Coley et al v. Lucas County, Ohio
Filing
109
Memorandum Opinion and Order: The 72 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Lucas County and Defendant Lucas County Sheriffs Office is denied. Magistrate Judge Vernelis K. Armstrong on 12/27/2013. (B,TM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DENISE M. COLEY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
:
Case No. 3:09 CV 0008
:
v.
:
LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO, ET AL.,
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
(DOCKET NO. 72)
Defendants.
:
I. INTRODUCTION.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 636(c) and FED. R. CIV. P. 73, the parties
in this case have consented to have the undersigned Magistrate Judge conduct any and all
proceedings in the case. The matter before this Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
filed by Defendant Lucas County and Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office to which Plaintiffs
filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Docket No. 72 & 77). For the reasons that follow, the
Magistrate denies Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 72).
II. THE PARTIES.
Plaintiff Denise M. Coley, a resident of Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, is the mother of the
late Carlton Lenard Benton and the administrator of Mr. Benton’s estate (Docket No. 70, ¶ 1)
Plaintiff DeCarlos Benton, a resident of Portsmouth, Virginia, is the decedent’s father
(Docket No. 70, ¶ 2).
Plaintiff Carla Benton, a resident of Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, is the decedent’s sister
(Docket No. 70, ¶ 4 ).
Plaintiff Maliki Larmond, a resident of Camden, New Jersey, is the decedent’s son (Docket
No. 70, ¶ 3).
Defendant Lucas County, Ohio, has its county seat in Toledo, Ohio, and the Board of
Commissioners, a three-member panel of elected officials, holds the administrative power for the
county.
Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office is a branch of Lucas County, Ohio government
responsible for law enforcement and maintaining full police jurisdiction in the municipalities,
villages and townships within Lucas County, Ohio (Docket No. 70, ¶ 5; www.co.lucas.oh.us).
At all times relevant to these proceedings, Defendant James A. Telb, a resident of Maumee,
Ohio, was the chief law enforcement officer in the Lucas County Sheriff’s Department and
Defendants John E. Gray, Robert M. McBroom and Jay M. Schmeltz, residents of Lucas County,
Ohio, were employees of the Lucas County Sheriff’s Office (Docket No. 70, ¶ 6).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The underlying issues arise from an incident at the Lucas County Jail on May 30, 2004:
Carlton Benton had been returned from the intensive care unit at St. Vincent
Hospital to a second floor medical unit at the jail. He struggled with authority upon
being removed from the hospital unit and again at the jail in the second floor
medical unit. The jury obviously determined that Defendant Gray applied a
“sleeper hold” to Mr. Benton during the course of attempting to remove restraints.
That attempt was by not only Defendant Gray, but several other sheriff's deputies.
Mr. Benton was rendered unconscious and the jury found that Defendant Gray left
the medical unit without informing anyone of that condition or of the fact that
Defendant Gray had used a “sleeper hold” on Mr. Benton. Benton was
subsequently found unconscious in the medical cell; although paramedics were able
to restore his pulse, he never regained consciousness and died on June 2, 2004 at
the hospital.
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United States v. Gray, et. al., 2011 WL 198006, *1 (N.D. Ohio,2011) (unreported).
IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
On December 9, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting federal claims pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 19831 against all Defendants in the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and on
January 5, 2009, the case was removed to this district court (Docket No. 2). On June 1, 2009, the
Magistrate Judge ordered that all further proceedings in this civil case be stayed and reopened only
for good cause (Docket No. 16). On October 7, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reopen Case to
Amend Complaint. The Magistrate Judge granted the Motion to Reopen and granted Plaintiffs
leave to amend the complaint on or before December 4, 2009 (Docket Nos. 17, 19 & 20). Plaintiffs
filed their First Amended Complaint on December 4, 2009 (Docket No. 21). On March 10, 2010,
the Magistrate Judge ordered that the case be stayed pending the jury verdict (Docket No. 27).
On October 26, 2012, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Lift Stay was granted. Defendant Lucas County
and Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office filed a Motion of Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket
No. 72) which Plaintiffs oppose (Docket No. 77).
V. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
In the Second Amended Complaint, all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Lucas
County are brought pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for damages arising from alleged
violations of their constitutional rights. Specifically, the Second Amended Complaint asserts the
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
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following claims:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Wrongful Death.
Deprivation of Constitutional Rights.
Failure to Train and Supervise Employees.
Negligence/Recklessness/Bad faith.
Assault and Battery.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Loss of Consortium.
Aiding and Abetting; Civil Conspiracy and Civil Racketeering Influence and
Corrupt Organizations act (RICO) under federal and state laws.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Defendant
Sheriff’s Office:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Deprivation of Constitutional Rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1985.
