Leonard v. Warden Sheldon et al

Filing 22

Order: I find that the Complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief for 'deliberate indifference' under the Eighth Amendment. Defendant Sheldon's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is, therefore, denied. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 2/7/2013. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Ronald D. Leonard,

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Plaintiff,
v.
Warden Sheldon,
Toledo Correctional
Institution, et al.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:12cv2515
JUDGE JEFFREY J. HELMICK
MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER

Pro Se Plaintiff Ronald D. Leonard filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Toledo
Correctional Institution (“ToCI”) Warden Ed Sheldon and “any other John Doe and Jane Doe
Defendants of [ToCI] to be added as they become known to Plaintiff in the future, through
discovery.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his health and safety when they failed to take sufficient precautions to protect him
from the Aryan Brotherhood.
This matter is currently before the Court upon Defendant Sheldon’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 11). For the following reasons,
Defendant’s Motion is denied.

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I.

Background

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at ToCI in Toledo, Ohio.1
Plaintiff claims the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang threatened to kill him and placed “a contract on
[his] life.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1). In response to this threat, Plaintiff states he filed an Informal
Complaint (“IC”) with Defendant Sheldon on November 23, 2011, requesting placement in
Protective Custody (“PC”) pursuant to Ohio Admin. Code 5120-9-14.2 (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1).
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Sheldon should have responded to this IC by holding him in a
“security control” area pending a PC Hearing. Defendant allegedly failed to do so, however, and
instead confined Plaintiff to a “Limited Access Privilege Unit” (“LAPU”), where Plaintiff claims he
was at continued risk of harm from the Aryan Brotherhood. Plaintiff further asserts he was assigned
to the LAPU without either a conduct report or a Rules Infraction Board (“RIB”) hearing. Plaintiff
thereafter filed a Notification of Grievance (“NOG”) on December 1, 2011, in which he objected to
his placement in the LAPU and stated generally that he is “in jeopardy of being killed by members
of the Aryan Brotherhood.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2). It is unclear from the Complaint whether Plaintiff
received a response to his NOG.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on December 6, 2011, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. See Leonard v. Sheldon, Case No. 2:11CV1091 (S.D. Ohio).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendants (1) were deliberately indifferent to his health and
safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) violated his procedural due process rights by
placing him in the LAPU in the absence of either a conduct report or RIB hearing. Plaintiff also
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According to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction website, Plaintiff is currently incarcerated
at Lebanon Correctional Institution in Lebanon, Ohio. See http://www.drc.state.oh.us/Offender. Defendant Sheldon
has indicated that, to the best of his knowledge, Plaintiff is scheduled to be released from prison on March 22, 2013.
(Doc. No. 17 at 2, fn. 1).
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OAC 5120-9-14(C) provides that: “[a]n inmate requesting or referred for protective control consideration may
be held in security control pending the protective control investigation and hearing. A protective control hearing shall be
held within seventy-two hours of the protective control request or referral, unless additional investigation is necessary
and approved by the warden.”
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sought a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to transfer him to the Hocking Correctional
Institution in Nelsonville, Ohio.
On December 22, 2011, Magistrate Judge Abel issued an Initial Screening Report &
Recommendation, in which he recommended the Court find Plaintiff had adequately stated a claim
under the Eighth Amendment for demonstrating deliberate indifference to his safety. (Doc. No. 3
at 3). The Magistrate, however, recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 3 at 3).
In addition, the Magistrate recommended Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction denied on
the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to provide “actual evidence” that he faces a substantial risk of
serious harm. (Doc. No. 3 at 4-5). Judge Marbley adopted the Magistrate’s Report &
Recommendation on February 3, 2012. (Doc. No. 8).
Defendant Sheldon then filed a Motion to Dismiss based on Improper Venue and Failure to
State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) & 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 11). In this Motion, Defendant
argued the Complaint should be dismissed because it failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations
to support Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. He also argued that venue
was not appropriate in the Southern District of Ohio because the Defendants reside, and the alleged
unconstitutional conduct occurred, in Toledo, Ohio. (Doc. No. 11).
Plaintiff filed two motions for extensions of time to file a Response to Defendant’s Motion,
both of which were granted. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 16, 18).3 In his “Second Motion for Extension of
Time to File Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 16) (hereinafter “Second
Motion for Extension”), Plaintiff not only sought additional time to file a Response but also
addressed on the merits some of the arguments raised in Defendant’s Motion. Specifically, Plaintiff
stated that he had (1) alerted Defendant Sheldon “several times” through “additional Formal
3

Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel on March 20, 2012, which was denied on April 25,
2012. (Doc. Nos. 12, 15).
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Grievance” that the Aryan Brotherhood had threatened to kill him, and (2) identified Benjamin
Chase as the specific Aryan Brotherhood member that had threatened him. (Doc. No. 16 at 2). He
further claimed that, despite this information, Defendant Sheldon “still flat-out refuses to abate the
sufficiently serious threat to Plaintiff’s safety and health” and, instead, “chooses to solely rely upon
an old Protective Control hearing conducted on 10/27/11 . . . that didn’t find a credical [sic] threat
to Mr. Leonard’s safety.” (Doc. No. 16 at 2). In addition, Plaintiff acknowledged the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct at issue occurred within the venue and jurisdiction of the Northern
District of Ohio and agreed that, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to transfer his
Complaint to this Court. (Doc. No. 16 at 2).
Defendant Sheldon opposed Plaintiff’s motion as failing to establish good cause for an
extension of time. (Doc. No. 17). He also, however, noted that “while Plaintiff’s Second Motion is
captioned as a motion for an extension, the majority of it reads like a memorandum in opposition to
Defendants’ MTD.” (Doc. No. 17 at 3). Arguing Plaintiff’s motion “responds to” the arguments
presented in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant urged the Southern District to deny
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Extension because “Plaintiff’s arguments demonstrate that he does
not need additional time to formulate a response to Defendants’ MTD.” (Doc. No. 17 at 4).
The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Extension on May 11, 2012,
giving him until July 11, 2012 to file a Response. (Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff failed to file any
responsive pleadings by that date. Thereafter, on August 17, 2012, the Magistrate Judge
recommended Plaintiff’s Complaint be transferred to this Court because (1) Defendant Sheldon
resides in Toledo; (2) all of the conduct alleged in Complaint occurred in Toledo; and (3) Plaintiff
himself requested in his Second Motion for Extension that the Complaint be transferred to the
Northern District. (Doc. No. 19). Judge Marbley adopted the Magistrate’s Recommendation and
transferred the instant case to this Court on October 9, 2012. (Doc. No. 20).
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While the Southern District addressed Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the
issue of improper venue, it did not address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It is this issue that is currently before me.
II.

Standard of Review

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the
Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In scrutinizing a complaint, the Court is
required to accept the complaint’s allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984), and view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” Rule 12(b)(6) requires more
than mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if
it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. See also Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride,
Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009).
III.

Analysis

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sheldon violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by failing to take sufficient precautions to protect him from the Aryan Brotherhood. He claims
Defendant was on notice of the threat to Plaintiff’s life and nevertheless failed to place Plaintiff in
protective custody. Although Plaintiff was transferred to the LAPU after he filed his Informal

