Universal Tube & Rollform Equipment Corporation v. YouTube, Inc.

Filing 20

Universal Tube & Rollform Equipment Corporation v. YouTube, Inc.

Doc. 20

Case 3:06-cv-02628-JGC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

UNIVERSAL TUBE & ROLLFORM EQUIPMENT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 06-2628

DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO RULE 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 1-8)
. Judge:

YOUTUBE, INC., CHAD HURLEY, and
STEVE CHEN

James G. Carr

Defendants.

Dockets.Justia.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
i. Introduction..........................................................................................................................l

II. Argument.............................................................................................................................l

A. Federal Claims.........................................................................................................l
1. Having failed to plead facts that it used UTUBE as a

trademark, Universal has no cognizable Lanham Act unfair competition claim.........................................................................................l
2. Courts do not have jurisdiction to cancel trademark

applications. ........... ............................................. ........ ........................... ......3

B. State Claims.............................................................................................................5
1. The Court should not exercise pendant jurisdiction or certify

Universal's novel claims to the Ohio State Supreme Court. .......................5
2. Ohio common law dilution claims require a famous mark..........................6
3. Universal has alleged neither a proper trespass nor a proper

chatteL. .......................................................................................................... 7
4. Universal's nuisance čIaim must be dismissed for failure to

plead an interference with land. ..................................................................9
5. Universal's negligence claim rests on bare legal conclusions. ....................9
6. Having failed to plead facts showing that it used UTUBE as a

mark, Universal's Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices must be dismissed. ...................................................................................................1 0
7. Universal's Ohio RICO claims fail for myriad reasons.............................l0
a. There is no basis for personal jurisdiction over Hurley

or Chen................................................. ~...................................... ...10
b. Universal

leaves out allegations regarding material
elements. ...................................................................................... ..12

c. The DMCA safe harbor precludes Universal's RICO claim............................................................................................. ..13
d. Universal's Ohio RICO claim is expressly barred by the

CDA. ............................................................................................ ..15
e. The alleged Ohio RICO violation is not the proximate

cause of Universal's injuries. ....................................................... .16

III. Conclusion....................................................................................................................... ..16

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies, Corp., 811 F .2d (6th Cir. 1987) ..... ............................ .............................................. ............. ......................6

Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, National Association, 214 F .3d 776 (6th Cir. 2000) .... ............... .................. ............................... ........................... ............3
Buitoni Foods Corp. v. Gio Buton & es.p.A.,

530 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.N. Y. 1981) ... ......... ........................... ............... ............................................4

Compuserve, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ...............................................................................................8
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson,

89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) .........................................................................................................10

D.M Antique Import Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N. Y. 1969)................................................... ..........;...................................4

PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F 3d 671 (6th Cir. 2004) ...........................................................................................................3
Durox v. Duron Paint Co.,

320 F .2d 882 (4th Cir. 1963) ...........................................................................................................3

In re Goodyear Derivative Litigation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1233 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5,2007)...................................................................2
Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

298 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ...........................................................................................14
Hughes v. Sanders,

469 F .3d 475 (6th Cir. 2006.) .................................................................................................... ....1 0
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder

's Edge, Inc.,

100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ...........................................................................................8
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

3 26 U.S. 310 (1945)...................................................................................................................... .11

Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 1998)........................... ........................... .................. ....................16
Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration System, 165 F .3d 419 (6th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................... ...... .................. ..............6

Johnny Blastoff Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 48 U .S.P.Q. 2d 13 85 (W.D. Wis. 1998)...... ............................ ...................... ...................................4

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MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).......... ............................................................................................................. .15
Nuckols v. National Heat Exchange Cleaning Corp.,

No. 4:00-CV -1698,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18693 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 11,2000) .............................9
Parker v. Google,

422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ................ ................................................................. .......... ..14
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBm LLC,

340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004) .........................................................................................14
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBm LLC,

Nos. 04-57143, -57207, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7238 (9th Cir. Mar. 29,2007) ..........................13
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.Net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ..............................:.............................................................6
Register.com v. Verio, 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N. Y. 2000)................................................ ..............................................8

Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp, 257 F.2d 485 (3rd Cir. 1958) ...........................................................................................................4
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co.,

418 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. IlL. 1976) ....................................................................................................4

Third National Bank v. Wedge Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990)...............................................11
Theunnisen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) .............................................................................................11

United States v. Flack, No. 2:96-CV-122, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1980 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 1997) .................................12 W &G Tennessee Importation, Inc. v. Esselte Pendajlex Corp., 769 F. Supp. 264 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)...............................................................................................4
Walker v. Concoby, 79 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 1999)............................................................~...............................12

Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F .2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974) ........................................................... ........................................... ...12

