 1.

2

Doc. 10.

Case No. 1:18-cv-671
Gwin, J.
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.3
District courts must dismiss any civil action filed by a prisoner seeking relief from a
governmental officer or entity, as soon as possible after docketing, under § 1915A, if the court
concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim.4 Similarly, § 1915(e)(2) requires the court to
dismiss in forma pauperis actions at any time on the same ground.5
Although pleadings filed by pro se litigants are “liberally construed” and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers,6 pro se plaintiffs must still meet the basic
pleading requirements.7 Courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf.8
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff sues Smith and others with claims that Chaplain Smith denied Plaintiff Goff
religious rights by failing to provide Goff with kosher meals for a few meals and by failing to
comply with religious accommodation request procedures. On June 26, 2018, the Court dismissed
certain claims and Grafton Correctional Institution Defendants from the action under §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A.9 The Court, however, permitted the action to proceed against Defendant Smith on the
First Amendment claims. In doing so, it indicated that Plaintiff Goff had stated a plausible claim for

3

Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Siller v. Dean, 205 F.3d 1341, 2000 WL 145167, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
table decision).
4

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”).
5

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
8
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
6
7

9
Doc. 7. Plaintiff Goff sued Grafton Correctional Institution (“GCI”) Warden LaShaunn Eppinger, GCI Deputy
Warden of Special Services Ronald Armbruster, GCI Chaplain Ronald Smith, and Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (“Department”) “RL” Dr. Michael Davis. Doc. 1 at 1. In the June 26, 2018 Order, the Court recognized that
Plaintiff alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and that he requested only injunctive relief. Doc. 7 at 1.

The Court proceeded to dismiss all claims against Defendants Eppinger, Armbruster, and Davis; dismissed the
RLUIPA claim; and denied the request for a temporary restraining order. See Doc. 7 at 3–4.

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Gwin, J.
relief.10
The Court now clarifies that the statement about the plausibility of the First Amendment
claim was dicta. Courts should rule only upon issues raised by the parties. At the time of the June
26, 2018 Order, Defendant Smith had not yet been served,11 let alone filed a motion to dismiss.
The Court also now acknowledges that its June 26, 2018 Order recognized the existence
of,12 but failed to address, Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claims when conducting the
preliminary screening. Thus, Defendant did not move to dismiss these claims. Accordingly, in
addition to addressing Defendant Smith’s motion to dismiss the First Amendment claims, the Court
addresses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
III. Discussion
The Court considers Plaintiff Goff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Chaplain Ronald
Smith alleging First Amendment free exercise and retaliation violations and Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection violations.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “that a person acting under the color
of state law deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”13
“Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on
their own unconstitutional behavior.”14 The behavior of others cannot be ascribed to a defendant.15

See Doc. 7 at 4–5 (“Plaintiff, however, has stated a plausible claim for relief under the First Amendment
against the Chaplain Ronald Smith. This action shall proceed solely against Smith on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.”).
10

11

The Summons, Complaint, USM Form, and Opinion and Order was issued to the U.S. Marshal on June 26,
2018 for service upon Defendant Ronald Smith. Docket Entry Text, Doc. 8. Defendant Smith received it on July 3, 2018.
Doc. 11.
12

Doc. 7 at 1.

Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d. 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012).
15
Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir.1991) (noting that personal liability “must be based on the
13
14

actions of that defendant in the situation that the defendant faced, and not based on any problems caused by the errors of
others, either defendants or non-defendants”).

