Richmond Road Partners, LLC et al v. City of Warrensville Heights et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in the Order, Defendant's 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. District Judge Patricia A Gaughan on 5/9/2024. (W,CM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Richmond Road Partners, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
City of Warrensville Heights, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:23 CV 01662
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Introduction
This matter is before the Court upon defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
(Doc. 11). This case arises from a zoning dispute wherein municipal defendants denied plaintiffs’
site plan application, which was later approved on administrative appeal. For the following reasons,
the motion is GRANTED.
Facts
Plaintiffs Richmond Road Partners, LLC and Step Forward filed this Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Mandatory Injunction (“Complaint”) against defendants City of
Warrensville Heights, City of Warrensville Heights Planning Commission (“Planning
Commission”), and City of Warrensville Heights Building Commissioner. This case was originally
filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas1 and removed to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Step Forward is an Ohio non-profit school providing Head Start early education
services for low-income families and children in the Cleveland area. Plaintiff Richmond Road
Partners, LLC owns property in the city of Warrensville Heights that it agreed to lease to Step
Forward for a Head Start program. The property is zoned U-7A. Warrensville Heights Ordinance §
Richmond Road Partners, LLC, et al. v. City of Warrensville Heights, et al., Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, CV-23-983040, filed July 27, 2023.
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1143.02 requires that buildings and land in the U-7A zoning district are used for “public and private
schools, universities, colleges, professional schools, vocational schools and related educational
facilities,” or “non-profit educational and scientific research agencies.” Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13.
In the fall of 2022, plaintiffs submitted a conditional use permit application seeking
approval to open a Head Start and daycare facility on the property.2 The Planning Commission
denied the application and the Warrensville Heights City Council thereafter accepted the Planning
Commission’s recommendation and denied the application.3
Around November 21, 2022, plaintiffs applied to the Planning Commission for site plan
approval for use of the property as a school and/or a non-profit educational agency. Around
December 12, 2022, plaintiffs appeared before the Planning Commission and the application was
denied. According to the Complaint, the commissioners indicated that they did not believe the
property was a good location “for this type of day care, school, or . . . whatever you want to call it.”
Compl. ¶ 12. The City Council denied the application on February 7, 2023.
On March 8, 2023, plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
§ 2506 with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.4 On October 4, 2023, the court found
that defendants’ decision denying plaintiffs’ application for site plan approval was arbitrary,
Richmond Road Partners, LLC, et al. v. Warrensville Heights City Counsel, et al., Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, CV-23-976289, Opinion and Order dated Oct. 4, 2023 (Kelley, K.), at 2
(hereinafter “State Court Order”).
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Id.
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Richmond Road Partners, LLC, et al. v. Warrensville Heights City Counsel, et al., Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, CV-23-976289, filed Mar 8, 2023.
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unreasonable, and unsupported by the preponderance of the submitted evidence.5 The court
remanded the matter, directing defendants to grant plaintiffs’ application.6
While the administrative appeal was pending, on July 27, 2023, plaintiffs filed this
Complaint, which asserts four causes of action. Count I seeks a declaration that defendants’
decision denying plaintiffs’ application for site plan approval was unconstitutional, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, and without substantial relation to the public health, safety and morals.
Count II is a takings claim based upon the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Count III is a request for
mandatory injunction to proceed with appropriations proceedings to compensate plaintiffs for the
alleged taking. Count IV is a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for violations of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the
Ohio Constitution based on the alleged taking.
This matter is now before the Court upon defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
Standard of Review
A “motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is generally reviewed under
the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Mellentine v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 2013 WL
560515 (6th Cir. February 14, 2013) (citing EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851
(6th Cir.2001)). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded
allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be
State Court Order, at 8 (“A review of the entire record reflects that the decision of Appellee
Warrensville Heights City Counsel of February 7, 2023, denying Appellants’ application for site plan
approval for the location of a preschool/educational facility . . . was arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.”).
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Id.
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granted only if the moving party is nevertheless entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2007).
Thus, “[w]e assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek
Management Corp., 2009 WL 1884445 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009) (citing Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008)). In construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, “the court does not accept the bare assertion of legal
conclusions as enough, nor does it accept as true unwarranted factual inferences.” Gritton v.