STATE CASES
Taylor v. City of

Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426 (1944)........................................................ ................. ..........................................9

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FEDERAL STATUTES
15 U.S. C. § 1064........................................................................................... ...................................3
15 U.S .C. § 1071................................................................. .......................... ...................................3

17 U.S .C. § 512( a) .............................................. ...................... ......... ............ ............................... .13
17 U .S.C. § 512(b )-( d) ........................,... .......................................... ......... .................................. ..14

STATE STATUTES
Ohio Rev. Code An. § 2923 .32(A)(1 )............................................ ........................................... ...13
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4165.01 (E)-( G).................................................................. .................... ...1 0

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I. Introduction

Universal Tube & Rollform Equipment Corp. ("Universal") and its counsel are clearly
fascinated with the copyright law implications of You

Tube's phenomenally successful service.

That fascination is understandable: the copyright law and Digital Milennium Copyright Act
issues are on the cutting edge of the law, and have garnered considerable interest among lawyers,

commentators, and the press. They wil no doubt be hotly contested in both pending cases and
others to come.

But Universal's interest in those copyright issues is nothing more than academic.
Universal doesn't own any copyrights. It isn't a broadcaster, or a producer, or a

competitor. It is

a seller of

used heavy machinery. So while Universal's counsel may very much wish to be

involved in the development of online copyright law, to do so he will need a client with a

copyright claim. The Copyright Act does not include a private attorneys general provision, and
the incantation of

"RICO" cannot create one.
copyright claims brought by other parties in other

Despite its incessant reference to

courts, Universal's complaint has nothing to do with copyright. It is, instead, a fatally flawed attempt to state trademark, trespass, and nuisance claims. As set forth in YouTube's opening
brief, those claims fail as a matter of law, are not curable, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Nothing in Universal's opposition changes that analysis.

II. Argument
A. Federal

Claims
1. Having failed to plead facts that it used UTUBE as a trademark,

Universal has no cognizable Lanham Act unfair competition claim.
Universal's complaint does not plead any facts that support a claim of ownership of a

trademark. The only allegation offact in that complaint is that Universal has used "utube.com"
as a domain name. (Compl. ~~ 16-17.) But, as set forth

in our opening brief, use as a domain

name is no more trademark use than use as a phone number or a physical address.

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In opposition, Universal attempts two arguments. First, it argues that there is no per se
rule that a domain name canot be a trademark. True enough: Y ouTube made the same point in

its opening brief. (Mot. to Dismiss 6 n.4.) Some domain names are trademarks because they are
also company names and are used as trademarks. Examples include "Pets.com," "MP3.com,"
"Cars.com," and "Hotels.com." Similarly, there is no per se rule that a phone number cannot be
a trademark if

the owner uses it as the name ofthe company, like "1-800-CONTACTS." That
every domain name, or every phone number, a trademark, even though (like

does not make

"utube.com") each one is unique. Here, Universal has not alleged~and cannot allege~that it

used "utube" as a trademark. It has not alleged that it ever used "utube" standing alone to

identify anything, and even "utube.com" is just a way of locating the company on the Internet.

Second, Universal argues that it is not required to plead every use of its purorted mark.
It must, however, plead some facts to show either federal registration or common law trademark

rights, not just the legal conclusion that it has such rights. This is not a "hypertechnical"
requirement deriving from a cramped reading of the statute, but a fundamental principle of
trademark law that prevents frivolous allegations of trademark infringement like the one

Universal has made. Instead of pleading facts, Universal belatedly suggests that "it is wiling to
provide evidence that it also used the UTUBE mark outside the internet," and asks leave to file

"an additional amendment alleging the needed facts." (Opp. Br. 6.) But Universal does not
deign to tell us what those additional facts are.

For Universal to impose on this Court for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, it

must show why leave would not be futile. i Universal cannot simply request leave to amend

without proffering the proposed amendment. See, e.g., In re Goodyear Derivative Litig., 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1233 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5,2007) (leave to amend denied where "plaintiffs have
i For the same reason, Universal's related argument-that a challenge to the validity of

the '

Utube mark requires evidence outside the pleadings-fails. (Opp. Br. 12.) There is no need to

challenge the validity of a mark unless and until Universal can plead facts that would support the

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failed to articulate what additional facts they would allege in a. Second Amended Verified

Consolidated Complaint"); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 699 (6th Cir. 2004)

(no leave to amend without proffering proposed amended complaint or contents thereof); Begala

v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Natl Ass'n, 214 F.3d 776,784 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
2. Courts do not have jurisdiction to cancel trademark applications.

