Reig et al v. Village of Seville
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: Intervenor's 5 motion to dismiss is GRANTED. All counts of Plaintiffs' complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED. Judge Charles Esque Fleming on 3/26/2024. (S,SR)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHELLE RIEG, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
vs.
VILLAGE OF SEVILLE,
Defendant.
I.
CASE NO. 1:22-CV-2120
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas concerning actions taken by the Village of Seville to approve the Flint
Development site plan which consisted of an industrial warehouse and distribution hub facility
allegedly in the vicinity of properties owned by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5–17). On
November 22, 2022, Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because the complaint asserted violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments via claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1, PageID #1–2).
On November 29, 2022, NEO Commerce Center, LLC moved to intervene as a party in
this case because the ordinance and the Village of Seville Planning Commission actions in question
concern the approval of an industrial warehouse development on its property. (ECF No. 3, PageID
#92). The Court granted that motion and Intervenor filed a motion to dismiss on November 30,
2022. (ECF No. 5). Intervenor moved for the Court to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiffs’ complaint
with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. (Id. at PageID #119). On December 29, 2022, Plaintiffs opposed Intervenor’s motion.
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(ECF No. 9). On January 12, 2023, Intervenor replied in support of its motion. (ECF No. 10).
For the following reasons, Intervenor’s motion is GRANTED.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
The “complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
under some viable legal theory.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508
F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). In assessing plausibility, the Court construes factual allegations in
the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, accepts the allegations of the complaint as
true, and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471,
476 (6th Cir. 2007).
III.
ANALYSIS
Intervenor argues that the complaint does not state a cognizable claim under either the
United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution, so counts three, four and five should be
dismissed. (ECF No. 5, PageID #125). If the legal basis underlying those claims is insufficient,
Intervenor notes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief, so count one should be
dismissed. (Id. at PageID #132). Intervenor alleges that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause
of action, so count two should be dismissed. (Id. at PageID #132–33).
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A. Counts Three, Four, and Five
In count three, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated procedural due process, substantive
due process, and equal protection when it passed Ordinance 2022-40 as an emergency and when
the Planning Commission applied Ordinance 2022-40 to approve a site plan for the Flint
Development that allowed violations of Section 611 of the Zoning Code. (ECF No. 1, PageID
#21–24). Plaintiffs allege in count four that Defendant’s “conduct in enacting and enforcing
Ordinance 2022-40 and its other unconstitutional ordinances, policies, and customs under color of
law was and is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at PageID #24). In count five, Plaintiff
alleges, “[t]o the extent the Village’s enactment and enforcement of Ordinance 2022-40 violates
Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution, it likewise violates Plaintiff’s rights under
Article I, Sections 1, 2, and 16 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.” (Id. at PageID #25).
Intervenor analyzes the state and federal constitutional violations together because both the
due process and equal protection clauses of each constitution are to be construed and analyzed
identically. (ECF No. 5, PageID #125 (citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 433
(Ohio 2007); Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors v. Cent. State Univ., 717 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ohio
1999))). The bulk of these claims will be analyzed together. However, there are indications that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution may offer protections beyond the federal
Constitution in certain circumstances. See State v. Mole, 74 N.E.3d 368, 374 (Ohio 2016) (“the
Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force”); State v. Noling, 75 N.E.3d 141, 146 (Ohio
2016) (“Because the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution is coextensive with, or
stronger than, that of the federal Constitution, we cite both throughout this opinion.”).
Accordingly, if there is case law that extends the state claim beyond the federal claim, the Court
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will consider it in its analysis. Otherwise, the alleged constitutional violations will be analyzed
together.
i.
Due Process
Intervenor argues that Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process claims fail because
Plaintiffs have not established a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. (ECF No.
