Tromler v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 14

Memorandum Opinion and Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge's 11 Report and Recommendation. The Commissioner's decision is affirmed. Judge David A. Ruiz on 3/10/2025. (G,CA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DENISE MARIE TROMLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:24-cv-492
JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Denise Marie Tromler (Plaintiff) filed her Complaint (R. 1) on March 15, 2024,
challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for
a Period of Disability (POD) and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Pursuant to Local Rule
72.2, the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge. Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd issued his
Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s
decision, on November 18, 2024. (R. 11). Plaintiff timely filed objections. (R. 12). The
Commissioner filed a response. (R. 13). As explained herein, Plaintiff’s objections (R. 12) are
OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation (R. 11) is ADOPTED.
I. Standard of Review
When a magistrate judge submits a Report and Recommendation, the Court is required to
conduct a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which an objection has been made.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Rule 72.3(b). “A general objection to the
entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to object.” Howard v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); accord Austin v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 1540389, at *4 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 19, 2021) (finding that a general objection
that merely restates an argument previously presented or simply voices a disagreement with a
magistrate judge’s suggested resolution “has the same effects as would a failure to object.”)
(citations omitted).
The Commissioner’s conclusions must be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ
failed to apply the correct legal standards or made findings of fact unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record. White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). A decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned even though substantial evidence
supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010);
see also Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). “The
substantial-evidence standard ... presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800
F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, if substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision, a court must defer to that finding “even if there is substantial evidence in the
record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273
(6th Cir. 1997).
II. Analysis
A. Background
Plaintiff’s Brief on the Merits set forth the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ
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failed to support her conclusions regarding the opinions of the treating sources with substantial
evidence; and (2) the ALJ committed harmful error when she failed to properly apply the criteria
of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p. (R. 7). The R&R determined that the ALJ properly
analyzed and explained the weight afforded to Nurse Pessefall’s opinion and explained how she
considered the supportability and consistency of the medical opinions in question pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. (R. 11). In addition, the R&R determined the ALJ properly applied the
criteria of SSR 16-3p when considering Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Id.
B. Objections
Plaintiff’s objections focus on the first assignment of error and do not raise any issue with
the R&R’s resolution of her second assignment of error. (R. 12). Given the lack of any objection
on this issue, the Court finds no clear error and adopts the R&R’s determination regarding the
second assignment of error.
With respect to the R&R’s resolution of the first assignment of error, Plaintiff disagrees
with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion, asserting that the R&R’s “conclusion is incorrect as the
evidence established that the ALJ’s opinion taken as a whole failed to establish that the opinions
of Steve Pessefall were not supported by and consistent with the remainder of the evidence in
this matter.” (R. 12, PageID# 641). The Objections go on to asset that “the ALJ did not
sufficiently consider the supportability and consistency of the treating certified nurse
practitioner’s opinions” and that “the ALJ failed to sufficiently articulate her consideration of the
reports of the treating source.” Id.
Plaintiff’s rather brief and conclusory objections largely reflect a mere disagreement with
the Magistrate Judge’s resolution of the issues raised rather than citing any actual error in the
R&R’s resolution of the assignment of error raised. (R. 12). As stated above, general objections
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that merely restate the objecting parties previous argument and voice mere disagreement with a
magistrate judge’s suggested resolution—have “the same effects as would a failure to object.”
Austin, 2021 WL 1540389 at *4; see also United States v. Dawson, 2020 WL 109137, at *1
(N.D. Ohio, Jan. 9, 2020) (“the Court is under no obligation to review de novo objections that are
merely an attempt to have the district court reexamine the same arguments set forth in the
petition and briefs.”) In other words, Plaintiff has not identified any deficiency in the Magistrate
Judge’s application of relevant rules, regulations, precedent, or statutes, but merely reiterates her
argument from her brief on the merits and concludes the Magistrate Judge incorrectly resolved
the issue without actually identifying any shortcoming in the R&R itself.1 (R. 12).
In this case, Plaintiff applied for benefits on October 13, 2022 (R 6, PageID# 51) — long
after the Social Security Administration’s rule changes went into effect concerning the weighing
of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings.2 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c &
416.920c. The changes eliminated any hierarchical consideration of medical opinions, including
the elimination of the treating physician rule. See, e.g., Kinney v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20CV-1155, 2021 WL 3854828, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2021) (concluding a report and