Universal's purported claim for "cancellation" of a pending trademark application is not

cognizable. Although Universal describes as "ludicrous" the proposition that a cour cannot
(absent express authority) interject itself

into an executive branch administrative process, none of

the cases it cites suggest otherwise.
Two separate Lanam Act provisions allow courts to exercise jurisdiction over decisions

ofthe Patent and Trademark Offce. First, Section 21 (15 U.S.C. § 1071) provides for appeals of

decisions ofthe Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to either the Federal Circuit or-if
the paries so elect-to a district court. Second, Section 37 (15 U.S.C. § 1119), on which

Universal purports to rely, applies with respect to registered marks. Neither provision, however,

grants a court jurisdiction to interfere with a pending trademark application?
Each ofthe seven cases cited by Universal involves either (a) an

appeal under Section 21,

(b) an action regarding a registered mark under Section 37, or (c) both. Durox v. Duron Paint
Co., 320 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1963), on which Universal primarily relies, was a Section 21 appeal
of a TTAB ruling. The first words of

the opinion are: "Plaintiffs complaint under 15 U.S.C.A.

§ 1071 . . . asked the district court to reverse a decision ofthe Patent Office Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board and to direct the Commissioner of Patents to issue to plaintiff its requested
registration. . . ." The question in Durox was whether, as part of

that appeal, the district court

could only reverse or affirm

the TTAB, or whether it could instead direct the PTO to modify its

existence of a mark in the first place.
2 Universal's Opposition cites Section 14 (15 U.S.C. §1064) as conferring

jurisdiction on this cour. Section 14, however, sets forth the procedure for petitioning the PTO to cancel a
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prior registration decision.

Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp, 257 F.2d 485 (3rd Cir. 1958),
was

an appeal of an action to cancel a registered mark. W &G Tennessee Imp., Inc. v. Esselte

Pendajlex Corp., 769 F. Supp. 264 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), similarly involved the cancellation ofa
registered mark, among other claims: the court was asked to stay the case pending cancellation
proceedings before the TT AB, based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Because the district cour case involved issues over and above registration, the cOurt declined to issue a stay.

Buitoni Foods Corp. v. Gio Buton & es.p.A., 530 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), dealt
with another Section 21 appeal of a TT AB decision cancellng a registration, and also involved
several other registered marks. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 418

F. Supp. 485 (N.D. IlL. 1976), concerned an appeal ofthe TTAB's refusal to cancel a registration,

and thus the court had jurisdiction under both Section 21 and Section 37. And D.M Antique
Import Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), was about cancellation of

a registered mark.
In short, not one of

Universal's cases involves cancellng a trademark application. As the

court in Johnny Blastoff Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (W.D. Wis.
1998), explained in rejecting the same argument that Universal urges here:

Because the PTO has yet to rule on the parties' competing federal applications
for registration of the "St. Louis Rams" mark, this court is without authority to
be made in the first instance by the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board of

direct that body to grant or deny the pending applications. Such decisions are to the PTO and appealed to a federal district court if an aggrieved party so chooses. It is premature at this point to grant the relief sought by the parties. Accordingly, the
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the registerabilty of the

parties' applied-for marks wil be denied.
Id. at 1386-87 (emphases added). Were the rule otherwise, the expertise of

the PTO in

determining issues of trademark registration could be preempted at any time by either the
applicant or any third pary, merely by filing a cause of action in

any cour. The court would

registered mark, and is thus doubly irrelevant.

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then have to override the authority of the PTO and inject itself into the determination of whether
a mark should be registered. Fortunately, that is not the law.

B. State Claims

1. The Court should not exercise pendant jurisdiction or certify
Universal's novel claims to the Ohio State Supreme Court.

Universal next urges this Court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over its Ohio state law

claims even if it dismisses both federal causes of action. While this Cour has discretion to
exercise pendent jurisdiction, doing so in this case would be

particularly inappropriate given

Universal's request that this Court certify at least three of its "novel" state law claims to the Ohio
Supreme Court. If-as Universal suggests-its state law claims are so novel and innovative that

this Court cannot decide them without first asking the Ohio cours for help, then why exercise

jurisdiction over them in the first place? After all, the easiest way to have Ohio courts interpret
"novel" questions of state law would be for Universal to bring them in Ohio

courts to begin with.

The Court should therefore decline jurisdiction rather than exercise it only to send the matter
back to the state via certification.3
Alternatively, this Court can dispose of

Universal's state law claims on the merits without

any need to turn to the Ohio Supreme Court. There is nothing "novel" or complicated about
Universal's legal theories, other than the attempt to apply them to conduct that fails to satisfy the

elements of each cause of action. If one were to accuse someone of assault and battery based
upon their choice to wear white after Labor Day, the claim might be "novel" in the trivial sense

that no one has ever brought it before. Indeed, one would expect there is no case law to guide the Court in assessing it. But this Court would not need to ask the Ohio Supreme Court whether

this "fashion crime" constitutes a cause of action. It would simply need to compare the alleged
facts to the elements of the claim.

