Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The Commissioner's final decision denying Rodriguez's application for disability insurance benefits is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd on 5/10/2024. (D,JJ)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ELSA MARIA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
I.

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Case No. 1:23-CV-01305
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REUBEN J. SHEPERD

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Introduction
Plaintiff, Elsa Maria Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), seeks judicial review of the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security, denying her application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. This matter is before me pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). I find the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not apply the
proper legal standards and reached a decision that is not supported by substantial evidence, and
vacate and remand the Commissioner’s final decision denying Rodriguez’s DIB application.
II.

Procedural History
Rodriguez filed for DIB on November 9, 2018, alleging an amended disability onset date

of April 21, 2017. (Tr. 170-78, 195). The claims were denied initially and on reconsideration.
(Tr. 81, 90). She then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 115-16). The ALJ issued a written
opinion on October 7, 2019, finding Rodriguez not disabled. (Tr. 15-25). The Appeals Council

denied her request for review on August 19, 2020, making the hearing decision the final decision
of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955, 404.981).
Rodriguez appealed the ALJ’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. The District Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case
to the ALJ. (Tr. 634). On remand, Rodriguez and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified before the
ALJ on April 4, 2023. (Tr. 585-609).
On April 28, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Rodriguez not disabled. (Tr.
562-84). As the case had previously been remanded by the District Court, the hearing decision is
the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 634; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.984). Rodriguez timely
filed this action on June 30, 2023. (ECF Doc. 1).
III.

Evidence
A.

Personal, Educational, and Vocational Evidence

Rodriguez was 54 years old on the date last insured, making her an individual closely
approaching advanced age according to Agency regulations. (See Tr. 576). She attended school
through the ninth grade. (See Tr. 201, 594). She has worked as a small product assembler, hotel
housekeeper, and laundry aide. (Tr. 201, 595-96).
B.

Relevant Medical Evidence 1

On April 21, 2017, Rodriguez reestablished care with her primary care physician, Leonor
Osario, D.O. (Tr. 310). Rodriguez’s chief complaints were anxiety and depression. (Id.).
Rodriguez explained that her husband died four months prior to her visit and that she was having
a difficult time with grief. (Id.). She felt very anxious and would overeat. (Id.). Rodriguez had no

This recitation of the medical evidence is limited to evidence relevant to Rodriguez’s challenge to the
ALJ’s findings regarding her mental health impairments, all other claims are deemed waived. See
Kennedy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 87 F. App’x 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2003).

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suicidal ideations and was negative for sleep disturbance, mood disorder, and recent
psychosocial stressors. (Id.). Dr. Osario informed Rodriguez about the importance of exercising
and decreasing her coffee intake to help with her anxiety. (Tr. 311). Dr. Osario prescribed
Lexapro and recommended a psychological consultation. (Id.).
On August 15, 2017, Rodriguez had an appointment with Dr. Osario for pain in her back.
(Tr. 303-04). During this appointment, Rodriguez reported that she was depressed but did not
have any suicidal or homicidal ideations. (Tr. 304). She complained that she did not have energy
and was overeating. (Id.). Rodriguez was alert and cooperative during her appointment. (Id.). Dr.
Osario increased Rodriguez’s Lexapro prescription to 20 mg per day. (Tr. 305).
On December 7, 2017, Rodriguez attended a follow up appointment with Dr. Osario for
weight management. (Tr. 293). Dr. Osario encouraged Rodriguez to write in a journal and
meditate rather than eat for stress relief. (Tr. 294).
Rodriguez saw Ilda Felix, CNP, on April 3, 2018. (Tr. 289). Rodriguez came to the
appointment with her daughter, who reported that Rodriguez was depressed and in denial after
her husband’s death. (Id.). Rodriguez would lose her patience which affected her family. (Id.).
CNP Felix noted that Rodriguez was negative for sleep disturbance, mood disorder, and recent
psychosocial stressors. (Tr. 291). CNP Felix referred Rodriguez to a consultation with
psychology for her depression and anxiety and instructed Rodriguez to continue taking Lexapro
for depression. CNP Felix prescribed Buspirone for anxiety. (Id.).
On May 9, 2018, Rodriguez saw Dr. Osorio, reporting that she was still experiencing
depression. (Tr. 286-87). Rodriguez was alert and cooperative with no signs of distress during
the appointment. (Tr. 287). Dr. Osario instructed Rodriguez to continue taking her Lexapro. (Id.).

