Ewing v. Lucas County Department of Job and Family Services

Filing 60

Memorandum and Order: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. See order for full details. Related document(s) 57 . Magistrate Judge Vernelis K. Armstrong on 10/20/2014. (B,TM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Dianne Ewing,
Plaintiff,

:

Case No. 3:12CV743

:

vs.

:

Lucas County Department of Job and Family
Services,

:

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

:
Defendant.
:

I. INTRODUCTION
The parties have consented to the undersigned Magistrate entering final judgment in this discrimination
case filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., OHIO REV. CODE §
4112.02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 57), to
which Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Docket No. 58), and Defendant filed a Reply (Docket No. 59). For the
reasons that follow, the undersigned Magistrate grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff Diane Ewing (“Plaintiff”), is Caucasian, a citizen of the United States and resident of the City
of Toledo, which is located in Lucas County, Ohio (Docket No. 19, p. 2 of 9). Defendant Lucas County Job and
Family Services (hereinafter “Defendant” or “JFS”) is a department within the governmental structure of Lucas
County, Ohio, under the authority of the Lucas County Board of County Commissioners (Docket No. 19, p. 2 of
9). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an Eligibility Specialist 2, prior to her discharge on or about April

1, 2011 (Docket No. 19, pp 2; 4 of 9). Defendant provides services to families in Lucas County, including
temporary cash assistance, food stamps, subsidized child care, adult protection, disability assistance and
prevention, retention and contingency services, and medical assistance (Docket No. 19, p. 2 of 9).
On January 2, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by Defendant after she filled out an
Authorized Representative Designation form, a form 7200 for expedited food stamps and a statement
concerning hours worked for her son, in violation of Defendant’s Conflict of Interest, Confidentiality, and
Authorized Representative policies (Docket No. 19, p. 3 of 9; Docket No. 58, pp. 2-3 of 9). On February 15,
2011, Plaintiff was charged with dishonesty, failure of good behavior and malfeasance by Defendant (Docket
No. 57, p. 5 of 17; Docket No. 58, p. of 9). In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, a predisciplinary meeting took place on February 25, 2011 (Docket No. 57, p. 6 of 17; Docket No. 58, p. 3 of 9). On
March 10, 2011, Defendant’s director recommended that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 2, p. 57 of 71). On March 29, 2011, the Lucas County Board of County Commissioner’s accepted
the Director’s recommendation and terminated Plaintiff’s employment with JFS (Docket No. 57, Attachment 2,
p. 56 of 71). A grievance was filed on behalf of Plaintiff by the employees’ union, however, the Board of
County Commissioners upheld her termination (Docket No. 57, Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3; Docket No. 58, p. 3 of
9). The employees’ union could have opted for binding arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement,
but chose not to do so in Plaintiff’s case (Docket No. 58, p. 3 of 9).
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and Equal Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on May 4, 2011 (Docket No. 19, Attachment 1). On March 13, 2012, the District
Director of EEOC notified Plaintiff of her right to file suit in an appropriate federal district court within ninety
(90) days (Docket No. 19, Attachment 2). On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this United States

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District Court asserting the following claims based upon her termination from employment with Defendant:
violations of due process and equal protection pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, racial discrimination pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., state law claims of defamation and invasion
of privacy, and racial discrimination pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 4112.02 (A) and 4112.99 as amended.
(Docket No. 1). On June 21, 2012, both parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and FED. R. CIV. P. 73 (Docket No. 13). Defendant filed its Answer on July 3,
2012 (Docket No. 15). On July 6, 2012 Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No.
16).
On August 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed both an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and her First Amended Complaint (Docket Nos. 18 & 19). Defendant filed its Answer to the First
Amended Complaint on September 22, 2012 (Docket No. 25). On September 24, 2012, Defendant filed its
Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), requesting dismissal of Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 27). Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Defendant’s motion on October
22, 2012 (Docket No. 31), and Defendant filed its Reply on November 12, 2012 (Docket No. 35). On
December 5, 2012, this Court filed a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings and dismissing all of Plaintiff’s state and federal claims (Docket No. 37). Plaintiff filed a Notice
of Appeal from the Court’s Memorandum and Order on January 2, 2013 (Docket No. 38).
On July 31, 2013, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s decision on all but one of
Plaintiff’s claims. The Court vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff’s reverse discrimination claim, remanding it to
this Court for further proceedings (Docket No. 42). On August 3, 2014, Defendant filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 57). Plaintiff filed an Opposition on September 2, 2014 (Docket No. 58), and
Defendant filed its Response on September 10, 2014 (Docket No. 59).