3 Universal also urges the Court to exercise jurisdiction

because (it speculates) Y ouTube would

seek to remove refiled state court claims to federal court on diversity grounds. But Universal's guesses on tactics in a hypothetical future suit canot change the suit actually filed, which does
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2. Ohio common law dilution claims require a famous mark.
Contrary to Universal's claim, Ohio common law dilution does require

a famous mark.

In support of its erroneous contention, Universal states that Ohio does not require a nationally
famous mark, citing

Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies, Corp., 811 F.2d 960,

965 (6th Cir. 1987). (Opp. Br. 8.) YouTube's motion, however, does not contend that
Universal's dilution claim must be dismissed because uTube is not a nationally famous mark.

Rather, it points out that uTube's complaint fails to plead any facts suggesting any degree of
fame, whether regional or nationaL. For that reason, the claim fails.
All of

the cases cited in YouTube's motion to dismiss and discussed in Universal's

response require the element of a famous mark to support a claim for dilution. Jet, Inc. v.
Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 1999), discusses the elements of

an Ohio common

law dilution claim and notes the "the senior user must demonstrate that it has a famous mark."

Id. at 242. Universal's suggestion that this is mere dicta is outright false. Ameritech, on which the Jet cour relied, holds that fame is a necessary element, but that such fame need not be
nationaL. Ameritech, 811 F.3d at 965. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.Net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d

942 (S.D. Ohio 2003), is even more clear, listing out the four elements of a dilution claim. The
first element is that "the senior mark

must befamous." Id. at 952 (emphasis added). There is
the law. In sum, Jet, Ameritech, and Reed

nothing to "misinterpret" in this explicit recitation of

all require fame, whether local or national, to make out a dilution claim. That there is a trend to allow dilution claims based on regional rather than national fame
ignores the point of Y ouTube' s motion to dismiss-that Universal has pled no fame whatsoever.

Ohio common law requires fame, and there is no Ohio statute that has eliminated that

requirement (as some other states have enacted). To say that uTube is a "distinctive and strong
mark" falls far short of

pleading that it is a famous mark.4 The Court should therefore dismiss

not allege diversity. 4 Saying that "there can only be one internet domain in the entire world named ":utube.com:?"
misses the point. As discussed in Section II. A.

1 , the fact that a web address is unique does not

mean that it is per se distinctive and deserving of trademark protection. After all, it is equally true that "there can be only one internet domain in the entire world named proqweijrfsemsfwoqerjio.com, (see Opp. at 9), but that does not magically turn
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Universal's Ohio common law dilution claim.
3. Universal has alleged neither a proper trespass nor a proper chatteL.

In an effortto salvage its trespass to chattels claim, Universal tries on various conflicting
theories in its opposition brief. In its Complaint, Universal claims that its chattel is the web

address utube.com. (Compl. ~ 79.) Yet it then argues in its opposition that it is the computer
servers, not the web address, that suffered diminished value, notwithstanding the fact that it does
not own those servers. (Opp. Br. 9.) Finally, Universal concludes that its claim "is not that its

computer is being trespassed but that its domain name" is being trespassed. (Opp. Br. 10-11.)
Universal acknowledges that its claim is "noveL." Its novelty, however, lies in the fact
that it does not comport with the elements necessary to make out a trespass to chattels claim.
First, Universal has not pled that Y ouTube acted intentionally to come into physical contact with
Universal's alleged chattel-utube.com. See Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 217, cmt e. To

the contrary, the contact that Universal alleges in its Complaint comes from Internet users
misspelling a web address, not Y ouTube directing any signals at UniversaL. (See Compl. ~~ 43,

45.) Universal does not allege that Y ouTube itself comes into contact with Universal's domain

name (or webservers) or that it intentionally directed others to do SO.5 Second, Universal does
not plead a proper chattel: a web address is not a piece of physical property with which one can

physically interfere. Instead, the right to use a web address is an intangible property right. By
definition, one cannot physically trespass an intangible piece of property. The simple fact that a

domain name is transferable property does not make it a "chattel"-the definition requires
movable, physical property. Black's Law Dictionary 251 (8th ed. 2004).
Given these pleading deficiencies, there is no reason to go into burdensome discovery
regarding intent. With

no allegation of intent, no claim of physical interference by Y ouTube,

and no physical chattel pled in the Complaint, the Court can dismiss the claim outright pursuant

proqweijrfsemsfwoqerjio.com or any other term into an automatically famous mark entitled to dilution protection. 5 The concept of joint liability has no applicability here, where there is no relationship between Y ouTube and random people using the Internet who visit the web address utube.com. Even if it have to plead facts in support of such a theory, which it has not done. did apply, Universal would
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to Rule 12(b)(6). In any event, the intent that Universal refers to in its brief-intent to adopt the
domain name Y ouTube.com, intent to develop a business based on video-file sharing to attract

visitors, and intent to succeed, (Opp. Br. i O)--oes not equate to the intent necessary for a
trespass to chattels claim. Universal fails to plead intent to bring about a physical contact with
Universal's chattel.6 See Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 217, cmt e.

