Santiago v. Ringle et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM OPINION granting Motion for reconsideration. Related Doc # 32 (, ); granting Motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity (Related Doc # 33 ). Judge David A. Katz on 8/9/12.(G,C)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
OSCAR SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:10 CV 173
-vsMEMORANDUM OPINION
DR. KURT RINGLE, et al.,
Defendant.
KATZ, J.
Plaintiff Oscar Santiago is currently incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Institute
(“MCI”) in Marion County, Ohio. Plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action against Defendant Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) physicians Kurt Ringle (then MCI’s
Medical Director), and Constance Mosher (then MCI’s Assistant Medical Director), alleging that
Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. On September 9, 2011, this Court declined to adopt the Magistrate’s
Report and Recommendation, and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 29).
Defendants subsequently filed the instant motions for reconsideration, (Doc. 32), and for summary
judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. (Doc. 33). Plaintiff responded through counsel
to both motions, (Doc. 40), and Defendants replied. (Doc. 41) For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants’ motions are granted.
I. Discovery Issues
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff raised several discovery complaints in his
response to Defendants’ original motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s complaints, however,
are without merit and do not demonstrate an inability to present facts essential to justify his
opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).1
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that his medical records were provided in a small, unusable
format (four pages of records per produced page), that Defendants did not produce a copy of
ODRC policies, and that Defendants’ discovery responses were untimely. Despite these claims,
however, Defendants reproduced Plaintiff’s medical records on January 26, 2011 with one page
per side of paper, and also indicated on that date that production of ODRC policies would be
unduly burdensome and costly given that they are available in the library at Plaintiff’s institution.
(Doc. 22-1 at 1). Regarding the timing of Defendants’ productions, Plaintiff did not request
discovery until November 18, 2011, nearly eight months after filing his complaint. Defendants
then requested, and were granted, until January 7, 2011 to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests. Thereafter, Defendants timely moved for summary judgment on January 10, 2011 per
this Court’s scheduling order. While Plaintiff raised objections to Defendants’ discovery
responses, Defendants immediately responded to those objections on January 26, as described
above. Further, despite offering factual analysis in response to the instant motions for
reconsideration and summary judgment, Plaintiff made no mention of outstanding discovery
issues or otherwise indicated that he is unable to present facts essential to justify his opposition.
(Doc. 40).
II. Motion for Reconsideration
1
The Court indicated in its Memorandum Opinion denying Defendants’ summary judgment motion
that Plaintiff’s discovery issues would be addressed at a future status conference. (Doc. 29 at 1
n.1). A conference is unnecessary, however, for the reasons described above.
2
“District Courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any
part of a case before entry of a final judgment. A district court may modify, or even rescind, such
interlocutory orders.” Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted);
see also Kelly v. City of Fort Thomas 610 F. Supp. 2d 759, 779 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (citing id.)
(granting defendants’ motion to reconsider denial of summary judgment). “Traditionally, courts
will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening
change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x
949, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2067, at **26-**27 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004) (citing Reich v. Hall
Holding Co., 990 F. Supp. 955, 965 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
At all times relevant, Dr. Ringle was MCI’s Medical Director, and Dr. Mosher was MCI’s
Assistant Medical Director. At issue is a delay in Plaintiff’s receipt of three treatments that an
Ohio State University (“OSU”) dermatologist recommended for Plaintiff’s Erytema Nodosum (an
uncomfortable, but non-dangerous skin rash). The dermatologist made the recommendations at a
February 20, 2008 dermatology consult, which was ordered by Dr. Ringle.
After the February 20 consult, Dr. Mosher transcribed the dermatologist’s
recommendations the same day. Dr. Mosher’s order remained unsigned, however, until February
27. Plaintiff subsequently received the first treatment (Triamcinolone) on February 29, and the
second treatment (compression stockings) on March 10. The third treatment, (SSKI), is a non-life
saving, non-formulary drug not kept in stock by the ODRC. As such the drug required a request
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from MCI’s Medical Director (Dr. Ringle) to the ODRC Central Office. Dr. Ringle made the
request on March 4, and Plaintiff received the drug around March 14-17.2
In denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court followed several Sixth
Circuit cases that applied the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), that “interruption of a prescribed plan of treatment could constitute a constitutional
violation.” Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir. 199) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105); Hines v. Wilkinson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21598, *2, *8 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1994); Byrd v.
