Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 16

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/22/19. The Court, for the reasons set forth in this Order, sustains plaintiff's objections, rejects the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, vacates the Administrative Law Judge's decision, and remands this case. (Related Docs. 14 and 15 ) (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
-----------------------------------------------------------------APRIL WALKER, on behalf of minor C.C.
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:18-cv-819

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Docs. 14, 15]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
In June 2014, Plaintiff April Walker applied for Social Security disability benefits on
behalf of her minor son C.C. In support of the application, Walker claiming her son suffers
from intellectual and neurological challenges.1
The Social Security Administration denied this application initially and upon
reconsideration.2 After two hearings, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that
C.C. was not disabled.3 The Social Security Appeals Council declined review,4 making the
ALJ’s decision the final agency action.
Magistrate Judge Parker issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”)
recommending that the Court affirm the ALJ’s decision.5 Plaintiff Walker objects.6 Because
Plaintiff objected to Judge Parker’s R&R, the Court reviews it de novo.7
For the following reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objections, REJECTS the

1

Doc. 10 at 58.
Id.
3 Id. at 55.
4 Id. at 6.
5 Doc. 14.
6 Doc. 15.
7 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
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Case No. 1:18-cv-819
Gwin, J.

R&R, VACATES the ALJ’s decision, and REMANDS this case to the ALJ.
Discussion
The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the decision was
supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standards.8 A decision is
supported by substantial evidence if, considering the entire record, “a reasonable mind
might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.”9
In determining whether a child is disabled, an ALJ employs a three-step analysis
considering: (i) whether the child was involved in substantial gainful activity, (ii) whether the
child had severe impairments, and (iii) whether those impairments met or functionally
equaled a listed impairment.10
The parties only dispute the third step. Specifically, Plaintiff Walker challenges the
ALJ’s determination that C.C. did not meet “Listing § 112.05B” and did not functionally meet
a listed impairment. The Court considers both in turn.
A.

Listing § 112.05B
The Social Security Administration’s regulations identify intellectual disorders that

qualify as an impairment in Listing § 112.05B.11 Under § 112.05B, Plaintiff Walker had to show
that C.C. had significant subaverage general intellectual functioning: meaning an IQ score of
at most 70, or an IQ score of at most 75 with a verbal or performance IQ score of at most
70.12 She also had to show significant deficits in adaptive functioning: meaning extreme
limitations in one, or marked limitations in two, of the following domains:

8

Blankenship v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 624 F. App’x 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 423–24.
10 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b)–(d).
11 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 112.05B.
12 Id. at § 112.05B(1)(a)–(b).
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Gwin, J.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Understanding, remembering, and applying information.
Interacting with others.
Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.
Adapting or managing oneself.13

The ALJ determined that, even assuming C.C.’s intellectual functioning was significantly
subaverage, C.C.’s limitations in these domains were less than marked.14 Plaintiff Walker
argues that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the first and third domains.15
The ALJ decision faces the problem that the ALJ inexplicably combined his analysis of
the first and third factors, making it impossible to understand his explanation.16 The
regulations presumably keep these factors separate for a reason, and the ALJ’s combined
discussion does little to promote clarity.
Further muddying the waters, the ALJ conflates three years of medical records. For
example, the ALJ relies on a 2017 examination to determine that C.C. was not disabled in
2014.17 Bluntly, the ALJ makes little effort in tying the evidence to the relevant timespan.
Also, some of ALJ’s relied upon evidence has no apparent bearing on the first and
third domains. For example, the ALJ states that “[t]he claimant plays video games, and uses
computers and tablets.”18 The ALJ further argues that C.C. enjoys fishing, hunting, and
playing outside.19 He even points to the fact that “[t]he claimant attends school”—which is
legally required and says nothing about his performance.20
Worst of all, some of the ALJ’s conclusions are simply inaccurate. The ALJ states that

13

Id. at § 112.05B(1)–(2).
Doc. 10 at 63–64.
15 Doc. 11 at 13–15.
16 Doc. 10 at 63.
17 Doc. 10 at 63 (citing a March 2017 Wechsler Intelligence Scale).
18 Id. at 63.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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Gwin, J.

C.C. attends school with typically developing peers.21 In fact, C.C. has been enrolled in
special education program since 2014. And in the 2017 academic year alone, C.C. received
dozens of hours of direct intensive instruction in reading, math, writing, and functional
academics.22 The ALJ’s statement suggests that C.C. was receiving an unexceptional
education. When, in fact, the school district had determined that C.C. would benefit from
extended time to complete tasks, simplified instructions, reduced reading levels, and seating
near a teacher.
Additionally, the ALJ determined that “there [was] no evidence of learning barriers
[or] repeated grades.”23 Again, untrue. As of 2014, C.C. was unable to receive special
education services with nondisabled peers because he requires “a small group in order to
provide direct, intensive instruction.”24 Further, in 2014, it seems the local school district
determined that C.C. met the state’s criteria for being disabled due to developmental
delay.25
Similarly, a May 2016 evaluation revealed that his reading, alphabet, and math skills
were “within the Very Low to Below Average” range.26 The same evaluation indicated that
his community use skills were extremely low, and his communication, functional academics,
school living, leisure, and self-direction skills were below average.27 Finally, C.C. had been
diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.28

21

Id.
Doc. 10 at 42.
23 Id. at 63.
24 Id. at 45.
25 Id. at 559.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 505.
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The Court could go on.
In sum, the ALJ boot-strapped later-in-time evidence, merged factors that should
have been separate, mischaracterized the evidence, and utterly failed to mention—much
less grapple with—the evidence supporting disability. Accordingly, the Court cannot
conclude that his decision was supported by substantial evidence.
B.

Functional Equivalence
For a claimant’s impairments to functionally equal a listed impairment, the claimant

must show that he has extreme limitations in one, or marked limitations in two, of the
following domains:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Acquiring and using information.
Attending and completing tasks.
Interacting with others.
Moving about and manipulating objects.
Caring for oneself.
Health and physical well-being.29

The ALJ determined that C.C.’s limitations were less than “marked” for all six domains.30
Plaintiff Walker challenges his analysis of the first and second domains.
The ALJ’s analysis of C.C. ability to acquire and use information suffers from the same
slipshod temporal application discussed above. He again cites to 2016 and 2017
examinations to deny a 2014 disability claim.
Further, the ALJ again presents an otherworldly account of the record. He relies on
the fact that C.C. “attended preschool with typically developing peers.”31 Not true. He

29

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)–(iv).
Doc. 10 at 77.
31 Id. at 63.
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states that “there is no evidence of learning barriers.”32 Not true. And he states that “[t]he
claimant was doing overall well in school.”33 Not true. To the contrary, a first-grade report
indicates that C.C. was meeting grade level expectations in exactly one subject—music.34
Again, the Court cannot conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision.
Conclusion
A perception of fairness is essential to the administrative system. Cherry-picked
explanations and mischaracterized evidence undermine that; likely leaving a mother—who
is uniquely positioned to observe her child—understandably bewildered by the
bureaucracy’s decision.
While the ALJ may still determine C.C. was not disabled, his explanation must
consider the record as a whole.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objections, REJECTS the
R&R, VACATES the ALJ’s decision, and REMANDS this case to the ALJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2019

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32

Id. at 69.
Id. at 63.
34 Id. at 19.
33

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