Bloomfield v. Whirlpool Corporation

Filing 57

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. re 51 . Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 2/7/2014. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Brenda Bloomfield,

Case No. 3:12-cv-00870
Plaintiff

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Whirlpool Corporation,
Defendant

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On November 27, 2013, I denied the motion of Plaintiff Brenda Bloomfield for partial
summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the motion of Defendant Whirlpool
Corp. for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 49). I concluded Whirlpool was entitled to summary
judgment on Bloomfield’s claims for sex discrimination, religious discrimination and harassment,
and retaliation in violation of Title VII. I further concluded neither party was entitled to summary
judgment on Bloomfield’s claim that Whirlpool’s termination of her employment violated state and
federal disability discrimination laws because there remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to
that claim. Now before me is Whirlpool’s motion for reconsideration of my denial of its motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. No. 51). Bloomfield has filed a response. (Doc. No. 52). Whirlpool
filed a reply. (Doc. No. 56). For the reasons stated below, Whirlpool’s motion is denied.

II.

STANDARD

Rule 54(b)1 provides that any order or decision, other than a “final judgment” entered as
described in the text of the Rule, “that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . of fewer than all the
parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties . . . may be revisited at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration of interlocutory orders are an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.” Reich v. Hall Holding Co., 990 F. Supp. 955, 965 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (citing Petition of U.S. Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, Fuhrman v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 414 U.S. 859 (1973)); see also Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1943) (“District courts have inherent power
to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.”)).
III.

ANALYSIS

In denying the parties’ motions for summary judgment, I concluded neither party could
show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Whirlpool’s stated explanation
for terminating Bloomfield was a pretext for discrimination. (Doc. No. 49 at 12). I determined
Whirlpool failed to carry its Rule 56 burden of establishing no reasonable juror could conclude
Whirlpool’s proffered reason for terminating Bloomfield was pretextual because Whirlpool did not
prove, as a matter of law, it “made a reasonably informed and considered decision” before firing
Bloomfield for insubordination. (Id.). I further determined that Bloomfield failed to carry her Rule
56 burden of establishing no reasonable juror could conclude Whirlpool’s proffered reason was
anything but a pretext for disability discrimination. (Id.).

1

Whirlpool seeks relief under Rule 59(e). A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a
final appealable order, Swint v. Chambers Cnty Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 41-43 (1995), and therefore Rule
59 does not apply.
2

Whirlpool does not identify any intervening change of controlling law or any new evidence
which previously was unavailable. Though it cites to a case in which my colleague Judge Gaughan
granted a defendant’s motion for reconsideration after the defendant “clarified facts that the court
had believed warranted denying summary judgment,” Whirlpool does not “clarify” any of the facts it
presented in support of its summary judgment motion. See Snyder v. Pierre’s French Ice Cream Co., No.
1:11-cv-2275, 2013 WL 641477 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 21, 2013). Instead, Whirlpool points to
documents and deposition testimony it offered previously; this lends itself to the inference that
Whirlpool believes I got it wrong the first time around and so committed a clear error or a manifest
injustice in denying its motion for summary judgment.
Whirlpool argues it had sufficient facts before it to support an honest belief in its proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Bloomfield. Whirlpool also argues that “[t]o show pretext,
it is not enough that a finder of fact could disagree with Whirlpool’s decision – it must be apparent
that, based on the evidence before it at the time, it was unreasonable for Whirlpool to have reached
the conclusion that it did.” (Doc. No. 51 at 5). Whirlpool’s argument, and thus its motion, fails
because Whirlpool misconceives its burden on a motion for summary judgment.
To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, Whirlpool needed to show “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Wiley v. U.S., 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249(1986)); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (in reviewing the record evidence, “the court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence”). The honest belief rule permits an employer to show it
honestly believed its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged adverse employment

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action by establishing “its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the
time the decision was made.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806-08 (6th Cir. 1998).
In support of its summary judgment motion, Whirlpool offered the nondiscriminatory
explanation that Bloomfield was fired for insubordination during an independent medical evaluation
with Dr. Charles Burke, and not as a result of her disability. Whirlpool further argued there was no
evidence that it did not hold an honest belief in its proffered reason. In response, Bloomfield
argued Whirlpool’s explanation had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate its decision, or was
insufficient to motivate its decision. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083
(6th Cir. 1994). I concluded Whirlpool failed to prove the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact regarding whether it made a reasonably informed and considered decision, and therefore was
not entitled to the presumption afforded by the honest belief rule, after noting Whirlpool only
offered evidence that Bloomfield did not sign a release form and refused to allow Dr. Burke to erase
a recording she made of the evaluation session. (Doc. No. 49 at 11-12).
I did not reach this conclusion through “a misapprehension of the facts of the case.” (Doc.
No. 51 at 4). Rather, I reached this conclusion because Whirlpool’s failure to pursue the most
plausible solution – asking Dr. Burke to allow Bloomfield to return to his office and sign the release
form2 – undermines Whirlpool’s attempt to show it reasonably relied on the particularized facts
before it. A reasonable juror could conclude Bloomfield’s failure to execute the release form was
insufficient to motivate Whirlpool’s termination decision. Moreover, given that Dr. Burke’s
evaluation was an independent psychiatric exam upon which Whirlpool intended to base its
determination of whether Bloomfield would be permitted to return to work following an extended
medical leave, a reasonable juror also could conclude Whirlpool’s proffered reason was pretext for
disability discrimination.