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On August 10, 2018, Rodriguez had a consultation with Dr. Osorio for right carpal tunnel
release. (Tr. 267). During the appointment, Rodriguez was alert and oriented, with no acute
distress. (Tr. 269). Dr. Osario noted that Rodriguez was “somewhat stable” regarding her anxiety
and depression with medication, but that Rodriguez would like to increase her dosage. (Id.). The
notes from this encounter indicate that Rodriguez was taking her Lexapro, but on August 7,
2018, she reported she was not taking her Buspirone. (Tr. 268-69).
On August 30, 2018, Rodriguez saw Dr. Osorio for a follow up regarding her depression.
(Tr. 265-66). Rodriguez reported having good days and bad days, noting that her family was an
active stressor. (Id.). She reported being medication compliant with no suicidal or homicidal
ideations. (Tr. 266). During the appointment, Rodriguez was alert and cooperative with no signs
of distress. (Id.). Dr. Osario noted that Rodriguez was negative for sleep disturbance, mood
disorder, and recent psychosocial stressors. (Id.). Rodriguez was informed that counseling,
journal writing, and exercise would help with depression. (Id.). Dr. Osario recommended that
Rodriguez consult with psychiatry. (Id.).
On September 28, 2018, Rodriguez went to the emergency room due to increased
depression. (Tr. 257). Rodriguez was described as tearful, nervous, and anxious during the visit.
(Tr. 257, 259). Rodriguez reported problems with her daughter which caused her to feel
overwhelmed and more depressed. (Tr. 257). She denied suicidal and homicidal ideations but
had passive death wishing thoughts. (Tr. 257, 261). Rodriguez reported palpitations, dizziness,
and a headache. (Tr. 258). Rodriguez stated she was compliant with her medication; however,
she did not take her psychiatric medications that day. (Id.).
Emma Borrelli, LPC, conducted a behavioral health intake with Rodriguez during her
emergency room visit. (Tr. 261). Rodriguez was calm and cooperative during the assessment.

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(Id.). She answered questions appropriately, but with a flat affect. (Id.). Rodriguez reported that
she did not have a support system, but that she was comfortable talking to two of her children.
(Tr. 261). Rodriguez declined admission into a mood behavioral unit because she feared it would
interfere with her ability to see her grandson. (Tr. 260-61). At discharge, Rodriguez’s disposition
was stable. (Tr. 261).
On November 16, 2018, Rodriguez saw Yaritza Colon, LISW-S for an initial evaluation,
seeking treatment for increased depressed mood, anxiety, and grief. (Tr. 405-06). Rodriguez’s
chief complaint at this visit was “‘Every [] time I think of my husband I start crying.’” (Tr. 406).
Rodriguez reported feeling overwhelmed by her symptoms, chronic tearfulness, low mood and
energy, decreased interests, increased apathy and appetite, and feeling alone. (Id.). Rodriguez
preferred to stay in bed all day, but also reported that her sleep was poor making her feel tired
daily. (Id.). Rodriguez reported chronic worry and ruminating thoughts. (Id.). She denied having
suicidal ideations but admitted to fleeting death wishes. (Id.). She felt guilty about her mood
swings and lashing out at her children. (Id.). She also reported low energy with fluctuating
concentration. (Id.). While Rodriguez had been taking Lexapro for two years, she did not feel as
though it adequately treated her symptoms. (Tr. 407). Colon administered the PHQ-9 and the
GAD-7, which Rodriguez scored 25 and 13 respectively, indicating moderate to severe
symptoms of depression and anxiety. (Id.).
On December 13, 2018, Rodriguez saw Dr. Osario for a follow up. (Tr. 1069). Rodriguez
reported that her depression had improved but was still present. (Id.). Rodriguez informed Dr.
Osario that she had an appointment with her psychiatrist scheduled for the following week to
discuss her medication dosage. (Id.).

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C.

Medical Opinion Evidence

On December 2, 2018, state Agency reviewer Janet Souder, Psy.D., evaluated
Rodriguez’s medical record and determined there was insufficient evidence to assess
Rodriguez’s mental health condition on initial review. (Tr. 77-78). On reconsideration, Vicki
Warren, Ph.D. found the same and affirmed Dr. Souder’s findings on January 8, 2019. (Tr. 8687).
D.