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review applicable to motions for summary judgment is established by FED. R. CIV. P. 56
and the associated case law. Miller v. Transfreight, LLC, 2013 WL 4039033, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving part
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED R. CIV. P. 56(c) (West 2014). Alternatively, summary
judgment is denied “if there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Miller, 2013 WL 4039033, at *1 (citing
Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1992)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct.
2505, 2511 (1986)). Thus, summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A material
fact is “genuine,” if it is such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[I]nferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions] must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Nat. Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 662, 664 (6th Cir. 1999)(quoting United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing
that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The reviewing court must
examine the record to determine whether the moving party, “in depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, affidavits and the like has demonstrated ‘the absence of a genuine issue of material fact’ . . . and his
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006)(quoting Celotex, 447
U.S. at 323)(citation omitted)).

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If the moving party meets its burden then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show, “by
affidavits or as otherwise provided under Rule 56 . . . that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Banks, 548 U.S.
529 (citation omitted)(emphasis in original). The nonmoving party must provide some evidence to demonstrate
that there is a genuine issue for trial beyond the pleadings themselves. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A non-moving
party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986)).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the judge must determine “whether a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The Court must refrain from resolving
conflicts in the evidence or making credibility determinations. Id. at 249. If the evidence is merely colorable . .
. or it is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-250 (citations omitted).
V. ANALYSIS
A.

“REVERSE” RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibit public employers from

discriminatory employment practices. Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000). To make a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2014). “To
establish an equal protection claim against a public employer under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the
employer made an adverse employment decision with discriminatory intent and purpose.” Weberg, 229 F.3d at
522 (quoting Boger v. Wayne Cnty., 950 F.2d 316, 324-25 (6th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted)). Under

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both Title VII and § 1983, a plaintiff is required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she “was
the victim of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir.
1988). In other words, a plaintiff must show that “the adverse employment decision would not have been made
‘but for’ her race.” Weberg, 229 F.3d at 522.
The Sixth Circuit “looks to Title VII disparate treatment cases for assistance in analyzing race
discrimination in the public employment context under § 1983.” Id. A plaintiff can meet his/ her evidentiary
burden “by introducing direct evidence of discrimination or by using the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting
paradigm.” Singfield v. Akron Metro Housing Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2004)(citing Kline v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997)). “Ohio discrimination claims under R.C. § 4112.02 are
analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims.” Voltz v. Erie Cnty., 2014 WL 2599855, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio 2014).
1.

DIRECT EVIDENCE

“Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was
at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc, 703
F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013)(quoting Thompson v. City of Lansing, 410 Fed.Appx. 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2011)).
“Consistent with this definition, direct evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any
inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by
prejudice against members of the protected group.” Id. at 914-915 (quoting Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d
858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003)).
In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to present any direct evidence that race played a role in the decision
to terminate her employment. “Alternatively, the plaintiff can meet her evidentiary burden through indirect
evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Weberg, 229 F.3d at 523; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

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Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “The direct evidence and circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive;
the plaintiff can meet her burden with either method of proof.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215
F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2000)).
2.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Under the burden-shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas, the initial burden of proof rests
with the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Texas
Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). In order to establish a prima facie case
for discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was subjected to an
adverse employment action; (3) is qualified for the position from which she was fired; and (4) was treated
differently than employees outside of the protected class for the same or similar conduct. Singfield v. Akron
Metro. Housing Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2004)(citing Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., L.T.D., 61 F.3d
1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995)).
In reverse discrimination cases in which a member of the majority is alleging discrimination on the basis
of race, the Sixth Circuit has modified the first and fourth prong of the prima facie case. Sutherland v. Mich.
Dept. Of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). “[T]o satisfy the first prong . . . the plaintiff must
demonstrate background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority.” Id. (quoting Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th
Cir. 2002)(internal quotations omitted)). To meet the fourth prong of the prima facie case for reverse
discrimination “the plaintiff must show that the defendant treated differently employees who were similarly
situated but were not members of the protected class.” Id.
“Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue.” Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. Of Treasury,