Universal's contention that it has a possessory interest in the computer system on which it

maintains its webpages is both irrelevant and incorrect. Universal complains of interference with

its domain name, not any computer system. (Compl. ~ 79; see also Opp. Br. 9-11.) Moreover,
Universal erroneously argues that Y ouTube seeks to bar a trespass to chattel claim where the

chattel was a tangible item located in leased warehouse space. (Opp. Br. 10.) The problem
Y ouTube points out is not that the computer systems reside somewhere else, it is (1) that they

aren't owned by Universal in the first place, and (2) that a domain name is not a "tangible item."
Finally, Universal does not address any of

the related caselaw discussed in YouTube's .

motion to dismiss. As detailed in the motion brief, trespass to chattels claims can address sóme
unwanted intrusions via the Internet, such as unsolicited email or web aggregators. See, e.g.,
Compuserve, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Register.com v. Verio, 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,

100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). But such a claim only works where an alleged trespasser
intentionally came into contact with the plaintiff s chattel-their computer system-by

generating and sending electronic signals to that computer system via email or over the web. See
id. at 1021; Register.

com v. Verio, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250; eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1070-71. The

theory does not work against Y ouTube because it did not intentionally come into contact with

Universal's computer system. So Universal's claim is not novel in the sense that it has been used
by others to address intentional electronic intrusions, it is simply inapplicable to the facts of this
case, where the alleged intruders are not Y ouTube, but rather third-party Internet users with no
preexisting relationship with Y ouTube.

6 Nor could it. It defies reason that Y ouTube could intend that its potential viewers fail to find used heavy machinery. YouTube's site, and instead stumble upon a seller of
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4. Universal's nuisance claim must be dismissed for failure to plead an

interference with land. .

Ohio common law nuisance requires an interference with land. The Restatement
(Second) of

Torts defines a private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest
Torts § 821D (emphasis

in the private use and enjoyment of land." Restatement (Second) of

added); see also § 822. Ohio courts follow this definition of a private nuisance claim. See, e.g.,
Nuckols v. Natl Heat l-xch. Cleaning Corp., No. 4:00-CV-1698, 2000. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18693,

*19 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 11,2000) (quoting same).
Universal's quotation from Taylor v. City of

Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426 (1944), is
whether a nuisance claim involving land requires an

inapposite. Taylor addresses the issue of

underlying showing of negligence. It does not address, either expressly or implicitly, whether a
nuisance claim may lie against interference with non-real-property rights.
Because it alleges that Y ouTube interferes with its domain name utube.com, not land,

Universal's nuisance claim must faiL. Universal offers no support for likening Internet domain

names and physical real estate. (Opp. Br. 11:) Internet domain names provide the address of a
web site; they are intangible property that cannot be interfered with physically. Land, by

contrast, may be physically interfered with by, for example, water ruoff, smoke, noxious odors,
and noise. Nuisance law properly addresses these types of

unreasonable physical interferences

with land, not non-physical invasions on intangible property rights.7

However novel, nuisance claims should not be interpreted contrary to the legal

requirement for a nontrespassory invasion of land. As such, the Court should dismiss this claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), not certify it to the Ohio Supreme Court.
5. Universal's negligence claim rests on bare legal conclusions.

In its opposition, Universal points to no facts supporting its negligence claim. Instead, it
relies on its prior averments of pure legal conclusion, altogether ignoring the crux of Y ouTube' s

motion to dismiss this claim: that the claim reads merely as a recitation of the necessary legal
7 Applying Universal's broad interpretation of

nuisance lawas extending beyond physical

interferences with land would create absurd results. Under Universal's theory, a patent or copyright holder could recast an infringement claim as a state-law nuisance claim by alleging an

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elements, but lacks underlying factual allegations.
Universal focuses its opposition on its allegation that Y ouTube owes Universal a duty of
due care. Here again, however, Universal can only repeat its conclusory allegation that "a

reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the acts
of

the (sic) YouTube." (Compl. ~ 93.) And while Universal cites to support for this underlying

principle of negligence law, it points to no facts in the Complaint to support the proposition that
Y ouTube should have anticipated any harm to Universal from operating a video-sharing website.

