Jackson v. Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas et al.

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in this Order, this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc No. 2 ) is granted. Judge Pamela A. Barker on 3/26/2024. (P,K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Anthony Jackson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:23 CV 2388
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Jackson filed this action against Cuyahoga County, the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judges
Daniel Gaul and Joan Synenberg, Metro Health System, Dr, Aileen M. Hernandez, Joe
Lucchese, Ashley Gilkerson, and the Cuyahoga County Metropolitan Housing Authority
Police Department. In the Complaint, Plaintiff challenges his arrest in 2021, and his
detention pending trial. He asserts claims for violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks $ 20,000,000.00 in damages.
Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc No. 2). That
Application is granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint is composed almost entirely of exhibits, making it difficult to
decipher. On October 20, 2020, Plaintiff was charged in Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas Case No CR-20-653683-A (“Jackson I”) with felonious assault, a seconddegree felony. (Doc #: 1-2 at PageID #: 79). Plaintiff pled not guilty to the indictment during
his arraignment on October 23, 2020. The trial court continued his bond at $10,000 cash,
surety, or property, and ordered him to have no contact with the victim. He posted bond on
November 5, 2020. (Doc #: 1-2 at PageID #: 79).
Plaintiff was arrested in his Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”)
apartment on January 21, 2021 for an offense committed on January 7, 2021. (Doc. No. 1-2
at PageID#: 79, Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 104). He indicates he had barricaded himself into
the apartment, although he does not indicate why he did so. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID#: 104).
He contends CMHA police entered the apartment with a key and pushed past the barricade.
They indicated they had a warrant for his arrest, but he challenged their ability to enter
claiming they did not have a search warrant. They executed the arrest warrant and removed
Plaintiff from the apartment. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID#: 104).
Plaintiff was charged on January 21, 2021, with robbery, a second-degree felony,
and theft, a fifth-degree felony in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-21656172-A (“Jackson II”). (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID#: 79). Plaintiff pled not guilty to the
indictment during his January 22, 2021 arraignment. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID#: 79). The
trial court set bond at $25,000 cash, surety, or property, and ordered him to have no contact
with the victim. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID#: 79).
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Plaintiff indicates he was injured by a Cuyahoga County Correctional Center officer
on January 22, 2021. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). He alleges the inmates were in line
to go to recreation when an older man asked to use the restroom. The officers denied his
request and Plaintiff laughed at him. He claims an officer placed him in handcuffs and put
him in a restraint chair. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). He states that when the officer
tried to take the handcuffs off the Plaintiff, he became irritated, and pushed Plaintiff’s head
forward. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). Plaintiff had sustained a previous neck injury
from a prior motor vehicle accident in which he was thrown through the windshield. He
contends that the officer’s actions aggravated that old injury and caused him to wear a neck
brace for several weeks. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #:5, Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105).
On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff was referred to the court psychiatric clinic for a
competency evaluation. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 80). He met with Dr. Hernandez. (Doc.
No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). In a February 23, 2021 report, Dr. Hernandez found him
incompetent to stand trial. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). Plaintiff contends she
misdiagnosed him with schizophrenia. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). On March 16, 2021,
the parties stipulated to the findings in the report and Judge Gaul issued a judgment entry
ordering Plaintiff to be transported to Northcoast Behavioral Health (“Northcoast”) in order
to be restored to competency. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 80). Plaintiff claims that this was
due to the misdiagnosis of schizophrenia. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105).
When Plaintiff had not been transported to Northcoast as of April 14, 2021, he posted
bond in Case No. CR-21-656172-A (“Jackon II”). (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 80). Plaintiff
appeared in court on April 22, 2021 in Jackson II. The parties waived a hearing and stipulated
to the court psychiatric clinic’s competency report. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 80). Judge
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Gaul again ordered Plaintiff to complete inpatient treatment at Northcoast for competency
restoration and remanded him to the Cuyahoga County Jail until a bed became available at
Northcoast. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 80).
Plaintiff was treated at Northcoast in April and May 2021. On May 19, 2021, an
updated report was prepared that determined Plaintiff was competent to stand trial. (Doc. No.
1-2 at PageID #: 80, Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 105). Plaintiff alleges that he returned to the
Cuyahoga County Corrections Center from Northcoast on May 20, 2021. (Doc. No. 1-4 at
PageID #: 106).
On May 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a “request for release” in both criminal cases,
asserting that he had already posted bond in both of his criminal cases on November 5, 2020
(“Jackson I”) and on April 14, 2021 (“Jackson II”). The parties appeared in court in Jackson
II on June 8, 2021. Defense counsel and the prosecutor stipulated to the updated competency
report and acknowledged that Plaintiff posted bond in both criminal cases. Judge Gaul,
however, denied the request for release, stating that it was his policy to deny release on bond
if the defendant was out on bond in another case when the current offense was committed.
(Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 81). Judge Gaul advised Plaintiff that he would not be released
until both criminal cases were resolved, stating “[t]hese are two very serious cases.” (Doc.
No. 1-2 at PageID #: 81). Defense counsel noted that the dockets in the criminal cases
indicate that bond was posted in both cases, and there was no indication on either docket that
bond had been revoked. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 82). On June 8, 2021, Judge Gaul issued
a judgment entry in Case No. CR-20-653683-A (“Jackson I”) revoking bond due to “the
substantive criminal indictment in Jackson II. On June 15, 2021, Judge Gaul denied
Plaintiff’s motions requesting release in both criminal cases. (Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID #: 82).
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Plaintiff appealed those decisions to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals on
June 28, 2021. On November 21, 2021, the Eighth District Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court to issue findings as required by Ohio Revised Code §2937.222(B) and
return the case to the Appellate Court by November 15, 2021. (Doc. No. 1-3 at PageID #:
99). On November 3, 2021, Judge Gaul held a video hearing with the parties. He began the
hearing by reciting the factors in Ohio Revised Code §. 2937.222(B) and then found them
satisfied without taking any evidence from either the prosecution or the defense. (Doc. No.
1-3 at PageID #: 99). On December 9, 2021, the Appellate Court filed its opinion and
reversed the trial court’s denial of bond, stating, “regardless of what standard of review this
court applies, we find that [the trial court] erred in revoking appellant’s bond and denying
appellant’s motions for release on bond.” (Doc. No. 1-3 at PageID #: 100). The Appellate
Court vacated the trial court decision and remanded the case “for the purpose of reinstating
the bond that was previously set and posted and ordering appellant’s immediate release.”
(Doc No. 1-3 at PageID #: 100). Plaintiff was released from custody on December 16, 2021.
He had been detained for 184 days. (Doc. No. 1-3 at PageID #: 101). 1
Plaintiff states he was arrested on October 6, 2022 (“Jackson III”), although he does
not indicate with which crime he was charged. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 110). He states
he tried to fire his public defender, but the court would not allow him to do so. (Doc. No. 14 at PageID #: 111). He indicates that four months later, Judge Synenberg was appointed to