Disponett, 2009 WL 1505256 (6th Cir. May 27, 2009) (citing In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,
123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). As outlined by the Sixth Circuit:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir.2012). Thus, Twombly and Iqbal require that
the complaint contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face based on factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Discussion
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Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because
the decision of the Court of Common Pleas directing the defendants to grant plaintiffs’ site
approval application renders plaintiffs’ claims moot. Moreover, defendants argue that plaintiffs fail
to allege a viable taking claim.
A. Count I
In Count I, plaintiffs request a declaration from the Court that defendants’ decision to deny
their site approval application was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the evidence. While
the Court of Common Pleas reversed defendants’ decision and directed defendants to grant
plaintiffs’ application, plaintiffs argue that their claims present issues that have not yet been
determined and were expressly reserved by plaintiffs through their administrative appeal. Opp. at
10.
“Under Article III of the Constitution, a federal court’s jurisdiction extends only to actual
cases and controversies. A federal court has no power to adjudicate disputes which are moot.”
Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation and alterations omitted). Claims
become moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.” Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Kentucky, 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1978)).
Pursuant to the State Court Order, plaintiffs have received the relief they now request in
Count I.7 Therefore, because defendants have already been directed to grant plaintiffs’ site plan
application, the motion is granted as to Count I on the basis that the claim is moot.
B. Counts II, III, and IV
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State Court Order, at 8.
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Counts II, III, and IV are all based upon an alleged violation of the Takings Clause. The
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use, without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment made the
Takings Clause appliable to the states. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536. Courts
apply “a two-part test to evaluate claims that a governmental action constitutes a taking of private
property without just compensation.” Coal. for Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365
F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004). “First, the court must examine whether the claimant has established a
cognizable “property interest” for the purposes of the Just Compensation Clause.” Id. (citations
omitted). “Secondly, where a cognizable property interest is implicated, the court must consider
whether a taking occurred.” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not establish a takings claim. They argue that “[a]bsent
extraordinary delay, a governmental entity’s application of its administrative process for making
zoning decisions cannot result in a state or federal taking claim.” Mot. at 9. They argue that there
was no delay to the administrative process, which concluded less than a year after plaintiffs’ site
plan application. Id. at 10–11.
Plaintiffs’ allegations supporting their takings claim are based upon defendants’ denial of
their site plan application prior to the State Court Order directing defendants to approve it.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants effected a temporary taking from February 7, 2023, when the City
Council denied their site plan application, to the time a new tenant is found for the property. Opp. at
13–14. Further, plaintiffs argue that the defendants’ administrative process was unnecessarily
delayed due to the denial of the site plan application, which plaintiffs submitted only after they
were advised that a school was a permitted use of the building. Id. at 14.
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The Court finds that plaintiffs do not establish a takings claim. Plaintiffs’ anticipated value
of rent lost during the period of the administrative process is not a cognizable property interest
sufficient to support a takings claim. See Snyder v. Village of Luckey, Ohio, 2024 WL 556134, at
*6–*8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2024) (dismissing takings claim because plaintiffs failed to identify a
legally cognizable property interest where “the physical property ha[d] not changed hands” and the
alleged property interest taken was the fluctuation in value during the process of governmental
decisionmaking”).
Moreover, even if it was a cognizable property interest, “[t]he Supreme Court has stated that
mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisiomaking, absent extraordinary
delay, are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a taking in the constitutional
sense.” Id. at *7 (citing Agins v. city of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980)) (alterations
omitted). While plaintiffs argue a delay occurred, a one-year delay is not extraordinary and does not
give rise to a takings claim. See, e.g., id. at *7–*8 (finding two-year delay not extraordinary);
Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002)
(finding thirty-two-month delay not extraordinary); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090.
1097–1100 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding seven-year delay not extraordinary).
Because plaintiffs do not identify a property interest to support a takings claim and cannot
establish an extraordinary delay, there is no illegal taking. Accordingly, the motion is granted as to
Counts II, III, and IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.8
Although not argued, because plaintiffs could have raised their state and federal claims alongside an
administrative appeal in the state court, their claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. See
Moore, Successor Tr. of Clarence M. Moore & Laura P. Moore Tr. v. Hiram Twp., Ohio, 988 F.3d 353
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: May 9, 2024
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
(6th Cir. 2021) (finding that administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 precluded subsequent claims
that could have been raised during the appeal) (collecting cases); Landberg v. Newburgh Heights Police
Dep’t, 2018 WL 2899660, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2018) (applying res judicata where plaintiff
“could have raised his age discrimination claims during his administrative appeal in the Court of
Common Pleas”).
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