Aiding and Abetting; Civil Conspiracy and Civil R.I.C.O.
VI. DEFENDANTS’ POSITION.
Relying on OHIO REV. CODE § 301.222 which bases the capacity to sue and be sued on the
distinct legal existence of an Ohio county that adopts a charter or alternative form of government,
Defendant Lucas County asserts that Plaintiffs failed to allege in any of their pleadings, the
existence of a charter or alternative form of government. Defendant Lucas County claims that it
cannot be sued because Plaintiffs failed to assert the existence of the charter or alternative form
or government. Defendant Lucas County seeks judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(c).3
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Every county adopting a charter or an alternative form of government is a body politic and corporate for the
purpose of enjoying and exercising the rights and privileges conveyed under it by the constitution and the laws of this
state. Such county is capable of suing and being sued, pleading and being impleaded.
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(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay
trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (Thomson Reuters 2013).
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VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) are beneficial
in disposing of cases in which there are no material issues of fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleading
filed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) is the same as for a motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).4 Fritz
v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog
Market, Incorporated, 249 F.3d 509, 511–512 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389,
399–400 (6th Cir.1999)). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, assuming the truth of all
materials facts pled in the complaint, the moving party is nonetheless entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id. (citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2007)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant
as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead “sufficient factual matter” to render the
legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1949–1950 (2009)). A legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation need not be accepted as
true on a motion to dismiss, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id.
(citing Hensley Manufacturing v. ProPride, Incorporated, 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir.2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965-1966 (2007); see also Delay v.
Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005–1006 (6th Cir.2009)).
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12 (b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Thomson Reuters
2013).
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VIII. ANALYSIS
The issue presented by Defendant Lucas County is whether its inability to be sued under
Section 301.22 precludes its ability to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Magistrate finds that it is actually the Eleventh Amendment immunity, not Section
301.22, that determines whether Defendant Lucas County can be sued under Section 1983. Smith
v. Grady, 2013 WL 249677, *6 -7 (S.D.Ohio,2013). Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state and
its agencies generally are immune from private lawsuits in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment, unless that immunity has been expressly waived. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977)). As such, whether the Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit against claims brought against an entity in federal court turns on the
question of whether the entity is an “arm of the State.” Id. (citing Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 572;
Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 999 (6th Cir.1993)).
This Court looks to Ohio law for guidance on whether a county is an “arm of the state.”
Id. Under OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.01(B), a county is considered a “political subdivision” of the
state. Id. Ohio courts also have recognized counties as “political subdivisions.” Id. (citing Zents
v. Board of Commissioners, 9 Ohio St.3d 204, 205, 459 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1984); Schaffer v. Board
of Trustee of Franklin County Veterans Memorial, 171 Ohio St. 228, 230, 168 N.E.2d 547, 549
(Ohio 1960); see also Turner, supra, 671 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“[T]here is no question that Lucas
County, [Ohio] . . . is a ‘political subdivision of the State of Ohio[.]’ ” (citing OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2743.01(B))). As a political subdivision, a county is not immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy, supra, 97 S.Ct. at 573 (“The bar of the Eleventh Amendment
to suit in federal courts extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances . . . but
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does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.”); S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374
F.3d 416, 420 (6th Cir.2004) (expressly affirming the “portion of the district court's order denying
immunity to defendant Hamilton County[, Ohio]” with respect to a claim brought under federal
law); Turner, 671 F.Supp.2d at 972 (finding an Ohio county was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Stack v. Karnes, 750
F.Supp.2d 892, 897 (S.D.Ohio, 2010) (finding “the immunity afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment [to be] inapplicable to Franklin County[, Ohio]”); Horen v. Lucas County, Ohio, 2011
WL 4842391, at *1–2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117773, at *4 (N.D.Ohio, 2011) (county is not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under federal remedial statutes of ADA, FMLA and
Rehabilitation Act) (unreported)).
Here, Defendant Lucas County does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from a
Section 1983 lawsuit. In fact, Ohio law is pre-empted insofar as it would impose any barrier to
bringing an otherwise valid Section 1983 action. Accordingly, the Magistrate declines to dismiss
the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint against Defendant Lucas
County. Defendant Lucas County is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and it may be
sued under Section 1983.
The Magistrate declines to grant Defendant Sheriff’s Office’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleading. Defendant Sheriff’s Office failed to cite any legal authority or advance any argument
to support its motion.
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IX. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant
Lucas County and Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Vernelis K. Armstrong
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: December 27, 2013
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