Administrative Hearing Evidence

At the hearing before the ALJ on April 4, 2023, Rodriguez testified that following an
accident in 2012, she did not work and stayed home with her husband who took care of her. (Tr.
597). Rodriguez’s husband died in 2016. (Id.). Following her husband’s death, Rodriguez
became severely depressed and began seeing a psychologist and a psychiatrist for her depression.
(Id.). As a result of her depression, Rodriguez does not go out often unless she is accompanied
by her daughter. (Id.). The fact that she cannot go out makes Rodriguez more depressed. (Id.).
Rodriguez takes medication to deal with her depression and anxiety. (Tr. 598). Rodriguez
has difficulty talking with her psychologist and psychiatrist because she gets anxious during their
phone calls and begins crying. When this happens, Rodriguez postpones the call. (Id.).
A few years after her husband’s death, Rodriguez’s father and sister died. (Tr. 602).
Rodriguez explained that it felt like it was one thing after another. (Id.). These subsequent family
deaths made Rodriguez feel worse and want to stay home. (Id.). Rodriguez felt more anxiety as a
result of the pandemic. (Tr. 603).
The VE testified at the hearing. (Tr. 605-07). He testified that a hypothetical individual of
Rodriguez’s age, education, and work history, limited to light exertion who can handle and
finger items frequently bilaterally; frequently climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders,

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ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, would be able to perform
Rodriguez’s past work as a small product assembler and hotel housekeeper, but not as a laundry
aide. (Tr. 606). The VE noted however, that Rodriguez may not be able to perform hotel cleaning
based on the constant use of her hands. (Id.).
He further opined such an individual could also perform the jobs of a marker, DOT
209.587-034, SVP 2, light exertion level, with 56,000 jobs in the national economy; garment
sorter, DOT 222.687-014, SVP2, light exertion level, with 23,000 jobs in the national economy;
and laundry classifier, DOT 361.687-014, SVP 2, light exertion level, with 21,000 jobs in the
national economy. (Tr. 606).
As for time off-task or absenteeism, the VE testified that employers would generally
tolerate no more than 10% of the time off-task and no more than one absence per month. (Tr.
607).
IV.

The ALJ’s Decision

In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings:
1.

The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act on June 30, 2018.

2.

The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period
from her alleged onset date through her date last insured of June 30, 2018
(20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3.

T[h]rough the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe
impairments: left elbow epicondylitis; lumbar radiculopathy; carpal tunnel
syndrome status-post right carpal tunnel release surgery; and obesity (20
CFR 404.1520(c)).

4.

Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that et or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date
last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform

5.

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light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except frequently climb ramps
and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; frequently stoop, kneel,
crouch and crawl; and frequently handle and finger bilaterally.
6.

Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past
relevant work as small products assembler and hotel housekeeper. This
work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded
by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7.

The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, at any time from the alleged onset date, through June 30, 2018, the date
last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

(Tr. 570-77).
V.

Law & Analysis
A.

Standard for Disability

Social Security regulations outline a five-step process the ALJ must use to determine
whether a claimant is entitled to benefits:
1.

whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;

2.

if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments;

3.

if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals
any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;

4.

if not, whether the claimant can perform their past relevant work in light of his
RFC; and

5.

if not, whether, based on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, they
can perform other work found in the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642-43 (6th Cir.
2006). The Commissioner is obligated to produce evidence at Step Five, but the claimant bears
the ultimate burden to produce sufficient evidence to prove they are disabled and, thus, entitled
to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).

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B.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine if it is supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the substantial
evidence standard is not a high threshold for sufficiency. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1154 (2019). “It means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Even if a preponderance of the evidence supports the claimant’s position,
the Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned “so long as substantial evidence also supports
the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir.
2003).
Under this standard, the court cannot decide the facts anew, evaluate credibility, or reweigh the evidence. Id. at 476. And “it is not necessary that this court agree with the
Commissioner’s finding,” so long as it meets the substantial evidence standard. Rogers, 486 F.3d
at 241; see also Biestek, 880 F.3d at 783. This is because the Commissioner enjoys a “zone of
choice” within which to decide cases without court interference. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,
545 (6th Cir. 1986).
Even if substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision, the court will not uphold that
decision when the Commissioner failed to apply proper legal standards, unless the legal error
was harmless. Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] decision
. . . will not be upheld [when] the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and that error
prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”); Rabbers v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, . . . we review

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decisions of administrative agencies for harmless error.”). Furthermore, this Court will not
uphold a decision when the Commissioner’s reasoning does “not build an accurate and logical
bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011). Requiring an accurate and logical bridge ensures that a claimant and the reviewing
court will understand the ALJ’s reasoning, because “[i]f relevant evidence is not mentioned, the
court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.” Shrader v. Astrue, No. 1113000, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012).
VI.

