Bloodworth v. Smith et al

Filing 8

Order: this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge James G. Carr on 9/19/2011. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Ronald Bloodworth,
Plaintiff,
v.
Keith Smith, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:11 CV 1154
JUDGE JAMES G. CARR

OPINION AND ORDER

Pro Se plaintiff Ronald Bloodworth filed the above-captioned action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Toledo Correctional Institution (“ToCI”) Warden Keith Smith and ToCI Captain K.J.
Fullenkamp. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights
by prohibiting him from wearing plait-style braids in his hair. Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory
and monetary relief.
I.

Background
Plaintiff is a state prisoner and is incarcerated at Toledo Correctional Institution in Toledo,

Ohio. He alleges that, on March 1, 2011, he was placed in segregation by order of defendant
Fullenkamp for wearing plait-style braids and refusing to remove them when requested. While he

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was in segregation, plaintiff appeared before the Rules Infraction Board for a disciplinary hearing
and was informed that plait-style braids are in violation of ToCI Local Policy L-02.1 Plaintiff was
sentenced by the Board to eight days of disciplinary control confinement.
It appears from the Complaint that plaintiff was asked to remove his plaits while in
segregation. Plaintiff claims that, when he refused to do so, ToCI corrections officers threatened
to extend his segregation placement and conduct a forced haircut. He further claims that his
segregation cell was excessively cold and that he caught a bad cold while staying there, for which
he was forced to seek medical attention.
On March 10, 2011, plaintiff filed an Informal Complaint Resolution (“ICR”) against
defendant Fullenkamp regarding plaintiff’s placement in segregation for wearing plait-style braids.
Therein, plaintiff alleged that ToCI Local Policy L-02's prohibition against plait-style braids
conflicts with Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D), which he claims explicitly authorizes such
braids. He further claimed that, because Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”)
Policy 56-DSC-01 prohibits a penal institution from creating any policy which conflicts with the
Ohio Administrative Code, ToCI Local Policy L-02 is unconstitutional and should never have been
enacted. Plaintiff’s ICR was denied.
Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Grievance with the Inspector for Institutional Services,
asserting the same arguments. Inspector Tara Pinski responded, stating that plaits are permitted per
ToCI Local Policy L-02 because they are a form of braid. She stated, however, that braids must
be worn from the front to the back of the head in order to satisfy the requirements of Local Policy

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Plaintiff has not attached ToCI Local Policy L-02 to his Complaint, or otherwise
provided this Court with the content of this Policy.
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L-02. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal to the Chief Inspector, arguing that plaits
cannot be worn from the front to the back of the head as they are “rope-styled” braids that hang
from the scalp. Accordingly, plaintiff argued, ToCI’s policy of permitting plaintiff to only wear
braids from the front to the back of his head effectively prohibits him from wearing plait-style
braids. He further argued that this policy constituted a violation of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s appeal was apparently denied.
Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant Complaint, asserting three causes of action. In Count
One, plaintiff alleges that defendants “have created and are enforcing” an institutional policy
against plait-style braids that is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Ohio Administrative
Code and is in violation of DRC 56-DSC-01. In Count Two, plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim
under the First Amendment on the grounds that he was placed in segregation not as a punishment
for wearing a prohibited hairstyle but in retaliation for wearing a permitted hairstyle (i.e., plaits)
that is disfavored at ToCI. Finally, in Count Three, plaintiff argues that his right to equal treatment
under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when defendants “refused to allow plaintiff to wear
a permitted hairstyle (plaits) unlike other inmates who are permitted to wear the permitted hairstyle
of braids.” (Compl. at ¶ 21).
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from this Court in the form of a judgment that ToCI Local
Policy L-02 is unconstitutional and plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated. He also
seeks an order expunging his March 1, 2011 conduct report and any other records of any kind
associated with the disciplinary proceedings related to this matter, as well as any privilege
revocations and/or sanctions associated therewith. Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel,
and $150,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Finally, he asks the Court to award him “his

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reasonable costs and attorney fees.” (Complt. at p. 20).2
II.

Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a complaint filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma

pauperis shall be dismissed with prejudice if it (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).3 A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable
basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact if it “contains factual allegations that are ‘fantastic or delusional’ or
if it is based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
Dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted “is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Brown, 207 F.3d at 866. See
also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007). The court must “‘construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to plaintiff [and] accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.’”
Thomas, 481 F.3d at 437 (quoting Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir.

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In his Complaint, plaintiff also seeks a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on the
same grounds, which was denied by this Court in an Order dated June 13, 2010.
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An in forma pauperis claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to
the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is
invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the
reasons set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997);
Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris
v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir.
1985).
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2003)). In addition, pleadings filed by a pro se litigant are held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). See also Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Thomas,
481 F.3d at 437.
For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to §1915(e).
III.

Analysis
To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he was deprived of a

right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Simescu v. Emmet County Dep’t of Soc. Services, 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991). If a plaintiff
fails to make a showing on any essential element of a § 1983 claim, that claim must fail. Simescu,
942 F.2d at 375.
Plaintiff alleges the following three claims under Section 1983: (1) a claim that ToCI Local
Policy L-02 is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D); (2)
a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (3) a Fourteenth Amendment claim equal treatment claim.
The Court will address each in turn.
A.

