Dhaker v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority Police

Filing 4

Opinion and Order: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2 ). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court DISMISSES this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge J. Philip Calabrese on November 22, 2024. (Y,A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
EMMANUAL DHAKER,

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Plaintiff,
v.
GREATER CLEVELAND
REGIONAL TRANSIT
AUTHORITY POLICE,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-1556
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Emmanual Dhaker, proceeding without counsel, claims to be a
“constitutional lawyer” and brings this action against the Greater Cleveland Regional
Transit Authority Police. Plaintiff requests that the Court order the Authority’s
police officers to “cease, stop, and decease any contact” with him. (ECF No.1, PageID
#4.) He also seeks $125,000 in damages. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). The Court GRANTS that application.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint concerns his interactions with the GCRTA police officers
in September 2024.

Mr. Dhaker states that, on September 4, 2024, officers

approached him at the Southgate International Transit Transient Transportation
Depot and advised him that the Authority had a warrant for his arrest due to an
unanswered citation issued previously.

Mr. Dhaker told the officers that he

“answered the charge” by filing an action in the Northern District of Ohio “because of

the constitutional question of the [GCRTA] police refusing to use my real name on
the citation.” (ECF No.1, PageID # 3.) According to Plaintiff, the officers advised him
that he must still appear in municipal court to address the citation, and the officers
issued him another citation. Plaintiff claims the officers “refused to use my real name
on the citation.” (Id., PageID #4.)
In a document filed in support of the complaint (ECF No.3), Plaintiff states
that, on September 19, 2024, at 4:30 a.m., GCRTA officers issued him a citation for
trespassing at the Southgate International Transit Transient Transportation Depot.
He states that he owns the property, and he claims that the officers are using his
father’s name on the citations, not his real name, because if they use his real name,
“this will prove [I] am the owner” of the Southgate International Transit Transient
Transportation Depot. (Id., PageID #39–40.) Plaintiff explains that the Bedford
Heights Police Department gave him the title and deed to the property. Also, Plaintiff
provides a purported example of the GCRTA officers showing an “overt miscarriage
of justice” when they threatened to blow the [U.S. federal investigators’] heads off if
[the federal investigators] did not leave the depot.” (Id., PageID #40.)
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e), however, the district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis
in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898

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F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th
Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact where it is premised on an
indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis where the
allegations are “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). A
cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in
the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but
he must provide more than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a
simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In reviewing a
complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff does not identify any federal civil claims on which this case could
proceed, and none is apparent on the face of the complaint. The Court recognizes that
pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient
treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92
F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not
“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989). The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims
against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The complaint must give the defendants fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it rests. Lillard v.
Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.1996) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Court has discretion to refuse to accept without question the
truth of a plaintiff’s allegations when they are “clearly baseless,” a term
encompassing claims that may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic, delusional,
wholly incredible, or irrational.

Denton, 504 at 32–33.

Such is the case here.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Rule 8 pleading
standard. His complaint fails to contain even a suggestion of any viable federal civil
claims he intends to assert—let alone any on which he could make a showing of
liability. And his factual allegations are at times wholly incredible and irrational.

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Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent the Court can liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint as a
challenge to the citations issued by the GCRTA police officers, and the cases
concerning these citations remain pending, the Court will not interfere with those
State court proceedings. A federal court must abstain from interfering with pending
State court proceedings involving important State interests absent extraordinary
circumstances not present here. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971).
Abstention is appropriate where: (1) State proceedings are ongoing, (2) the State
proceedings implicate important State interests, and (3) the State proceedings afford
Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Leveye v. Metropolitan
Pub. Def. Office, 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at
43–45).
If Plaintiff’s municipal court cases remain pending, all three factors supporting
abstention are present here. The criminal case that is purportedly the subject of
Plaintiff’s complaint implicates important State interests. See Younger, 401 U.S. at
43–45 (explaining that State criminal prosecutions have traditionally been
considered an arena in which federal courts decline to interfere). And there are no
suggestions in the complaint that the available State court proceedings do not afford
Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to challenge the citations or raise federal claims.
Therefore, to the extent that State court proceedings concerning the citations issued
by the GCRTA remain pending, the Court will not interfere with them.

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And to the extent the State court proceedings against Plaintiff have concluded,
this complaint essentially constitutes an appeal from them. In that case, the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. See Distric of Columbia Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415–16 (1923). “Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction
that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive [of] the federal proceeding
as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court
judgment.” Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted),
amended on other grounds, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001). Federal appellate review of
State court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court. See
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16. Therefore, to the extent the
State court proceedings concerning the citations issued by the GCRTA have
concluded and Plaintiff seeks to vacate or challenge a State court’s order, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this matter.
For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No.1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 22, 2024

J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

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