5, PageID #125). Plaintiffs contend they have a constitutionally protected property interest
because their “properties are in areas adjacent to the Overlay District” and because they have
standing to appeal an administrative zoning order. (ECF No. 9, PageID #201). Intervenor replies
that the requirements to establish standing for a zoning appeal do not establish a constitutionally
protected property interest, any “adverse effects” due to proximity do not create a vested property
interest, and diminution of property values does not give rise to substantive due process protection.
(ECF No. 10, PageID #217–20).
The Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This clause has a procedural
and a substantive component. EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir.
2012). Procedural due process requires “that the government provide a fair procedure when
depriving someone of life, liberty, or property” while substantive due process “protects individual
liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.” Id. (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). The
threshold question of both a procedural and a substantive due process claim is whether Plaintiffs
have shown that a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest exists. Id. (citing Women’s
Med. Pro’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) and Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp.,
519 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2008)). “[N]either the Sixth Circuit nor Ohio courts have gone so far
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as to say that property owners have a property interest in the existing zoning classifications of
nearby or neighboring properties.” Brooks v. Butler County, Ohio, 2022 WL 2526601, *7 (6th Cir.
July 7, 2022).
The plaintiffs in Brooks raised a similar argument to Plaintiffs in this case concerning their
property interest. The plaintiffs in Brooks argued their ability to appeal a zoning decision to the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas was “sufficient to create a protected property interest under state
law.” Id. at *6. The Sixth Circuit found that the right to appeal does not automatically create a
property interest. Id. Instead, the Sixth Circuit held, “for a contiguous or adjacent property owner
to show a property interest in a [Board of Zoning Appeals] decision, the property owner must, at
the minimum, participate in the administrative process and demonstrate a direct effect from the
decision.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, “[t]he Rieg Residence is in the neighborhood adjoining the
Flint Property and is in the immediate vicinity of the Flint Development” and “[t]he Wangler
Residence is directly adjoined to the Flint Property and Flint Development.” (ECF No. 1, PageID
#8). Plaintiffs allege that because of Seville’s enactment and enforcement of Ordinance 2022-40,
which led to the subsequent approval of the Flint Development site plan by the Planning
Commission on September 19, 2022, they “lost value in their properties and have incurred
litigation costs, expenses, and attorney fees.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #16). They expect damages to
continue in the future. Id.
Plaintiffs’ complaint details their participation in the administrative process surrounding
the approval of the Flint Development and the passage of Ordinance 2022-40. (ECF No. 1, PageID
#10) (At a May 23, 2022 Planning Commission meeting concerning proposed amendments by
Flint, “some of the Plaintiffs here, spoke against the Amendments and the Flint Development
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identifying violations of the Mixed Use Overlay District provisions, stating concerns of health
effects, excessive sound, environmental issues, unreasonable traffic increases, drainage problems
and loss of value to their own properties.”); Id. at PageID #12–13 (“On or about June 13, 2022, at
a public hearing, Mrs. Rieg questioned the propriety of emergency language in Ordinance 202240” and “Mrs. Wangler asked the Seville Village Council to define ‘reasonable’ as it was used in
the Ordinance.”); Id. at PageID #14 (“On or about June 27, 2022, the Flint Development site plan
was presented to Planning Commission. Again, the Wanglers and Riegs appeared and objected.”);
Id. (“At a Council meeting on July 11, 2022, Rieg asked the Council why all ordinances concerned
with the Flint Development included emergency language.”); Id. at PageID #15 (Prior to a
September 19, 2022 Planning Commission meeting, “the attorney for the Riegs and Wanglers, on
their behalf, e-mailed to Seville’s solicitor a comprehensive statement in opposition to Ordinance
2022-40 and the Flint Development site plan and requested the solicitor forward the same to the
Planning Commission members. The attorney also submitted hard copies of the statement to each
of the Planning Commission members at the meeting.”); Id. at PageID #16 (At the meeting, “[t]he
Riegs and Robin Wangler appeared and stated what objections they could within the three minutes
allotted. The Riegs’ and Wanglers’ attorney also spoke on their behalf in objection to the site plan
and the Ordinance 2022-40.”). Intervenor concedes this in its motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 5,
PageID #127) (“Plaintiffs attended and were active participants at the hearings concerning the
Zoning Code amendment and the Development.”). Thus, Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that they
participated in the administrative process.