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It is well established that “issues which are ‘adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.’” See, e.g.,
Kennedy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 87 Fed. App’x 464, 2003 WL 23140056, at *1 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996)) (rejecting perfunctory
argument); McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-996 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1050, 118 S. Ct. 1370, 140 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1998) (same); McClellan v. Astrue, 804 F. Supp.2d
678, 688 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (court under no obligation to scour record for errors not identified by
claimant).
2
“Prior administrative findings” refers to the findings of the State Agency physicians or
psychologists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(1)(5). While the new regulations differentiate between
“medical opinions” and “prior administrative medical findings,” the regulations do not ascribe
greater significance to either, and both and are evaluated utilizing the same factors. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c & 416.920c.
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recommendation “accurately reflected the fact that the hierarchical deference previously afforded
the medical opinion of a treating physician had been eliminated”) (Lioi, J); Bovenzi v. Saul, No.
1:20-cv-185, 2021 WL 1206466 at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2021) (“Under the new regulations
applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the opinions of [a treating medical source]
are not entitled to any specific evidentiary weight.”) (Pearson, J.).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) & 416.920c(a), an ALJ need “not defer or give
any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), including those from your medical sources.” Nevertheless, an
ALJ must still “articulate in [the] determination or decision how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all
of the medical opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in [the] case record.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) & 416.920c(b).
The R&R correctly identified the applicable regulations, and the standards of evaluation
ALJs are required to employ when addressing medical opinions. It correctly indicated:
At a minimum, the ALJ must explain how she considered the supportability and
consistency of a source’s medical opinion(s), but generally is not required to
discuss other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Other factors include: (1) the
length, frequency, purpose, extent, and nature of the source’s relationship to the
client; (2) the source’s specialization; and (3) “other factors,” such as familiarity
with the disability program and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(3)-(5). Consistency concerns the degree to which the opinion
reflects the same limitations described in evidence from other sources, whereas
supportability concerns the relevancy of objective medical evidence and degree of
explanation given by the medical source to support the limitations assessed in the
opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2).
(R. 11, PageID# 631). The ALJ discussed Nurse Pessefall’s opinions as follows:
Mr. Passefall’s opinions were not persuasive because they were inconsistent with
his own treatment notes. On August 18, 2023, the claimant treated with Stephen
Pessefall, PMHNP-BC and reported that overall, she had only a few depressive
days (Ex. 12F/1). Her mental status had no gross abnormalities. She was friendly
and communicative. She had no suicidal thoughts. Her thinking was generally
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intact, and her thought content was appropriate. There were no signs of anxiety.
Examination showed that her dress and grooming were appropriate (Ex. 9F/2).
She was friendly and communicative. Her mood was euthymic. Her thinking was
generally logical, and her thought content was appropriate. Her cognitive thinking
was intact. The record as a whole supported improvement after her hospitalization
for depression, and she had no more than moderate mental limitations. Mr.
Pessefall noted that the claimant had “no apparent serious mental status
abnormalities” (Ex. 2F/2). She endorsed depression, but there was no mood
elevation evident. Her speech was normal. There were no signs of cognitive
difficulty. Her memory was intact for recent and remote events. There were
apparent signs of anxiety.
(Tr. 34-35).3
The Court agrees with the R&R that the ALJ’s above opinion offers a cogent explanation
as to why she believed the opinions were unsupported, namely the inconsistencies with the
treating source’s own treatment notes. Plaintiff’s attempts to undermine the ALJ’s analysis by
identifying portions of the record that she believes support the assessed limitations do not render
the ALJ’s analysis inadequate, as this Court’s role in considering a social security appeal does
not include reviewing the evidence de novo, making credibility determinations, or reweighing the
evidence. See, e.g., Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir.
1989); Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed. App’x 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2006); Hunter v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19 CV 1977, 2021 WL 32116, at *3, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1112, at
*6-7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2021) (“it is well settled that this Court cannot and will not re-weigh
evidence; in these cases, the Court exists solely to determine whether the ALJ's findings, on

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The quoted language does not encompass the entirety of the ALJ’s discussion of Nurse
Pessefall’s treatment of the Plaintiff. The ALJ summarizes the contents of at least eight other
treatment visits with Nurse Pessefall, as well as numerous other mental health treatment
encounters. (Tr. 31-34). The Court considers the decision as a whole when deciding whether the
ALJ has adequately addressed the medical opinions of record under the regulations. The R&R
correctly noted the two opinions of Pessefall were contained in check-box forms with little to no
explanation for the limitations assessed. (R. 11, PageID# 623, 632).
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initial review, are supported by substantial evidence.”) (Knepp, J.) (citing Wright v. Massanari,
321 F.3d 611, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2003)); Stief v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-11923, 2017 WL
4973225, at *11 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2017) (“Arguments which in actuality require ‘reweigh[ing] record evidence’ beseech district courts to perform a forbidden ritual.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3976617 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2017). “When deciding
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, we do not
try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility.” Ulman v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d
506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007)).
With respect to consistency, the R&R notes that the ALJ “also cited evidence from other
providers, including another treating source, Dr. Fink, and the consultative examiner, Dr. Oh,
that indicated normal mood and affect as well as normal memory and concentration to show
inconsistency with other sources.” (R. 11, PageID# 631, citing (Tr. 32-34)). The ALJ also found
the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants, whose opinions were less restrictive
than Nurse Pessefall’s, generally persuasive. (Tr. 35). Reading the decision as a whole, the ALJ
plainly found Pessefall’s opinion was inconsistent with these prior administrative medical
findings—a proper consideration under the regulations when weighing consistency.
Plaintiff’s objections do not identify any shortcomings in the R&R. The Court, having
reviewed the briefs, R&R, and the relevant evidence of record, agrees with the reasoning of the
R&R and finds no error.
III. Conclusion
The Court has carefully reviewed the Report and Recommendation, according to the
above-referenced standard, as well as the ALJ’s decision, and agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s
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resolution of the issues raised. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(R. 11) is hereby ADOPTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 10, 2025

s/ David A. Ruiz
David A. Ruiz
United States District Judge

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