Wilson, 701 F.2d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1983). On reconsideration, however, the Court finds that it
mis-apprehended the facts regarding the dermatologist’s treatments, and the Court must now grant
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and enter summary judgment in their favor. Specifically,
Defendants indicated in their original motion for summary judgment that the dermatologist’s
treatments were recommendations only. (Doc. 18 at 5, 6). As such, the dermatologist’s
treatments were not a prescribed plan of treatment, but were recommended for consideration by
the attending physicians; i.e., Defendants. There was, therefore, never an interruption in a
prescribed plan of treatment, and Plaintiff’s complaint that Defendants’ course of treatment did
not immediately comport with recommendations made by a consulting physician does not state a
cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment.
2
The Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) indicates that Plaintiff began receiving
the SSKI on March 17, 2008. (Doc. 26 at 3). Defendants did not dispute this date in their
response to Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R, and this Court’s denial of Defendants’ summary
judgment motion likewise indicated that Plaintiff began receiving the SSKI on March 17. (Doc.
29 at 5). Defendants now urge on reconsideration that evidence suggests Plaintiff began receiving
the SSKI three days earlier, on March 14. As explained below, however, this discrepancy is
immaterial to the disposition of Plaintiff’s claim.
4
These facts are buttressed by Dr. Mosher’s January 6, 2011 affidavit–attached to
Defendants’ original summary judgment motion–which explains that “all medical orders for
treatments and medications were timely processed and administered to the Plaintiff in accordance
with [ODRC] procedures.” (Doc. 18-4 at ¶16). Defendants provided further explanation of these
facts via Dr. Mosher’s October 18, 2011 affidavit–attached to Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration–which states both that “[a]s of February 20, 2008, the above
medications/treatments were recommendations for the consideration of the attending
physician(s),” (Doc. 32-1 at ¶7), and that “[t]he Medical Director has/had the discretion to
determine whether and/or when to prescribe/implement a consulting physician’s
recommendations.” Id. at ¶8. Dr. Mosher’s affidavit goes on to detail the medical reasons why
Defendants, in their discretion, did not immediately implement the dermatologist’s
recommendations. Id. at ¶¶10-12. Further, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration reemphasizes
that because SSKI is a non-life saving, non-formulary drug, it requires a request from the Medical
Director to the ODRC Central Office. Dr. Mosher’s affidavit explains that Dr. Ringle “was not
required to seek approval for non-formulary medications that are neither classified as emergent
nor life-saving.” Id. at ¶13.
To be clear, the Court does not see this information as new evidence, but as a clarification
of the facts presented to the Court on Defendants’ original motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for reconsideration so as to prevent
manifest injustice, and will enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
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III. Qualified Immunity
Defendants seek leave for this Court to consider Defendants’ second motion for summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. (Doc. 33). Defendants’ motion is granted.
The federal doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials performing
discretionary functions are immune from suit unless the plaintiff shows that the official violated
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Champion, 380 F.3d at 900.
Determining whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry.
See Scott v. Haris, 550 U.S. 372, 277 (2007); Hudson v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir.
2007). First, the Court examines whether the facts show that a constitutional violation occurred.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, if a constitutional violation is found, the Court
examines whether the constitutional right was clearly established such that an objectively
reasonable official would have known his or her conduct violated the right. Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). Importantly, qualified immunity is a question of law. Champion, 380
F.3d at 900. “[I]f there is a disagreement as to the facts, the reviewing court must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.” Landis v. Baker, 297 Fed. App’x. 453, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 21945, at **18 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2008) (citing Champion, 380 F.3d at 900).
Further, “[i]f the legal question is dependent upon which version of facts one believes, then the
jury must determine liability.” Landis, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21945, at **17. Finally, “[t]he
plaintiff has the burden to ‘show that the defendant is not entitled’ to qualified immunity.”
Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d
1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 1999)).
6
In the instant matter, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred
for the same reasons articulated in the foregoing analysis of Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and their second motion
for summary judgment is granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motions for reconsideration, (Doc. 32), and for
qualified immunity, (Doc. 33), are granted. Case closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ David A. Katz
DAVID A. KATZ
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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