Simply reciting the legal elements of a claim does not meet pleading standards. See

Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475,477 (6th Cir. 2006.) Having failed to point to underlying facts
that support its conclusory allegations, Universal's negligence claim should be dismissed.
6. Having failed to plead facts showing that it used UTUBE as a mark,

Universal's Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices must be dismissed.
As outlined in detail in the opening brief, Universal's Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices
Act claim fails for the same reason that Universal's federal unfair competition claim fails:

Universal has failed to allege that it ever used UTUBE to identify its goods or services and
distinguish them from those of

others. See Ohio Rev. Code An. § 4165.01(E)-(G). Nor does

Universal's statement in the opposition that whether or not it has a protectable mark is "a
question of fact" somehow excuse Universal from pleading the facts that might support its cause
of action.

7. Universal's Ohio RICO claims fail for myriad reasons.
a. There is no basis for personal jurisdiction over Hurley or Chen

Universal incorrectly contends that "the Ohio long-ar statute is not necessary as general
jurisdiction is allowable." (Opp. Br. 13.) Jurisdiction requires a showing that (1) a defendant is
amenable to suit under the forum's long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of

jurisdiction satisfies

the Constitutional requirements of due process. Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
1262 (6th Cir. 1996). Because the Ohio long-arm statute has been interpreted to extend as far as
the notions of

federal due process allow, this two-pronged analysis collapses into one-whether

interference with its intangible property rights.
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a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction to satisfy due process. See

Intl Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). That analysis requires a distinction between
"specific" and "general" jurisdiction, with general jurisdiction over a defendant resting on
continuous and systematic contacts with the state. Third Nat 'I Bank v. Wedge Group, Inc., 882

F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
In any event, Universal misrepresents the underlying basis for Y ouTube' s Rule 12(b )(2)

motion to dismiss. Y ouTube does not fault Universal for relying on its allegation of general

jurisdiction, as Universal suggests. (Opp. Br. 13.) Rather, Y ouTube's motion rests on the fact
that Universal failed to plead any facts warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction over Chen
and Hurley. Indeed, Universal acknowledges that it bears the

burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction. (Opp. Br. 4.) Moreover, it correctly notes that it may not stand on its pleadings but
must by affidavit or otherwise set forth specific facts showing that the Court can exercise

jurisdiction over Hurley and Chen. Id. (citing Theunnisen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th
Cir. 1991)). Yet Universal fails to meet these legal burdens.8

Universal points the Cour to no facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction over Chen
and Hurley. Instead, Universal stands on its conclusory assertion that the "Court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendants due to their continuous and systemic contacts with this district."
(Compl. ~ 6.) And it has proffered no affidavit or other proof

to set forth specific facts showing

that

the Court can exercise jurisdiction.9
Universal does argue that You

Tube has sufficient contacts with Ohio to subject the

company to general jurisdiction. But Y ouTube's contacts with the state of Ohio do not confer

personal jurisdiction over Chen or Hurley. Universal confuses the requirements for personal
jurisdiction with the question of whether, if personal jurisdiction were to exist, Chen and Hurley 8 Curiously, Universal responds to a challenge to jurisdiction over Hurley and Chen by submitting an affidavit supporting jurisdiction over Y ouTube. Y ouTube, however, did not contest jurisdiction to begin with. 9 Nor can it. Defendants Hurley and Chen are residents of California who work in California. Neither has ever lived in Ohio. Neither has property in Ohio. Neither has done any business in Ohio. Indeed, Chen has never been to Ohio, while Hurley only visited Ohio about eight to ten
times for college track and field and cross country ruing events.
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would be protected by the corporate veil doctrine. Even if Ohio's RICO statute could pierce the
corporate veil and reach Chen and Hurley, it can do so only if there is personal

jurisdiction over

them. It is bootstrapping to claim that jurisdiction over the corporation leads inexorably to
jurisdiction over individual employees of that corporation, regardless of their contacts with Ohio.
Bypassing the minimum contacts analysis in this way would be inconsistent with due process.

Contrary to Universal's argument, the fiduciary shield doctrine does insulate Chen and

Hurley from being subjectto jurisdiction in Ohio courts based upon their positions as officers of
Y ouTube. In Ohio, the activities of corporate offcers on behalf of a corporation do not confer

jurisdiction over the individuals. United States v. Flack, No. 2:96-CV -122, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1980, *11 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 1997) (citing Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927,

930 (6th Cir. 1974)). In Flack, the court expressly noted that while some jurisdictions have
abandoned the fiduciary shield doctrine, district courts in Ohio continue to apply the doctrine as
a limit to personal

jurisdiction. See also Walker v. Concoby, 79 F. Supp. 2d 827,834 (N.D. Ohio

1999) (quoting Weller for the proposition that "jurisdiction over the individual officers of a

corporation cannot be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over the corporation," but noting that