Discussion
Rodriguez assigns the following error for this Court’s review: “the ALJ erred by

assessing Plaintiff’s mental impairments as non-severe at step two and the ALJ’s error permeate
the remainder of the decision and Plaintiff’s RFC.” (ECF Doc. 11, PageID 2014).
A.

The ALJ erred in failing to explain or consider Rodriguez’s mental
impairments when determining her RFC.

Rodriguez argues the ALJ erred when he determined that her mental impairments were
non-severe because her medical records demonstrate that her mental limitations meet Step Two’s
de minimis hurdle. (ECF Doc. 11, PageID 2025). For example, Rodriguez points to her
November 16, 2018 appointment with LISW-S Colon where she scored 25 on the PHQ-9 and 13
and on the GAD-7. (Id.). In support of her argument, Rodriguez cites Pearson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 19-13506, 2020 WL 8266422, (E.D.Mich., 2020) for the proposition that the PHQ-9 is
recognized by the Sixth Circuit as a reliable source when determining the severity of a claimant’s
depression. (ECF Doc. 11, PageID 2025). Rodriguez further argues that the ALJ failed to
consider her mental impairments – regardless of severity – when he determined her RFC. (Id. at
PageID 2027).

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In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err because based on the
“limited record, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the evidence did not establish more than a
minimal limitation in [Rodriguez’s] ability to do basic work activities through her date last
insured.” (ECF Doc. 13, PageID 2036). Further, the Commissioner notes that Rodriguez “relies
entirely on medical records that, at the earliest, post-date [her] June 30, 2018 date last insured by
several months.” (Id.).
I find that the record suggests that Rodriguez’s depression and anxiety had more than a
minimal effect on her ability to work at Step Two of the sequential five-step analysis. I further
find that the ALJ erred in failing to adequately explain why Rodriguez’s mental impairments did
not result in work-related limitations.
At Step Two, the ALJ considers the medical severity of a claimant’s impairment and
whether there is a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment – or
combination of impairments – that meets Agency duration requirements. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Generally, agency regulations provide that finding no limitations or only
mild limitations result in finding a limitation to be non-severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1).
An impairment or combination of impairments is non-severe when it “does not significantly limit
[one’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at § 404.1522(a). “If we rate
the degrees of your limitation as ‘none’ or ‘mild,’ we will generally conclude that your [mental]
impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a
minimal limitation in your ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). See
also Carrelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 390 F. App’x 429, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming a nonsevere mental impairment finding despite claimant’s moderate limitations); Atterberry v. Sec’y of

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Health & Human Servs., 871 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding a finding that claimant
who was “‘somewhat depressed’” did not have a severe mental impairment).
Here, the ALJ determined that Rodriguez’s mental health impairments were not severe
based on the “four broad functional areas . . . known as the ‘paragraph B’ criteria.” (Tr. 571).
Included in the four functional areas are the abilities to interact with others and to adapt or
manage oneself. (Tr. 572). The ALJ found Rodriguez had no limitation prior to her DLI
regarding interacting with others, citing to Rodriguez driving for Uber and appearing alert,
pleasant, and cooperative at medical appointments. (Id.). He further found Rodriguez had mild
impairments regarding adapting and managing herself. (Id.). In making this finding, the ALJ
noted despite her mental health diagnoses and resulting symptoms, her “mental status
examination remained unremarkable showing she remained alert, oriented, cooperative, and
pleasant.” (Id.).
To support this appeal Rodriguez relies primarily on medical records from November 16,
2018, post-dating her DLI. Rodriguez’s post DLI medical records are not entirely without value
in my review of the ALJ’s decision, but the value is significantly diminished. “[P]ost-date-lastinsured medical evidence generally has little probative value unless it illuminates the claimant’s
health before the insurance cutoff date.” Grisier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 721 Fed. Appx. 473,
477 (6th Cir. 2018). Rodriguez’s post-DLI medical records illuminate the extent to which
Rodriguez suffered from depression and anxiety before the DLI when limited signs of distress or
recent psychosocial stressors were present. In those scenarios, Rodriguez presented alert,
cooperative, and without sleep disturbance, mood disorder, and suicidal ideations. (Tr. 291, 304,
310). However, when a stressor emerged – like a fight with her family – Rodriguez would lose