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344 F.3d 603, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2003)(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have recognized the shifting burden creates a rebuttable
presumption against the employer that it unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). If, however, the
defendant rebuts the presumption, then the burden shifts once again to the plaintiff, who must be given an
opportunity to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the rationale offered by defendant was not its true
reason, but instead a pretext for discrimination. Id. “To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff need only
produce enough evidence to support a prima facie case and to rebut, but not to disprove, the defendant’s
proffered rationale.” Shazor v. Professional Transit Management, Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957 (6th Cir.
2014)(quoting Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2012)).
a.

WHETHER PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED HER PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving Plaintiff, as this Court is required to do in
evaluating motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff has failed to establish her prima facie case for reverse
discrimination under either the first or fourth prongs. The Sixth Circuit’s modified first prong requires a
plaintiff to show background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer
that discriminates against the majority. See Zambetti, 314 F.3d at 256. A plaintiff may meet this burden by
presenting evidence that defendant has unlawfully considered race as a factor in past employment matters,
which would warrant a suspicion of “capricious discrimination” on account of race. Id. (citing Jamison v.
Storer, 1987 WL 44901, at *3 (6th Cir. 1987)(unpublished)). The Sixth Circuit has found, for example, that the
fact that an adverse employment decision was made by a member of a racial minority was sufficient to meet the
first prong of the prima facie case for reverse discrimination. See Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587,
603 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing Zambetti, 314 F.3d at 257). In this case, however, Plaintiff has failed to make any
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such showing or to otherwise present evidence of background circumstances supporting a suspicion that
Defendant discriminates against the majority.
Plaintiff has also failed to put forward evidence that she was treated differently than a similarly situated
employee of a different race. At prong four, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant treated differently
employees who were similarly situated but were not members of the protected class.” Sutherland, 344 F.3d at
614. In Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit held that “to be deemed
‘similarly-situated,’ the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt
with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s
treatment of them for it.” Id. (emphasis added). Since Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit has clarified and relaxed the
“similarly-situated” requirement holding that “[t]he plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the
employee receiving more favorable treatment in order for the two to be considered ‘similarly-situation,’ rather .
. . the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself must be similar in
‘all relevant aspects.’” Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir.
2008)(quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)(citing Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s decision to terminate her employment was on the basis of her race and
argues that other similarly situated JFS employees of a different race were subjected to more favorable levels of
discipline and were permitted to return to work (Docket No. 19, pp. 6-7 of 9; Docket No. 58, pp. 7-8 of 9).
According to JFS Director Brian Cunningham, only the charges specifically listed in the collective bargaining
agreement between the County and employees union could be utilized in disciplinary actions (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 3 of 3). Mr. Cunningham also indicated that the list of charges set forth in the collective

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bargaining agreement are not defined and that the severity of the discipline imposed by the County on an
offending employee is not based upon the designation of the charges themselves, but rather the specific
circumstances underlying those charges (Docket No. 57, Attachment 1, p. 3 of 3).
Plaintiff contends that JFS employees Markus Stewart, Malaika Bell, Ameer Abdul-Malik, Amy
Hancock, Robert Gutierrez, Renee Thomas, Stephanie English, Roberta Gordon, and Jennifer Hill, all of whom
are either African American or Latino, were similarly situated and more favorably treated than herself (Docket
No. 58, pp. 7-8 of 9). The table included below contains a summary of each employee’s conduct, charges, and
discipline:
JFS Employee & Title

Charges

Conduct

Punishment

Plaintiff,
Eligibility Specialist 2

Dishonesty, Failure of
Good Behavior, and
Malfeasance (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
56 of 71).

