Vaughn et al v. Titan International Inc.

Filing 76

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff Shirley Vaughn's motion for an entry of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (Doc. No. 74) is granted and the Court finds there is no just reason to delay appellate review. re 74 . Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 3/3/2015. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Shirley Vaughn, et al.,

Case No. 3:13 cv 409
Plaintiffs

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Titan International, Inc. et al.,
Defendants
This matter comes before me on Shirley Vaughn’s unopposed motion for an entry of final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). For the reasons that follow, I find Plaintiff’s motion well taken.
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple
Parties. When an action presents more than one claim for relief—
whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim-- or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated,
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the
claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Rule 54(b) was enacted as "a response to the need created by the liberal joinder provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to revise 'what should be treated as a judicial unit for purposes
of appellate jurisdiction.'" Corrosioneering v. Thyssen Environmental Systems, Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282
(6th Cir. 1986)(citation omitted). The Rule "'attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability

of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of
the parties.'" Id. (citations omitted). The determination of whether to allow for an appeal pursuant
to Rule 54(b) is a matter left to the discretion of the district court. Id.
The Rule itself states that the district court must find that there is no just reason for delay of
the appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). However, the Sixth Circuit has indicated that in order to avoid a
finding of abuse of discretion in the certification of an appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), the "district
court should do more than just recite the Rule 54(b) formula of "no just reason for delay.'" Id.;
Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Daleure v. Commonweath of
Kentucky, 269 F.3d 540, 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (a district court certifying a 54(b) order must “clearly
explain why it has concluded that immediate review of the challenged ruling is desirable.”). As the
Supreme Court explained in Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968):
It is essential, however, that a reviewing court have some basis for
distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after comprehensive
consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in
appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the
law.
Id. at 434.
Certification under Rule 54(b) requires two steps. “First, the district court must expressly
direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties in a case.
Second, the district court must expressly determine that there is no just reason to delay appellate
review.” EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 689 F.3d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting Gen. Acquistion,
Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994).
The Sixth Circuit has enumerated a "nonexhaustive list" of factors to consider in
Corrosioneering, supra, as follows:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated
claims; 2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be
mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility
that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a
second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim
which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made
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final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims,
expense and the like. Depending upon the factors of the particular case,
all or some of the above factors may bear upon the propriety of the trial
court's discretion in certifying a judgment as final under Rule 54(b).
Corrosioneering, 807 F.2d at 1283 (quoting Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360
(3d Cir. 1975)).
In this case, I must first determine whether there has been a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all the claims or parties. On December 5, 2014, this Court granted Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on all the claims asserted by Shirley Vaughn against the Defendants.
As all of the rights and liabilities against one party have been adjudicated and all claims of Shirley
Vaughn are concluded, I find the first requirement under Rule 54(b) is satisfied.
Under the second step, I consider whether there exists a just reason to delay appellate
review. Here, the Defendant moved for summary judgment against each of the two Plaintiffs.
Shirley Vaughn’s claims were dismissed and Plaintiff Kyle Metz’s were found to have survived
dispositive motion practice and are currently set for trial on May 4, 2015. Although both Plaintiffs
asserted claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, the
determination of Vaughn’s claims were not dependent upon those asserted by Metz. I further find
there is no possibility the appellate court’s review will be impacted by future developments in Metz’s
claims before this Court. Nor do I find there is a possibility the appellate court will be required to
consider the same issue twice. In sum, I cannot find a factor which supports a just reason for delay
in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Shirley Vaughn’s motion for an entry of final
judgment under Rule 54(b), (Doc. No. 74), is granted.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
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