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her patience, experience heart palpitations, dizziness, and headaches, and express death wishing
thoughts. (Tr. 257-61, 289).
Evidence in the record demonstrates that Rodriguez suffered from depression and anxiety
resulting from her husband’s death in 2016, prior to her June 30, 2018 DLI. (Tr. 287-87, 289,
303, 310). She cites to records that pre-date her DLI, including appointments with Dr. Osario on
April 15, 2017, and CNP Felix on April 3, 2018, where she was prescribed Lexapro and
Buspirone for her depression and anxiety. (ECF Doc. 11, PageID 2026; Tr. 289-91, 310-11). Her
depression and anxiety led Rodriguez to overeat, have passive death wishing thoughts, and, at
times, affected her relationship with her family. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that
Rodriguez complained of depression and anxiety arising from her husband’s death as early as
April 21, 2017 when she reestablished care with Dr. Osario. (Tr. 310). Her grief persists
throughout her medical records. (Tr. 310, 289, 406).
Accordingly, the record suggests that Rodriguez’s mental health impairments had more
than a minimal effect on her ability to work. Indeed, the ALJ found she had mild impairments
which would suggest that Rodriguez has crossed the de minimis threshold at Step Two.
However, my analysis does not end here, because “‘an ALJ’s conclusion that an
impairment is non-severe is not tantamount to a conclusion that the same impairment—either
singly or in combination with a claimant’s other impairments—does not impose any workrelated restrictions.’” Patterson v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-1470, 2015 WL 5560121, at *4
(N.D.Ohio Sept. 21, 2015) quoting Katona v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-CV-10417, 2015 WL
871617, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Feb.27, 2015). Thus, the question before me is not whether it was error
for the ALJ to fail to find her mental health impairments severe at Step Two, but rather whether

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it was error for the ALJ to overlook the non-severe impairments when forming the RFC at later
steps in the sequential evaluation.
“When formulating an RFC, an ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the
claimant’s impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately,
would be of sufficient severity.” Kochenour v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:14-CV-2451,
2015 WL 9258609, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2015) (quotation marks and alteration omitted)
citing LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 388 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ALJ’s
assessment of residual functional capacity reflects a claimant’s functional capacity in light of all
his limitations, not just those that are severe.”). “Courts within the Sixth Circuit have repeatedly
held that ‘an ALJ’s failure to adequately explain how an impairment affects an individual’s RFC
may constitute reversible error.’” Patterson, 2015 WL 5560121, at *4 quoting Katona, 2015 WL
871617, at *7.
“Where an ALJ determines that non-severe impairments do not result in any workrelated restrictions or limitations, the ALJ ‘is required to state the basis for such conclusion.’”
Patterson, 2015 WL 5560121, at *4 quoting Hicks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-13581, 2013
WL 3778947, at *3 (E.D.Mich. July 18, 2013) (finding that a remand was necessary where the
ALJ explained his findings for why a mental impairment was non-severe but failed to consider
“combined limiting effects” of claimant’s non-severe mental and severe physical impairments).
In the present case, the ALJ stated that he “must consider all of the claimant’s
impairments, including impairments that are not severe” in making his RFC determination and
referenced that Rodriguez had depression, was afraid to go out alone, took medication for her
symptoms, and spoke to a psychologist. (Tr. 570, 574). Notwithstanding these statements, the
ALJ did not state a conclusion as to why Rodriguez’s mental impairments did not result in any

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work-related limitations. Rather, the ALJ detailed Rodriguez’s physical impairments and how
those impairments imposed work-related limitations. (Tr. 573-75). Accordingly, I find remand
necessary because it is unclear if the ALJ failed to consider or merely failed to explain why
Rodriguez’s mental impairments did not result in work-related limitations in determining her
RFC. Due to this error, I cannot determine whether the ALJ discredited or merely overlooked the
relevant evidence in the record. See Shrader, No. 11-13000, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6. In this,
therefore, there is error, as the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge between the
evidence and his Step Two finding and RFC determination. See Fleischer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at
877.
VII.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision denying Rodriguez’s DIB

application is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Dated: May 10, 2024
Reuben J. Sheperd
United States Magistrate Judge

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