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Complaint, he claims placement in this Unit did not isolate him from the Aryan Brotherhood and he
remained in danger of serious bodily harm.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from acting with deliberate indifference to
a substantial risk of serious harm to a prison inmate. Farmer v, Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that “having stripped [inmates] of virtually every
means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials
are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. at 833. Thus, prison officials “have a duty
. . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. The Court explained,
however, that not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into
constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. Instead, in
order to establish a constitutional violation, a prison inmate must meet two requirements, often
described as objective and subjective components. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir.
2001).
To satisfy the objective component, the inmate must show that the failure to protect him
from risk of harm is objectively “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. In particular, the
inmate must show that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. See also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (explaining the objective component
requires a determination of whether “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough’ to
establish a constitutional violation”); Curry, 249 F.3d at 506.
To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must establish that prison officials acted
with “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir.
2011). “An official is ‘deliberately indifferent’ if he or she ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id.
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(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). That awareness can be demonstrated through “inference from
circumstantial evidence . . . and a fact finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that a risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. See also Greene v.
Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004). However, “a prison official who was unaware of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate may not be held liable under the Eighth Amendment even if
the risk was obvious and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767.
See Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[t]he subjective
component must be addressed for each officer individually”).
In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Sheldon argues Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
should be dismissed because the Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual allegations to satisfy
either the objective or subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference standard. Specifically,
Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to satisfy the objective component because the Complaint “does not
provide any details regarding the nature of the threat, such as how he knows of it, when or where it
was made, or if he has suffered any physical harm from the Aryan Brotherhood or any other
prisoners.” (Doc. 11 at 7). With respect to the subjective component, Defendant maintains the
Complaint is insufficient because it fails to allege facts indicating Defendant Sheldon was “aware of
facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff
exists.” (Doc. No. 11 at 7). In particular, Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff’s November 23, 2011
Informal Complaint does not mention the alleged threat from the Aryan Brotherhood or otherwise
explain the reason for Plaintiff’s request to be transferred to PC.4 Defendant maintains that, in the
absence of such allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for “deliberate indifference” to his health
and safety as a matter of law.
4

Although difficult to read, it appears Plaintiff’s IC states as follows: “Involuntary and forciable [sic] placement
in LAPU Unit per directive of John Doe Lt. Upon arrival back from outside Court and per directive of shift office,
white shirt officer John Doe, when I’ve asked to be placed in Protective Control pursuant to 5120-9-14.” (Doc. No. 1-1
at 1).
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As set forth supra, Plaintiff did not file a Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion. In his
Second Motion for Extension (Doc. No. 16), however, Plaintiff does address some of the arguments
raised in Defendant’s Motion. Specifically, Plaintiff states he alerted Defendant Sheldon “several
times” through “additional Formal Grievance” that the Aryan Brotherhood had threatened to kill
him and identified Benjamin Chase as the specific Aryan Brotherhood member that had threatened
him. (Doc. No. 16 at 2). He further claims that, despite this information, Defendant “still flat-out
refuses to abate the sufficiently serious threat to Plaintiff’s safety and health.” (Doc. No. 16 at 2).
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, I will consider the legal arguments set forth in his Second Motion for
Extension (Doc. No. 16) as a Response to Defendant Sheldon’s Motion to Dismiss. To the extent
Plaintiff raises any new factual allegations not contained in the Complaint itself, however, I may not
consider such allegations in resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See Winget v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court
may not consider matters beyond the complaint”); Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d
426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
Viewing the Complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, I find Plaintiff has set forth
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment as to both the objective
and subjective components of the “deliberate indifference” standard. With respect to the objective
component, I find Plaintiff’s allegation that the Aryan Brotherhood threatened to kill him and
placed a “contract on [his] life” is objectively “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. While
Defendant correctly notes that the Complaint does not contain detailed allegations regarding the
time, place, or reason for these threats, a Complaint need not contained such “detailed factual
allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather,
the Complaint need only contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. I find Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding death threats from the
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Aryan Brotherhood prison gang are sufficiently plausible to satisfy the objective component, at least
for purposes of withstanding dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Moreover, I find the Complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations indicating that
Defendant Sheldon “knew of and disregarded” an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety.
Although Plaintiff’s IC did not specifically reference threats from the Aryan Brotherhood, his NOG
expressly states that “a contract is on my life from the Aryan Brotherhood that is going to murder
me.” (Doc. No. 1-1). In addition, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff expressly notified Defendant
Sheldon of this threat and, further, that Defendant refused to move him to a secure area or conduct
a PC hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). I am satisfied, that accepted as true and viewed in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, these allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV.

Conclusion

Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth above, I find that the Complaint sets forth
sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief for “deliberate indifference” under
the Eighth Amendment. Defendant Sheldon’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is, therefore, denied.
So Ordered.

s/Jeffrey J. Helmick
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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