Calixte v. Jeffrey et al

Filing 33

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Defendants' Motion (Doc. No. 26 ) is granted and this case is dismissed as to all remaining Defendants. Judge Jack Zouhary on 10/5/11. (C,D)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Alcius Calixte,

Case No. 3:10 CV 2838
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

-vsJUDGE JACK ZOUHARY
Jeffrey Briggs, Sr., et al.,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Defendants Mark Lawson, Charles Dell, Donna Varney, and Craig Branson have moved for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 26).
Plaintiff has not opposed.
BACKGROUND
A more detailed background of this case appears in this Court’s previous Memorandum
Opinion and Order (Doc. No. 6), but a brief recitation of the pertinent facts is helpful here. Pro se
Plaintiff Alcius Calixte was formerly an inmate in the Seneca County Jail. In April 2010, Plaintiff
became upset and began yelling for assistance when another inmate locked Plaintiff in his cell. When
deputies attempted to calm Plaintiff down and move him to another area, Plaintiff resisted, struck
Deputy Mark Lawson in the face twice, and was quickly subdued, by force, by other deputies. Shortly
thereafter, Deputy Lawson filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff for assault and Plaintiff was
indicted (Doc. No. 26-2 at 1–2).

In December 2010, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Defendants, as well as other
Seneca County officials who were previously dismissed from this case (Doc. No. 6), for, among other
things, what this Court construed as excessive force arising from the incidents in April 2010.1 Within
two weeks of filing this lawsuit, however, Plaintiff entered plea of guilty to the assault charge
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Doc. No. 26-2 at 4, 6–9).
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no
genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. This burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district
court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court
must draw all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court is not
permitted to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute; rather, the court
determines only whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find
for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986).

1

There appears to be some dispute whether Defendant Ben Phal was properly served pursuant to Federal Civil
Rule 4 and therefore remains a party to this lawsuit (See Doc. No. 16). The Court need not determine the
sufficiency of service because Plaintiff’s allegations against Phal are identical to those against Defendants
Lawson, Dell, Varney, and Branson. Therefore, this Court will treat Phal as if he remains a party to this lawsuit
and the present Motion is applicable to him as well as the other Defendants.

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Heck v. Humphrey and Plaintiff’s Claims
Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 487 (1994), a case in which the Supreme Court held that Section 1983 plaintiffs are barred
from advancing claims that, if successful, “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a prior
conviction or sentence. The Sixth Circuit addressed the scope of Heck in Cummings v. City of Akron,
418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2005). In Cummings, plaintiff filed a civil rights claim against police officers
for the use of excessive force under Section 1983. Before his federal claim was filed, plaintiff pled
no contest in state court to assault on one officer during the course of the same struggle that formed
the basis of his Section 1983 claim. The Sixth Circuit held that Heck precluded the excessive force
claim because it was “inextricably intertwined” with his assault conviction and because plaintiff could
have raised the excessive force claim as a defense in his criminal proceedings, but instead chose not
to contest the charge. Id. at 683.
This Court sees no meaningful difference between the present matter and the facts of
Cummings. Plaintiff here pled guilty to assault charges stemming from his altercation with law
enforcement officers, which forms the basis of his Section 1983 claims.

Those claims are

“inextricably intertwined” with his conviction and therefore barred by Heck. Plaintiff’s Alford plea,
rather than a no-contest plea or guilty plea which admits all factual allegations charged in the
Indictment, does not change the outcome here. See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th
Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no difference in the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) for a defendant who
pleads guilty and admits to acts constituting the crime and a defendant who pleads guilty but who
either 1) affirmatively protests his innocence or 2) refuses to admit to acts constituting the crime; that
is, either of the two possible Alford-type guilty pleas.”); see also Thomason v. Harris, 2006 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 37360 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (“The fact that Plaintiff entered an Alford plea, not a no-contest plea,
is not important here.”).
Because Heck is dispositive of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, this Court declines to address
Defendants’ remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion (Doc. No. 26) is granted and this case is dismissed as to all remaining
Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
October 5, 2011

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