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Case No. 1:18-cv-671
Gwin, J.
A. First Amendment Claims
Plaintiff Goff claims § 1983 First Amendment violations16 based on allegations that
Defendant Smith did not include Goff’s name on a kosher meal approval list, causing Goff to
receive non-kosher offerings for a few meals; that Defendant has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s
religious accommodation requests, violating Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
(“Department”) policies and potentially preventing Plaintiff from observing the soon-approaching
Passover; and that the Department may use certain practices to deter Plaintiff Goff from seeking
legal remedies.
1. Free Exercise of Religion
A prison inmate must have a reasonable opportunity to exercise his First Amendment
religious freedom guarantees.17 The inmate’s rights, however, are limited by “the fact of
incarceration and from valid penological objectives.”18
First, Defendant Smith’s alleged delay in adding Plaintiff to the kosher meal-approval list,
causing Plaintiff to “miss[] a few meals,”19 did not deprive Plaintiff of a reasonable opportunity to
exercise his religion. Ohio used a kosher-meal list “to verify persons receiving kosher meals.” Ohio
also required inmates to document their religious need for kosher food. Although Plaintiff missed
kosher meals for a few meals, Plaintiff received the kosher meals once Plaintiff produced his kosher
approval papers.20

16
Defendant addresses a hypothetical § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim in its motion to dismiss. Doc. 10 at 5–
6. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not appear to assert an Eighth Amendment violation, but even if it did, his allegations do not
state a claim for it. Defendant Smith’s leaving Plaintiff’s name off of the list used to verify persons receiving kosher meals,
which caused Plaintiff to miss only a few meals until he produced his Kosher-meal approval papers, is not a sufficiently
serious deprivation to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment prison claim. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991). The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners against conditions of confinement that constitute
health threats, such as “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
348 (1981). But it does not protect against conditions that cause mere discomfort or inconvenience. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
17
18

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam)).
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23

(1974)).
19

Doc. 1 at 2.

20

Id.

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Gwin, J.
Despite the short delay in providing kosher meals, Ohio’s practice for confirming religionbased food substitutions was rationally related to a valid penological interest.21
The brief failure to provide kosher food is also insufficient to constitute a constitutional
violation. Although “prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the
inmate's religious dietary restrictions,” a diet is considered adequate so long as it “is sufficient to
sustain the prisoner in good health.”22 Here, Plaintiff only missed a few meals, and he does not
allege any adverse health impact from this episode. To the contrary, he states that he “didn’t make
a big thing of [missing the meals]” at the time.23 The allegations of Defendant Smith’s delayed
addition of Plaintiff to the kosher meal list does not state a free exercise claim.
Second, according to the Complaint and its many exhibits, Plaintiff in December 2017
requested kosher meals and chapel access for Passover24 under Department policies.25 Defendant
allegedly did not respond to the requests. Plaintiff says this violates the Institution’s responsibilities
under the policies.26 Plaintiff alleges he cannot observe Passover if his requests are not
accommodated.27
This claim is not ripe for judicial review. The Complaint was signed on March 8, 2018 and
filed on March 23. Yet the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to exercise his Jewish faith would

See Russell v. Wilkinson, 79 F. App'x 175, 177 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he prison policy of not providing [Plaintiff]
kosher meals may be permissible if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”).
21

22

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Alexander v. Carrick, 31 F. App’x 176, 179 (6th

Cir. 2002)).
23

Doc. 1 at 2 (admitting that, at the time, Plaintiff Goff “didn’t make a big thing of [missing the meals]”).

24

See Ex. H, Doc. 1-9; Ex. I, Doc. 1-10; Ex. J, Doc. 1-11.
See Ex. B, Doc. 1-4; Ex. C, Doc. 1-5; Ex. E, Doc. 1-6. Plaintiff appears to correctly note that Department

25

Policy 72-REG-07 requires the Department to “accommodate kosher dietary restrictions to recognized Jewish inmates
pursuant to DRC Policy 72-REG-02 Religious Accommodations.” Ex. E, Doc. 1-6 at 2. This policy instructs inmates
desiring an accommodation to complete the Request for Religious Accommodation form (DRC4326), and submit it to the
chaplain, who thereafter meets with the inmate to discuss the request. Ex. C, Doc. 1-5 at 2–3. The chaplain then must
refer the request and his recommendation to the review committee within 14 days. Id. at 3. The committee thereafter
makes a recommendation to the Managing Officer or other designee, who either makes the final decision or returns the
matter to the committee for further consideration. Id. at 3–4. After a final decision, the inmate receives a copy of it and is
permitted to appeal and object to any recommendation. Id. at 4.
26
27

See Doc. 1 at 2.
Id. (“Failure to grant this would render myself with no way to observe the Pesach Seder, and contaminate the

foods provided making them non-kosher. This would require me to refuse to eat for eight days . . . .”).