Ohio cours may exercise jurisdiction over a corporate officer ifthe officer were physically
present in Ohio and engaged in a tortious transaction). Ignoring this precedent, Universal instead
relies on inapplicable cases from jurisdictions that, unlike Ohio, have abandoned the fiduciary
shield doctrine. (Opp. Br. 14.) Pursuant to Flack, Weller, and Walker, this Court cannot

exercise jurisdiction over Chen and Hurley simply because they are officers of Y ouTube, and

Universal has presented the Cour with no facts that Chen or Hurley themselves committed any
tortious acts while in Ohio. Thus, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), the Court should

dismiss
jurisdiction.

Universal's Ohio RICO claim for lack of

personal

b. Universal leaves out allegations regarding material elements.
Here again, Universal misrepresents the crux of You

Tube's motion to dismiss the Ohio

RICO claim. You Tube does not contend that Universal's claim must fail because the "person" and "enterprise" need to be distinct. YouTube contends that, as pleaded, Universal's RICO
claim does not line up with the words of the statute.

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As noted in the opening brief, the Ohio RICO statute states that "No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs
of

the enterprise through a pattern of corrpt activity or the collection of an unlawfl debt."

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.32(A)(1). Universal reiterates these requirements in its brief.

(Opp. Br. 14.) Nonetheless, Universal's Complaint does not plead these elements.
In its complaint, Universal alleges that the You Tube engages

in allegedly corrpt activity

such as criminal copyright infringement and distribution of live musical performances. (See
Compl. ~~ 114-27, 129-32, and 137-40.) It does not allege that Chen and Hurley are engaged in
such activity. Nor can it; the alleged infringing activity is committed

by third parties who post
statute requires Universal to plead that Hurley

content on YouTube's website. And while the

and Chen engaged in corrupt activity while conducting the affairs of Y ouTube, Universal alleges

the reverse: that Y ouTube, not Chen and Hurley, has engaged in corrupt activity. Universal seeks to hold Chen and Hurley liable merely because they are officers of Y ouTube. Such

allegations do not track the statute. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.32(A)(1) & (2).
Consequently, the Court should dismiss the Ohio RICO claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

c. The DMCA safe harbor precludes Universal's RICO claim.
Universal's argument concerning the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") is

simply bizare. Without citing any authority, Universal claims that Y ouTube, as a "mere
website," is not an "Internet Service Provider" ("ISP"), and thus that the DMCA does not apply
to it. Were this the law, it would come as quite a shock to the thousands of

"mere websites" that

register DMCA agents, establish notice-and-takedown procedures, and employ thousands of

people to process notices of claimed infringements. But of course, this is not the law. As Universal notes, the DMCA has two separate classes of ISPs. The first class includes
what people vernacularly refer to as "ISP"s: the V erizons, Comcasts, AT &Ts, and the like, who

provide pure connectivity. These ISPs come under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which provides
immunity without any obligation to implement notice-and-takedown procedures (as they do not
store anything to begin with, there's nothing to take down).
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The second class ofISPs is much broader, and encompasses any entity that stores,

locates, or caches data on the Internet. See 17 U.S.c. § 512(b)-(d). As the court held in In re
Aimster, "(a) plain reading of

both definitions reveals that 'service provider' is defined so

broadly that we have trouble imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall
under the definitions." 254 F. Supp. 2d 634,658 (N.D. IlL. 2002) (emphasis added), affrmed 334

F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). Every court to consider the applicability ofthe DMCA to "mere
websites" has found that they come within the DMCA's ambit. See, e.g, Hendrickson v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (Amazon as ISP); Parker v. Google, 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (Google as ISP); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBm LLC, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. CaL. 2004) (credit card service as ISP). YouTube is an Internet service that

stores and indexes material that is posted by its users. There can be no question that it is an
"ISP" under the DMCA.

Universal's other point concerning the DMCA is similarly misplaced. It consists of an
argument that Y ouTube has actual knowledge of infringing files and fails to act on that

knowledge, thus disqualifying it from DMCA safe harbors. Such questions, Universal argues,
are one of fact and preclude dismissaL. Universal misses the point: there are no such allegations

in Universal's complaint. Nor could there be. Universal has never sent YouTube a DMCA
notice, because Universal is not a copyright holder. A

fortiori, Universal cannot allege that

Y ouTube has failed to respond to such notices. Neither does Universal allege that anyone else

has sent a notice to which Y ouTube has not responded. In fact, Universal alleges just the
opposite. (Compl. ~~ 25,34,39.) Universal's speculation, in its brief, that YouTube somehow
acquires knowledge of infringing po

stings of the works of unnamed third parties independent of

such notices, and that it somehow fails to act on that knowledge, cannot substitute for pleading

facts that would support such speculation.