2

During his deposition, Dr. Burke admitted he could not explain why his office personnel did not
ensure Bloomfield executed the release prior to beginning the evaluation, as was the typical practice
in his office. (See Doc. No. 36 at 55-56).
4

While Whirlpool claims it “had a complete picture . . . of Bloomfield’s conduct during the
IME,” it can point only to Dr. Burke’s description of Bloomfield’s conduct in support. (Doc. No.
51 at 6). Bloomfield adamantly disputes Dr. Burke’s characterization of her actions and words.
Whirlpool claims Sue Dye was informed “of the full extent of Bloomfield’s insubordination,” (Doc.
No. 51 at 6), yet Dye could recall only that Dr. Burke informed her that he could not complete his
exam because Bloomfield recorded it without his knowledge. (Doc. No. 25-8 at 21).
Whirlpool asserts “there was a reasonable expectation” that Bloomfield would attend the
IME “in a cooperative fashion.” (Doc. No. 56 at 6). Whirlpool fails, however, to establish the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Bloomfield was uncooperative. Ohio
law permits her to record conversations without the other participant’s knowledge. See Ohio Rev.
Code 2933.52(B). Dr. Burke explained his evaluation standards to Bloomfield prior to the exam but
admitted he did not tell her she could not tape-record the examination until after Bloomfield
revealed the tape recording. (Doc. No. 36 at 75). Dr. Burke further admitted he asked questions as
he would have in any other exam. (Id. at 76).
In the end, Whirlpool can only offer insinuations and inferences as to the argument it would
prefer to make in support of its termination decision – that Dr. Burke thought Bloomfield did not
give honest responses to some of his questions because she recorded the session – in place of its
reliance on the comparatively insignificant action of failing to sign a release form.3 (See, e.g., Doc.
No. 51 at 5-6 (“Whirlpool relied upon Dr. Burke’s opinion . . . that Bloomfield did not cooperate
during the IME. . . .”; “It was not unreasonable for Whirlpool to have relied upon the opinion of the
doctor who had experienced Bloomfield’s refusal to cooperate first-hand.”)). (See also Doc. No. 24
at 16 n.11; Doc. No. 37 at 20; Doc. No. 42 at 16 n.10, 17). Dr. Burke testified during his deposition
that he told Dye that he would not provide a report on Bloomfield’s IME because he thought
3

This is not to say Whirlpool’s termination decision was unreasonable or unsupportable as a matter
of law; I previously denied Bloomfield’s motion for summary judgment because she did not
establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Whirlpool’s proffered
reason was pretext for discrimination. (Doc. No. 49 at 12).
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Bloomfield had not been honest. (Doc. No. 36 at 57). Dye did not recall this communication,
however. (Doc. No. 25-8 at 21). Nor was this assessment reflected in more contemporary sources
such as Dr. Burke’s letter to Dr. Leslie or Bloomfield’s termination letter. (Doc. No. 25-5 at 2; Doc.
No. 25-11 at 2).
Whirlpool points to a number of cases in which the courts admonished that they would not
substitute their judgment for the employer’s business judgment and argues, pursuant to the honest
belief rule, that “[t]his Court should decline to second guess the Company’s decision.” (Doc. No. 51
at 6); (see also id. at 5, Doc. No. 56 at 7-8). With regard to most of these cases, Whirlpool cites
statements of general principle with which I offer no disagreement. Whirlpool relies heavily on
Comiskey v. Auto. Indus. Action Grp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 877 (E.D. Mich. 1999), arguing that case is
“strikingly similar” to this one and that, as the court did in Comiskey, I should “decline to question
Whirlpool’s business judgment that Bloomfield’s failure to cooperate during the IME amounted to
insubordination.” (Doc. No. 56 at 8). Whirlpool’s argument is not persuasive for two reasons.
First, in Comiskey, the court improperly relied on cases from the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits in which those courts ruled that it did not matter if the employer’s reasons were “poorly
founded” or “mistaken.” Comiskey, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 896. In adopting the honest belief rule, the
Sixth Circuit expressly rejected this highly deferential standard of review and required proof that the
employer reasonably relied on particularized facts. Smith, 155 F.3d at 806 (“To the extent the
Seventh Circuit's application of the “honest belief” rule credits an employer's belief without
requiring that it be reasonably based on particularized facts rather than on ignorance and mythology,
we reject its approach.”).
Second, Whirlpool cannot insulate its proffered explanation from judicial review simply by
referring to its explanation as the result of a business judgment. In denying Whirlpool’s motion for
summary judgment, I did not “second guess” its termination decision; instead I concluded
Whirlpool failed to carry its burden under Rule 56 and instead is entitled to convince a jury that it
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did not discriminate against Bloomfield on the basis of her disability. It is the responsibility of the
jury, and not the court on a motion for summary judgment, to weigh the evidence and determine
whether the facts more likely than not support the conclusion the plaintiff has proven her case, or
whether the defendant is entitled to prevail. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“Credibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge . . . .”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

While Whirlpool argues it had all of the relevant facts before it at the time Bloomfield was
terminated, the evidence Whirlpool presents in support of this position is not “so one-sided” that
Whirlpool must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Rather, the evidence requires
drawing inferences about what Whirlpool employees knew and balancing the inconsistent
recollections of other Whirlpool witnesses, which is exactly the role of the finder of fact. For the
reasons stated above, Whirlpool’s motion for reconsideration, (Doc. No. 51), is denied.

So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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