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Case No. 1:18-cv-671
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not occur until Passover and would not occur before the complaint was filed.28
Plaintiff has not properly amended his complaint to flesh out any factual allegations
regarding Passover limitations. Thus, the alleged deprivation of a federal right may or may not have
occurred.
The Court dismisses without prejudice the § 1983 free exercise claim relating to Defendant
Smith’s alleged noncompliance with the religious accommodation request procedure. Plaintiff may
re-file this case if Defendant Smith’s noncompliance did in fact deprive him of the opportunity to
observe Passover.
2. Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that certain practices are used by the Department29 to deny or deter
prisoners’ access to legal remedies. This allegation does not state a § 1983 retaliation claim against
Defendant Smith.30 It neither alleges that Defendant Smith specifically took adverse action to deter
Plaintiff from engaging in this conduct,31 nor that it was actually taken against him personally. The
Court therefore dismisses the § 1983 retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith’s noncompliance with the religious accommodation
request procedure violates his due process rights and equal protection guarantees.32
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff first must identify some liberty or

See Doc. 10 (requesting “Kosher for Pesac meals using the Traditional Jewish Calendar for March 30, 2018
@11:17AM thru April 7, 2018 @8:15PM”).
28

29

Doc. 1 at 3 (claiming that legal action elicits the Department to use certain practices, such as “frequent cell
moves, segregation placements, segregation for investigations ( no cause needed to be explained) and institutional
transfers,” to deny prisoners access to legal remedies).

King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring a showing that (1) the plaintiff engaged in
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is,
the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct” (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999))).
30

31

Gibson, 926 F.2d at 535 (explaining that the behavior of others cannot be ascribed to a defendant).

32

Doc. 1 at 4.

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property interest that a state actor has denied, and then show that he was not afforded adequate
procedural rights before the deprivation.33 Even if the Court assumes, without deciding, that
Plaintiff has a sufficient liberty interest in the requested religious accommodations, Plaintiff does not
allege that Defendant actually denied him this liberty interest. Rather, he alleges that he may soon
be denied the interest if his requests are not accommodated. This claim is not ripe for adjudication.
In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations do not identify a substantive due process violation. Due
Process provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights, constitutionally protected liberty interests, and egregious government action that “shocks the
conscience.”34 Plaintiff Goff has not identified government interference with any of the following.
As such, he fails to state a substantive due process claim.
Plaintiff Goff’s equal protection claim is analyzed under a standard similar to that for the
free exercise claims, and thus it fails for the reasons explained above. The equal protection
guarantee requires that prison officials provide inmates with “reasonable opportunities . . . to
exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment without fear of
penalty.”35 The few missed meals did not deprive Plaintiff of a reasonable opportunity to exercise
his religion, and any deprivation from Defendant Smith’s alleged noncompliance with the
Department’s regulations is not ripe for judicial review.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process claim is dismissed with prejudice, and the § 1983
procedural due process and equal protection claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES the § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim

See Russell, 79 F. App'x at 178 (citing Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir.1999)).
See Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249–52 (6th Cir. 2003); Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 573 (6th
Cir. 2008) (citing Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir.2007)). Further, prisoners have narrower liberty interests
than other citizens. See Grinter, 532 F.3d at 573.
35
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
33
34

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under Rule 12(b)(6), and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the § 1983 First Amendment free
exercise claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds.
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claims, the Court DISMISSES the
substantive due process claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE the procedural due process and equal protection claims for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on ripeness grounds.
The Court therefore need not consider whether granting the permanent injunction is
appropriate, and dismisses the action.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision
could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/

Dated: September 12, 2018

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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