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d. Universal's Ohio RICO claim is expressly barred by the CDA.

Universal's CDA argument simply ignores the case law cited in our opening brief.

Universal argues that its Ohio RICO claim is not preempted because it is based upon a federal

intellectual property claim. It is not. Universal's claim rests upon an Ohio state statute, which
itself depends on an underlying allegation of criminal conduct; Universal does not assert that
Y ouTube has infringed any Universal copyright. Yet lacking its own copyright claims,
Universal tries to litigate someone else's by dressing them up in the cloak of

Ohio RICO law.

In any event, the recent decision in Perfect 10,. Inc. v. CCBm LLC establishes that all

state court causes of action are preempted, regardless whether they are based on claims

denominated "intellectual property" or not. Nos. 04-57143, -57207,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
7238, *33 (9th Cir. Mar. 29,2007). Since Universal's RICO claim is based on Ohio state law, it
10
is preempted.

The court in Doe v. Bates also held that state law civil claims do not survive CDA
preemption, even if the underlying criminal claims on which they are based would. No.

5:05-

CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006). "Congress
decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs that a
service provider's actions violated the criminal

laws." Id. at 12. The CDA therefore preempts
II

Universal's state law RICO claim based upon allegations of criminal copyright infringement.

Universal's reliance on MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), is similarly misplaced.
YouTube's (and the Doe cour's) interpretation of

the CDA would not mean that "websites such

as Grokster (would be) immune from copyright infringement claims." (Opp. Br. 19.) The

federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad 'federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service." Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBil LLC Nos. 04-57143, -57207, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7238, *31-32 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (citations omitted).
10 As Perfect 10 also points out, "(t)he majority of II The same analysis applies to state law civil claims based on underlying

federal intellectual

property claims. But, again, that is not what Universal has alleged here.
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claims in Grokster were civil federal copyright claims, and thus the CDA did not preempt them.
e. The alleged Ohio RICO violation is not the proximate cause of

Universal's injuries.
Universal has no standing to bring its Ohio RICO claim because there is no proximate

causal connection between its alleged injury-unwelcome visits to its website-and the alleged
corrpt activity-criminal copyright infringement. Although Ohio RICO law allows some

indirectly injured persons to assert claims, the alleged injuries here are too legally remote from

the alleged criminal conduct. An Internet user's misspelling ofthe web address YouTube.com is
entirely divorced from any alleged corrupt activity by Y ouTube. Indeed, the unwanted traffic

may result solely from the misspellngs of Internet users looking for posted material that does not violate copyright laws. As such, Universal's claim is not like one brought by a union health trust
against a tobacco company to recover medical expenses paid by the trust and allegedly caused by
beneficiaries' smoking. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 1998). Here, unlike in Iron Workers, the injury is more than

just

indirect, it bears absolutely no relation to the alleged corrupt activity.
III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Universal's claims should be dismissed without leave to amend.

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Dated: March 30, 2007 Respectfully Submitted
By: /s/ MatthiasA. Kamber

HARRY D. CORNETT, JR. - #13179 CAROLYN C. RUSSELL - #73549 Tucker Ellis & West LLP
1150 Huntington Building

925 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115-1475
Telephone: [phone]

Facsimile: 216/592-5009

MICHAELH. PAGE

MARKA. LEMLEY
MATTHIAS A. KAMBER Keker & Van Nest, LLP
710 Sansome St.

San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: [phone] Facsimile: 415/397-7188
Attorneys for Defendants, You

Tube, Inc.,

Chad Hurlev. and Steve Chen

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L.R. 7.1(0 Certification
I hereby certify thatthe foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO RULE 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 18) meets the page limitations set forth in L.R. 7.1. This case was placed upon the standard track pursuant to Order ofthis court on 3/8/2007 (Doc. #18).
Isl Matthias A. Kamber MATTHIAS A. KAMBER Keker & Van Nest LLP 710 Sansome St San Francisco, CA, 94111 Phone: [phone] Fax: [phone] E-mail: rnamber~kvn.com

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on March 30, 2007, a copy of foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT TO RULE 12(b)(6) and
(CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 1-8) was fied electronically. Notice of this filing wil be

sent by

operation of the Court's electronic filing system to all parties indicated on the electronic filing
receipt. All other paries wil be served by regular U.S. maiL. Parties may access this filing

through the Court's system.
Isl Matthias A. Kamber MATTHIAS A. KAMBER Keker & Van Nest LLP 710 Sansome St San Francisco, CA, 94111 Phone: [phone] Fax: [phone] E-mail: mkamber(fkvn.com

18