The remaining issue for determination of property interest is whether Plaintiffs adequately
pleaded a direct effect from the zoning decision at issue in this case. Plaintiffs contend this element
is met through proximity of the Flint development to their properties and through the diminution
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of the value of their properties. (ECF No. 9, PageID #202). Proximity alone does not meet this
requirement because the Sixth Circuit noted in Brooks, “neither the Sixth Circuit nor Ohio courts
have gone so far as to say that property owners have a property interest in the existing zoning
classifications of nearby or neighboring properties.” Brooks v. Butler County, Ohio, 2022 WL
2526601, *7 (6th Cir. July 7, 2022). Consequently, the remaining issue is whether Plaintiffs’
alleged loss of value in their properties is adequate to establish a property interest.
Intervenor cites to case law from the Second Circuit for the proposition that alleged decline
in property values is not an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fusco v. State
of Conn., 815 F.2d 201, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987). The Court could not find any cases within the
Sixth Circuit addressing this issue. The closest analogy the Court could find was in analysis of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause where the Sixth Circuit determined that decline in property
values is not per se a taking requiring compensation. See Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789,
796 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)). Plaintiffs cite to
an Ohio case that conferred standing to raise an administrative appeal of a zoning decision when
there was evidence that the challenging party’s property value may be reduced. See Jenkins v.
Gallipolis, 715 N.E. 2d 196, 200 (Ohio 4th Dist. 1998). However, Plaintiffs again confuse the
requirements for bringing an administrative appeal with the requirements for establishing a due
process property interest, which the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected in Brooks. Brooks v. Butler
County, Ohio, 2022 WL 2526601, *6 (6th Cir. July 7, 2022).
With no authority to support the contention that alleged diminution of property values
establishes a constitutionally protected property interest, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
adequately pleaded a claim for either procedural or substantive due process.
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ii.
Equal Protection
Intervenor argues that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails because Plaintiffs are not
similarly situated to Intervenor and were not denied the variance process. (ECF No. 5, PageID
#130–31). Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant lacked a rational basis to adopt
Ordinance 2022-40 and approve the Flint Development. (Id. at PageID #131–32).
Plaintiffs respond that Intervenor is mistaken as to what similarly situated class they
identified in their complaint. (ECF No. 9, PageID #213). Plaintiffs allege the similarly situated
party consists of property owners adjacent to other zoning districts that enjoy the protection of
Seville’s robust variance procedure. (Id.). Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Intervenor is confused
as to what rational basis is required. (Id.). Plaintiffs concede there is a rationale for the economic
development, but they argue that it is the distinction between them and their articulated similarly
situated class that requires a rational basis. (Id.). Plaintiffs state, “[t]here is no rational basis to
treat Plaintiffs differently than other property owners in Seville.” (Id.).
In reply, Intervenor notes that the complaint does not allege that Defendant treated
Plaintiffs differently than other property owners. (ECF No. 10, PageID #229). Intervenor argues
that Plaintiffs instead repeatedly allege that Defendant’s actions impacted Plaintiffs and “the
community at large.” (Id.). Even if that class had been properly alleged, Intervenor contests that
Plaintiffs are still not similarly situated to property owners adjacent to other zoning districts
because “property owners adjacent to other zoning districts will neighbor properties that are
subject to separate and distinct substantive restrictions and procedural requirements.” (Id. at
PageID #230). Intervenor challenges that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant’s actions lacked
a rational basis because they “must negate every conceivable basis which might support the
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government action or show that the challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” (Id.
