Jackson v. State of Ohio

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2 ) is GRANTED, and his complaint (ECF No. 1 ) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Charles Esque Fleming on 3/11/2025. (S,SR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF OHIO,
Defendant.

I.

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CASE NO. 1:24-cv-2201
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Jackson has filed a civil complaint against the State of Ohio that

invokes § 1983 as the basis for jurisdiction and seeks monetary damages as relief. (ECF No. 1).
Although not specifically set out or separated, the complaint generally asserts: (i) state-law claims
for wrongful imprisonment, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; and (ii) federal claims
for violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. (Id. at PageID #4).
With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
That motion is GRANTED.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required
to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any
such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
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relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal
standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at
471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although
the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se
plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must
still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their
behalf or “guess at the nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). First, the State of Ohio is not a proper defendant under § 1983. “Section 1983
creates liability for ‘persons’ who deprive others of federal rights under color of law. Only a
‘person’ faces liability under the statute.” Hohenberg v. Shelby Cty., 68 F.4th 336, 342 (6th Cir.
2023) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d
45 (1989)). It is well-settled that “a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.” See
Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
Second, the claims against the State of Ohio are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign immunity to the States, guaranteeing that

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“nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Guertin v.
Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 936 (6th Cir. 2019). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the State of Ohio
and its agencies are immune from suit “unless the State’s immunity has been abrogated by
Congress or the State of Ohio has consented to be sued.” Hall v. Brazie, No. 4:22-cv-2275, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50997, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2023). “This immunity bars suits ‘for
injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief.’” Morgan v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of the Supreme Court
of Tenn., 63 F.4th 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The State of Ohio has not consented
to be sued under § 1983 and Congress has not otherwise abrogated Ohio’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity with respect to § 1983 claims. See Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir.
2020) (“Notably, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Smith v.
DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“The State of Ohio has immunity for all
claims against it because Ohio has not consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress
abrogated Ohio’s immunity under § 1983.”).
Finally, the State of Ohio has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits
asserting violations of state law in federal court. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (“[T]he States’ constitutional immunity from suit prohibits all state-law claims filed
against a State in federal court, whether those claims are monetary or injunctive in nature.”);
McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 664 (6th Cir. 2012). The State of Ohio has solely
consented to suits for state-law claims brought before the Ohio Court of Claims. Allen v. Ohio
Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 697 F. Supp. 2d 854, 908 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“The Sixth Circuit has
repeatedly and consistently held that the State of Ohio has not consented to be sued for state law
claims in federal court. Rather, Ohio has consented to be sued in only one forum—the Ohio Court
of Claims.”). Because the State of Ohio is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and is also entitled

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to Eleventh Amendment immunity on all federal and state-law claims, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this action.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED,

and his complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
further CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 11, 2024
__________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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