Filled out an Authorized
Representative
Designation form for her
son’s application for
expedited food stamps
and wrote a statement
concerning her son’s
work schedule in
violation of agency
policy (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, pp. 37-38
of 58).

Termination (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 56
of 71).

Markus Stewart,
Casework Aide

Dishonesty, Neglect of
Duty, Failure of Good
Behavior and
Malfeasance (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
50 of 71).

Excessive absenteeism
and falsifying a leave
slip (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3).

Thirty (30) day
suspension served inhouse (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 2, p. 50 of
71).

Malaika Bell,
Eligibility Specialist

Insubordination, Neglect
of Duty, Failure of Good
Behavior and
Malfeasance (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
55 of 71).

No specific details in the
record

Three day suspension
without pay (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 55
of 71).

10

Ameer Abdul-Malik,
Adult Protection Worker

Failure of Good
Behavior (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 49
of 71).

Yelling at his supervisor,
excessive absenteeism
and failing to report
absences (Docket No.
57, Attachment 1, p. 2 of
3).

Three (3) day suspension
served in-house (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
49 of 71).

Amy Hancock,
Casework Aide

Neglect of Duty and
Dishonesty (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 51
of 71).

Excessive absenteeism
and falsifying a leave
slip (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3).

Thirty (30) day
suspension served inhouse (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 2, p. 51 of
71).

Robert Gutierrez,
Layout Design Artist

Dishonesty, Neglect of
Duty, and Failure of
Good Behavior (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
52 of 71).

Excessive absenteeism
and falsifying a leave
slip (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, pp. 2-3 of
3).

Fifteen (15) day
suspension served inhouse with pay (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
52 of 71).

Renee Thomas,
Eligibility Specialist 2

Failure of Good
Behavior and Failure to
Follow Policy (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
53 of 71).

Physical altercation with
another employee and
failing to report it
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 3 of 3)

Thirty (30) day
suspension, fifteen (15)
days to be served inhouse and fifteen (15)
days without pay
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 2, p. 53 of
71).

Stephanie English,
Eligibility Specialist 2

Failure of Good
Behavior and Violation
of Policy (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 54
of 71)

Physical altercation with
another employee and
failing to report it
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 3 of 3)

Fifteen (15) day
suspension (eight (8)
days to be served inhouse and seven (7) days
to be served without pay
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 2, p. 54 of
71).

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Roberta Gordon,
Application Registration
Aide

Dishonesty, Failure of
Good Behavior, Neglect
of Duty and Malfeasance
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, p. 51 of
58).

Scanned a verification of
address stating the
address provided by her
son was for mailing
purposes only.
Document was created
and signed by Ms.
Gordon and scanned into
her son’s case via
OnBase (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, p. 52 of
58).

Terminated (Docket No.
57, Attachment 3, p. 51
of 58).

Jennifer Hill,
Knowledgeability
Specialist

Not Provided

Represented a significant
other in a hearing
concerning the denial of
his benefits (Docket No.
57, Attachment 3, pp. 2829 of 58).

Terminated before
receiving a six-month
suspension (Docket No.
57, Attachment 3, pp. 2829 of 58).

After reviewing the charges for these employees, the undersigned Magistrate finds that Plaintiff focuses
too narrowly on the designation of the charges and in doing so ignores the facts giving rise to the disciplinary
action. For example, the record reflects that Mr. Stewart was charged with dishonesty, neglect of duty, failure
of good behavior and malfeasance, three of which are the same charges which were also levied against Plaintiff,
however, both Mr. Cunningham’s affidavit and JFS Executive Director Deb Flores’ deposition testimony reflect
that the circumstances under which Mr. Stewart was disciplined were related to attendance (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3; Docket No. 57, Attachment 2, 16-17 of 71). “In determining whether an allegedly
comparable employee is similarly situated to the Plaintiff, the question is whether ‘all of the relevant aspects of
his employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [the African American or Latino employee’s]
employment.” Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 929 (6th Cir.
1999)(quoting Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (citation omitted)). The undersigned Magistrate finds the relevant
aspects for comparison in this case are not merely the designated charges by themselves, but also the underlying