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Judge Gaul was suspended from the practice of law for one year by the Ohio Supreme Court. (Doc. No.
1-3). His denial of bond in Plaintiff’s case was one of the eight incidents mentioned by the Supreme Court in its
opinion. In reference to Plaintiff’s case, the Ohio Supreme Court focused on Judge Gaul’s refusal to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and comments he made during the hearing that the Supreme Court deemed to be disrespectful to
the Appellate Court. (Doc. No. 1-3 at PageID #: 101-102).

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his case. She ordered him to be returned to Northcoast. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 111).
He indicates he was at that facility for a week before being returned to jail.
Plaintiff alleges he spent ten more months in jail before being released. He contends
that he was offered a plea deal in his second case and told that if he pled guilty to a
misdemeanor, he would be released. He claims that he accepted the plea deal but was still
held in jail because his bond in Jackson II had been raised to $ 50,000.00. (Doc. No. 1-4 at
PageID #: 111-112). He asserts that the bond was excessive. Nevertheless, he posted bond
in August 2023. He states that this case was dismissed two weeks later. (Doc. No. 1-4 at
PageID #: 112).
Finally, Plaintiff states that the conditions at the Cuyahoga County Jail were
“deplorable and unfit for humans.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 112). He states that the
conditions were so bad that some people died. He claims there were instances when he was
locked in his cell for four to seven days at a time in what was called the “Red Zone.” (Doc.
No. 1-4 at PageID #: 112).
Plaintiff does not elaborate on the claims he intends to pursue against each Defendant.
Instead, he simply lists his causes of action as violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
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City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in
law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations
in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on
the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide
more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the
Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Before attempting to figure out how Plaintiff’s list of constitutional amendments may
apply to the facts stated above, the Court must determine if any of the Defendants are
properly named in this suit. After careful reading of the Complaint, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against any of the named
Defendants.
Plaintiff names the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and the Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority Police as Defendants. Common Pleas Courts and Police
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Departments are not sui juris, meaning, they are not separate legal entities that can sue or be
sued. Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App'x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014); Black v.
Montgomery Cty. Common Pleas Court, No. 3:18-CV-00123, 2018 WL 2473560, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio June 4, 2018); Gibson v. Mechanicsburg Police Dep't, No. 3:16cv48, 2017 WL
2418317, at *5 (S.D. Ohio 2017). Plaintiff’s claims against them fail as a matter of law.
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against Cuyahoga County appear to be based on the
actions of County employees and officials. Claims against the County must be based on
constitutional violations that occurred as the result of the County’s own official policy
enacted by its lawmakers, Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d
592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978)), or by the County’s own custom which, while not officially memorialized in an
ordinance, is so permanent and well-settled that it carries the force of law. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691. Section 1983 does not permit a Plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the
theory of respondeat superior, meaning that Plaintiff cannot sue the County for the actions
of its employees. Id. at 692-94. The claims must be based on the County’s own wrongdoing.
Therefore, to demonstrate that the County’s policies or customs caused constitutional harm,
the Plaintiff must “(1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the
municipality (not just to an employee or official of the County), and (3) show that his
particular injur[ies] w[ere] incurred due to execution of that policy.” Brawner v. Scott Cty.,
14 F.4th 585, 598 (6th Cir. 2021)(quoting Morgan v. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 566
(6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff, however, does not allege that any of
the incidents in the Complaint were directly caused by a custom or policy of Cuyahoga
County. The claims against Cuyahoga County must be dismissed.
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Defendants Joe Lucchese, Ashley Gilkerson and Metro Health System are not
mentioned at all in the body of the Complaint or in any of the attachments that contained
factual allegations. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a clear
showing that the Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of
the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v.
Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). The Court can find
no connection between these Defendants and the allegations in the Complaint. The Court is
not obligated to search through voluminous exhibits attached to the Complaint in order to
determine how a Defendant could be connected to the case. This is beyond the scope of the
Court’s obligation to give liberal construction to Plaintiff’s pro se pleading. Lucchese,
Gilkerson, and Metro Health System are dismissed from this action.
While Dr. Henderson is mentioned more prominently in the exhibits to the
Complaint, Plaintiff’s only allegation against her is that she diagnosed him with
schizophrenia. He disputes that diagnosis. A difference of opinion regarding the medical
diagnosis does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 107 (1976). That is particularly true in this case where that assessment was conducted to
determine Plaintiff’s competency to stand trial, and not for the purpose of treatment.
Moreover, that evaluation was performed in February 2021. The statute of limitations for a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years.

LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing

Authority, 55 F. 3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995). This case was filed in December 2023, more than
two years from the date of the evaluation.
Finally, Plaintiff names Judge Synenberg and Judge Gaul as Defendants. Judges are
provided absolute immunity from civil suits that are based on decisions they made in the
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course of presiding over a case. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell,
105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are accorded this broad protection to ensure that
the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment is not impaired by the exposure to
damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. Judicial immunity is justified
and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches,
and thus has its limits, in the form of two exceptions: (1) when the conduct alleged is
performed at a time when the Defendant is not acting as a judge; or (2) when the conduct
alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter
jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes,
105 F.3d at 1116. A distinction is drawn between an action in excess of jurisdiction and an
action taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Stern v. Mascio,
262 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001)(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S (13 Wall.) 335, 352
(1872)). A judge will be not deprived of immunity, however, even if the action he or she
took was performed in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority so
long as it was performed within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court over which he or
she presides. Id.
Plaintiff contends Judge Synenberg was appointed to preside over one of his criminal
cases and ordered him to be returned to Northcoast. (Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID #: 111). This
action was clearly performed when she was acting as the judge in his case. Moreover,
Common Pleas Courts have subject matter jurisdiction to try felony criminal cases. Ohio
Rev. Code § 2931.03. The judge who presides over a criminal case must determine that the
defendant is competent to stand trial. Judge Synenberg was acting within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court when she referred Plaintiff to Northcoast for a
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competency evaluation. Neither exception to immunity applies in this case and Judge
Synenberg is absolutely immune from suits for damages.
Judge Gaul is also entitled to judicial immunity. Plaintiff claims Judge Gaul ordered
him to be evaluated at Northcoast and subsequently denied his release even after he posted
bond.

Both of these decisions were made by Judge Gaul while he was presiding over

Plaintiff’s criminal cases. The first exception to immunity does not apply. In addition,
because criminal cases fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court
and decisions to grant release on bond are within that subject matter jurisdiction, the second
exception does not apply. Immunity is not forfeited even though his decision was reversed
by the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals, and he was later disciplined by the Ohio
Supreme Court for “ignoring the clear mandates of [Ohio Rev. Code §] 2937.222 twice by
failing to require the state of Ohio to produce clear and convincing evidence as required by
law, making findings prior to offering counsel to present any evidence or argument, and
being critical of the court of appeals for reversing his clearly erroneous decisions.” (Doc.
No. 1-3 at PageID #: 101). While he may have misapplied the law, and perhaps acted
willfully in doing so, he did not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction of the Common
Pleas Court and is entitled to absolute immunity in this case.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, the Cuyahoga County
Metropolitan Housing Authority Police Department, Joe Lucchese, Ashley Gilkerson, Metro
Health System, Dr, Aileen M. Hernandez, and Judges Daniel Gaul and Joan Synenberg, are
dismissed from this case. As no Defendants remain in this action, this case is dismissed
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that
an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc No. 2) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: March 26, 2024

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