Constitutionality of ToCI Local Policy L-02

Plaintiff first alleges that ToCI Local Policy L-02 is unconstitutional because it conflicts
with Ohio Admin. Code (“OAC”) § 5120-9-25(D), which plaintiff claims explicitly authorizes plaitstyle braids. Because Dept. of Rehab. and Correction (“DRC”) regulation 56-DRC-01 prohibits a
penal institution from creating any policy which conflicts with the Ohio Administrative Code,
plaintiff argues that ToCI Local Policy L-02 is unconstitutional and should never have been enacted

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or enforced.
As stated supra, plaintiff has not provided this Court with ToCI Local Policy L-02 or
otherwise set forth its contents anywhere in his Complaint. For purposes of this analysis, the Court
will assume, as plaintiff alleges, that Local Policy L-02 prohibits prisoners from wearing plait-style
braids that are worn hanging from the scalp, rather than from the front to the back of the head.
As an initial matter, it is not clear that Local Policy L-02 expressly conflicts with Ohio
Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D), as plaintiff maintains. Section 5120-9-25(D) provides as follows:
Haircuts shall be provided as needed. Hair shall be clean, neatly trimmed,
shall not extend over the ears or shirt collar and shall not protrude more than
three inches from the scalp. Braids may be worn subject to the limitations of
this rule. The following hairstyles or facial hair are not permitted: Initials,
symbols, dyes, multiple parts, hair disproportionately longer in one area than
another (excluding natural baldness), weaves and dreadlocks. Other
hairstyles not specifically listed herein may be prohibited if they are
determined to be either a threat to security or contrary to other legitimate
penological concerns, as determined by the office of prisons. If approved by
the warden, an inmate may wear a wig for medical reasons or in conjunction
with medical treatment.
Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D). Contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds that the
above provision does not explicitly authorize plait-style braids that are worn, as plaintiff prefers,
hanging from the scalp.
Even if this provision did expressly authorize such plait braids and therefore conflict with
Local Policy L-02, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted because he has not alleged that Local Policy L-02's prohibition against plait-style braids
infringes on any federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not set forth any allegation that his
ability to exercise a constitutional right is impeded by defendants’ prohibition against plait-style
braids that are worn in plaintiff’s preferred style, i.e., hanging from the scalp. Rather, it appears

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from plaintiff’s Complaint that his desire to wear plait braids is purely a matter of personal
preference. As the Supreme Court has noted, however, “[a] detainee simply does not possess the
full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
In the absence of any allegations that Local Policy L-02 infringes on plaintiff’s exercise of
a constitutional right, plaintiff’s argument Local Policy L-02 is unlawful because it conflicts with
Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D) in violation of DRC 56-DRC-014 is not cognizable under §
1983. Accordingly, the Court finds that Count I of plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e).5
B.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff next alleges a retaliation claim under the First Amendment on the grounds that
defendants placed him in segregation in retaliation for wearing a hairstyle that is “disfavored” at
ToCI, i.e., plait-style braids.
In order to establish a cause of action for retaliation, a plaintiff must: (1) prove that the
conduct which led to the retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) show that the defendant took
adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) demonstrate a causal link between the exercising of the
constitutional right and the adverse action taken. See Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir.
2002); Johnson v. Collins, 2009 WL 1543811 at *6 (N.D. Ohio June 2, 2009).

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DRC 56-DRC-01 relates to the “Inmate Disciplinary Process” and provides, in
pertinent part, that an institutional policy “must not conflict with the [Ohio] Administrative Rules
regarding discipline.” See 56-DRC-01 at VI(C)(2).
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Similarly, to the extent plaintiff is generally challenging the reasonableness of ToCI
Local Policy L-02, this claim must fail as well for the reason that plaintiff has not alleged that this
policy impinges on his constitutional rights. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding
that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”) (emphasis added).
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In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that the conduct which led to his placement in
segregation was his wearing of, and refusal to remove, plait-style braids in violation of ToCI Local
Policy L-02.

As stated above, plaintiff has not alleged that his ability to wear plait braids is

constitutionally protected. Therefore, the Court finds that Count II of plaintiff’s Complaint has
failed to satisfy the first element of a retaliation claim under Brown, supra, and is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e).
C.

Fourteenth Amendment “Equal Treatment” Claim

Lastly, plaintiff alleges that his right to equal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment
was violated when defendants “refused to allow plaintiff to wear a permitted hairstyle (plaits)
unlike other inmates who are permitted to wear the permitted hairstyle of braids.” (Compl. at ¶ 21).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all classifications, but simply prevents
governmental decision makers from treating differently persons who are similarly situated in all
relevant respects. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
In order to establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendants treated similarly situated individuals in a disparate manner. Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d
1095, 1101 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court finds that plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails in the instant
case because plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants permitted other inmates to wear plait-style
braids but prohibited plaintiff from wearing such braids. While plaintiff claims that defendants
allowed other inmates to wear corn row-style braids without being placed in segregation, these
inmates are not similarly situated to plaintiff because they did not attempt to wear their hair in plait

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braids.6 Accordingly, the Court finds that Count III of plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and is, thus, subject to dismissal under § 1915(e).
Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court certifies
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.7
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/ JAMES G. CARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Plaintiff himself distinguishes between corn-row and plait-style braids in his
Complaint, noting that the former are worn close to the scalp whereas “plait-style” braids are a
rope-style braid worn hanging from the scalp.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.