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conduct giving rise to the disciplinary action.
The record in this case reflects that four JFS employees, including Plaintiff, were similarly situated
based on their involvement in family member’s cases with the agency: (1) Plaintiff, (2) Julie Gale Jagodzinski,
(3) Roberta Gordon, and (4) Rosetta Peoples.1 Two of these employees, Plaintiff and Ms. Jagodzinski are both
Caucasian and Ms. Gordon and Ms. People are both African Americans. The table below is a summary of their
charges:
JFS Employee & Title

Charges

Conduct

Punishment

Plaintiff,
Eligibility Specialist 2

Dishonesty, Failure of
Good Behavior, and
Malfeasance (Docket
No. 57, Attachment 2, p.
56 of 71).

Filled out an Authorized
Representative
Designation form for her
son’s application for
expedited food stamps
and wrote a statement
concerning her son’s
work schedule in
violation of agency
policy (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, pp. 37-38
of 58).

Termination (Docket No.
57, Attachment 2, p. 56
of 71).

Rosetta Peoples,
Eligibility Specialist 2

Dishonesty, Failure of
Good Behavior, Neglect
of Duty and Malfeasance
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 1 of 3).

Wrote and signed a false
“rent statement” on
behalf of her niece
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 1 of 3).

Terminated (Docket No.
57, Attachment 1, p. 1 of
3).

Julie Gale Jagodzinski,
HR Administrative
Secretary

Not provided

Accessed agency case
information regarding
family members and her
former spouse in
violation of agency
policy (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3).

Terminated, however
after filing an appeal she
was allowed to resign
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3).

1

Although JFS employee Lori Klein’s charges were similar, her conduct did not involve case conflicts with
family members.

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Roberta Gordon,
Application Registration
Aide

Dishonesty, Failure of
Good Behavior, Neglect
of Duty and Malfeasance
(Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, p. 51 of
58).

Scanned a verification of
address stating the
address provided by her
son was for mailing
purposes only.
Document was created
and signed by Ms.
Gordon and scanned into
her son’s case via
OnBase (Docket No. 57,
Attachment 3, p. 52 of
58).

Terminated (Docket No.
57, Attachment 3, p. 51
of 58).

The table reflects that Plaintiff, Ms. Peoples, and Ms. Gordon were all charged with dishonesty, failure of good
behavior, and malfeasance, although Ms. Peoples and Ms. Gordon also faced another charge of neglect of duty
(Docket No. 57, Attachment 1, pp. 1-2 of 3).2 In each case, JFS’ recommendation to the Lucas County Board
of County Commissioners was that the employees be terminated (Docket No. 57, Attachment 1, pp. 1-2 of 3).
The record indicates that the Board of County Commissioners terminated all but Ms. Jagodzinski, who was
permitted to resign upon filing an appeal (Docket No. 57, Attachment 1, p. 2 of 3).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that Ms. Gordon received more favorable treatment than she did,
comparing her previously clean disciplinary record to that of Ms. Gordon’s and noting that Ms. Gordon was not
terminated until after her fifth infraction (Docket No. 58, p. 8 of 9). While the undersigned Magistrate
recognizes that in appropriate instances, two similarly situated employees’ past disciplinary history could be
relevant, such is not the case here. There is no evidence that Ms. Gordon was ever previously charged with the
same or similar conduct and given a more favorable punishment. Moreover, the summary of events detailed in
Ms. Gordon’s grievance documentation contain mitigating circumstances in two prior incidents, which are not
present in this case, making them distinguishable from the charges of misconduct for which both Ms. Gordon
2

The record does not contain the specific charges assessed Ms. Jagodzinski.

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and Plaintiff were terminated in this case (Docket No. 57, Attachment 3, pp. 51-52 of 58). Thus, Plaintiff has
failed to establish the facts that similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more favorably
than she was as required under the fourth prong.
Since Plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing to establish her prima facie case under either the
first or forth prongs, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the undersigned
Magistrate grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s reverse discrimination claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/Vernelis K. Armstrong
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: October 20, 2014

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