at PageID #231).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that “[n]o State
shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. “[A] valid equal protection claim requires showing that the government treated
the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment
either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Reform
America v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 37 F.4th 1138, 1152 (6th Cir. 2022). To be “similarly
situated,” “the plaintiff and the comparator must be alike in all relevant respects.” Id. (citing
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Equal protection claims can be brought by a class of
one, “where the plaintiff alleges that the state treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for such difference in treatment.” Warren v. City of
Athens, Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005). As Plaintiffs are not a suspect class, they proceed
under a class of one theory. “A class of one plaintiff may demonstrate that a government action
lacks a rational basis in one of two ways: either by negating every conceivable basis which might
support the government action or by demonstrating that the challenged government action was
motivated by animus or ill-will.” Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1179 (6th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded “that property owners adjacent to other zoning districts
enjoy the protection of Seville’s robust variance procedure” and that Plaintiffs were denied that
protection simply because their property lies in the vicinity of an “Overlay District.” (ECF No. 9,
PageID #213). Plaintiffs stated in their complaint, “owners of properties neighboring Mixed Use
Overlay Districts are denied the equal protection of law (namely the variance process) that other
land owners are provided as it relates to development of properties neighboring other districts.”
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(ECF No. 1, PageID #12).
Intervenor contends that property owners adjacent to other zoning
districts are not “similarly situated.” (ECF No. 10, PageID #230). Intervenor states that those
property owners are inherently dissimilar because each zoning district has its own permitted and
prohibited uses and procedures. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiffs and property owners that are adjacent to
other zoning districts in Seville are not “similarly situated in all relevant respects.”
Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded that they were treated
differently from others alleged to be similarly situated, Plaintiffs failed to allege there was no
rational basis for the difference in treatment, or that it was due to animus/ill will. Plaintiffs concede
in their complaint that Defendant stands to “gain substantial amounts of money from direct and
indirect tax revenue generated by the Flint Development.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #16). Defendant
noted in Ordinance 2022-40 that the purpose of the Ordinance was “to maximize potential for
economic development within the Village.” (Id. at PageID #39). Plaintiffs did not allege any
animus or ill-will from Defendant in their complaint and did not argue that in their opposition.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege:
While there is rationale for economic development, it is the class distinction that
needs a rational basis. There is no rational basis for placing upon Plaintiffs a
disproportionate amount of the burden that comes from the economic benefit to
Seville just because they live next to an Overlay District as opposed to another type
of zoning district.
(ECF No. 9, PageID #213). Intervenor argues that it is rational for Defendant to decide that certain
zoning districts are appropriate for economic development and pass the requisite ordinances to
accomplish that. (ECF No. 10, PageID #231). The Court concurs. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to negate
every conceivable basis which might support the government action or demonstrate that the
challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will as required.
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Plaintiffs did not adequately pleaded claims for a violation of their rights to procedural due
process, substantive due process, or equal protection. As Plaintiffs have failed to plead a violation
of either the United States or Ohio constitution, counts three, four, and five are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Count One
Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment against Defendant in count one of their complaint
because Ordinance 2022-40 is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to the Flint
Development. (ECF No. 1, PageID #17–20). Intervenor argues that this count should be dismissed
because Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief when the legal basis underlying the claim is
insufficient, as determined above. (ECF No. 5, PageID #132). As counts three, four, and five are
dismissed, there remains no legal basis for a declaratory judgment. Count one is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Count Two
Count two seeks to enjoin the construction of the Flint Development under the current site
plan approved by the Planning Commission. (ECF No. 1, PageID #21). Intervenor argues that
injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. (ECF No. 5, PageID #132–33). Intervenor also
notes that count two should be dismissed because there are no remaining causes of action. (Id.).
As there are no remaining causes of action, the Court DISMISSES count two of Plaintiffs’
complaint WITH PREJUDICE; injunctive relief can only be granted if the underlying claims are
meritorious.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Intervenor’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. All counts of Plaintiffs’ complaint are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 26, 2024
__________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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