Coats v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
28
Memorandum Opinion and Order that the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner denying Coats's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income (Related Doc # 1 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr. on 12/9/2014. (S,G)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CURTIS L. COATS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 3:13 CV 2607
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Introduction
A.
Nature of the case and proceedings
Before me1 is an action by Curtis L. Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications
for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.2 The Commissioner has
answered3 and filed the transcript of the administrative record.4 Under my initial5 and
1
ECF # 12. The parties have consented to my exercise of jurisdiction.
2
ECF # 1.
3
ECF # 8.
4
ECF # 9.
5
ECF # 4.
procedural6 orders, the parties have briefed their positions7 and filed supplemental charts8 and
the fact sheet.9 They have participated in a telephonic oral argument.10
B.
Background facts and decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Coats, who was 47 years old at the time of the decision and, therefore, a “younger
individual,”11 has a limited education that does not include graduation from high school or
a GED and has worked in the past as a supervisor of landscape laborers, a truck driver, and
a warehouse worker.12
The ALJ, whose decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, found that
Coats had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease with foraminal
stenosis, degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, bipolar disorder, social phobia,
major depressive disorder, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and asthma.13
6
ECF # 10.
7
ECF # 17 (Coats’s brief); ECF # 18 (Commissioner’s brief); ECF # 19 (Coats’s reply
8
ECF # 17-1 at 3-6 (Coats’s charts); ECF # 18-1 (Commissioner’s charts).
9
ECF # 17-1 at 1-2 (Coats’s fact sheet).
brief).
10
ECF # 27.
11
Transcript (“Tr.”) at 24.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 16-17.
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After concluding that the relevant impairments did not meet or equal a listing,14 the
ALJ made the following finding regarding Coats’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except he is limited to only
occasional climbing of stairs and ladders, crouching, crawling, kneeling,
stooping/bending, he must avoid continuous exposure to pulmonary irritants;
and, he is able to occasionally reach overhead with the dominant, right upper
extremity. Additionally, the claimant is limited to work that is simple, routine,
and repetitive and that allows him to control the pace. He is further limited to
occasional contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. He
also needs the opportunity to alternate between sitting and standing, as he
desires, while engaged in the work.15
The ALJ decided that this residual functional capacity precluded Coats from performing his
past relevant work.16
Based on an answer to a hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert at the
hearing setting forth the RFC finding quoted above, the ALJ determined that a significant
number of jobs existed locally and nationally that Coats could perform.17 The ALJ, therefore,
found Coats not under a disability.18
14
Id. at 17-19.
15
Id. at 19-20.
16
Id. at 24.
17
Id. at 25.
18
Id. at 25.
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C.
Issues on judicial review and decision
Coats asks for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision on the ground that it does not
have the support of substantial evidence in the administrative record. Specifically, Coats
presents the following issues for judicial review:
•
The ALJ found that Coats’s impairments do not meet any listing, and
specifically the listing for Section 1.04 (disorders of the spine) or
Section 12.04 (affective disorder). Does substantial evidence support
that finding?
•
The ALJ found that Coats had the RFC for sedentary work, with a
sit/stand option, with additional postural and environmental limitations
and with mental limitations regarding the complexity and pace of work
and interaction with others. Does substantial evidence support this
finding?19
For the reasons that follow, I will conclude that the ALJ’s finding of no disability is
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must be affirmed.
Analysis
A.
Standard of review – substantial evidence
The Sixth Circuit in Buxton v. Halter reemphasized the standard of review applicable
to decisions of the ALJs in disability cases:
Congress has provided for federal court review of Social Security
administrative decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the scope of review is
limited under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g): “The findings of the Secretary as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....” In other words, on
review of the Commissioner’s decision that claimant is not totally disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the only issue reviewable by
19
See, ECF # 17 at 1.
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this court is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is “ ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’ ”
The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely
because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion. This is so because there is a “zone of choice” within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.20
Viewed in the context of a jury trial, all that is necessary to affirm is that reasonable minds
could reach different conclusions on the evidence. If such is the case, the Commissioner
survives “a directed verdict” and wins.21 The court may not disturb the Commissioner’s
findings, even if the preponderance of the evidence favors the claimant.22
I will review the findings of the ALJ at issue here consistent with that deferential
standard.
B.
Application of standard
Coats’s initial argument is that: (1) his degenerative disc disease with foraminal
stenosis met or equaled the listing in Section 1.04 for disorders of the spine, and (2) his
bipolar disorder, social phobia, and manic depressive disorder met or equaled the listing in
Section 12.04 applicable to mental impairments.23 In that regard, Coats contends that, based
20
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
21
LeMaster v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986);
Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06cv403, 2008 WL 399573, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12,
2008).
22
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007).
23
ECF # 17 at 9-16.
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on those portions of the record cited in his brief, there is substantial evidence in the record
to find that he met or equaled the two listings.24 Moreover, Coats asserts that the ALJ’s
failure to adequately articulate the reasons why he did not meet or equal the listings is itself
a basis for a remand.25
As to the listing for Section 1.04, the ALJ found that Coats did not have a spinal
disorder resulting in a compromise of the nerve root or the spinal cord with evidence of nerve
root compression, spinal arachnoiditis or lumbar spinal stenosis resulting.26 To that point, the
Commissioner contends first that because there is no evidence that Coats has a listed disorder
resulting in nerveroot compression, he cannot satisfy all the criteria of Section 1.04 and so
did not meet this listing.27
Concerning the listing for Section 12.04, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ did
not err by concluding that Coats failed to meet the “C” criteria of that listing.28 To that end,
the Commissioner cites, among other things, to the findings of the state agency reviewing
psychologist who concluded that Coats did not meet the “C” criteria of Section 12.04.29 The
Commissioner also notes that the ALJ found that Coats did not establish that he “has an
24
Id.
25
Id. at 14.
26
Tr. at 17-18.
27
ECF # 18 at 16,
28
Id. at 16-18.
29
Id. at 17 (citing transcript).
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inability to function outside of a highly supportive living arrangement, has a residual disease
process that would result in decompensation due to even a slight increase in mental demands
or change in environment, or a complete inability to function outside of his home.”30
Moreover, the ALJ found that Coats produced no evidence of “repeated episodes of
decompensation.”31
That said, however, oral argument on these issues narrowed and framed the disputed
points beyond the briefs. As regards Section 1.04, the dispute has become whether Coats’s
impairment resulted in an inability to ambulate effectively as set forth in Section 1.00B2b.
The Commissioner agreed that the ALJ’s finding at step two of degenerative disc disease
with foraminal stenosis indicates the presence of nerve root compression. And the issue
concerning Section 12.04 is now whether Coats’s receipt of assistance in his home is
equivalent to living in an institutional setting and so qualifies as a “highly supportive living
arrangement” under the regulations.
I note first that the ALJ here has not done an exemplary job in articulating her
reasoning or in citing to specific portions of the transcript that support her conclusions. Far
too much of the Commissioner’s argument is devoted to locating support in the record that
the ALJ should have noted. But, that said, this case does not present the particular
articulation requirements imposed by the good reasons requirement of the treating physician
30
Tr. at 19.
31
Id.
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rule.32 Nor has Coats argued that the ALJ failed to articulate reasons at step three why all the
severe impairments at step two did not meet or equal a listing.
Further, Coats has not presented evidence demonstrating that his impairment
medically equaled a listing. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, a claimant may show that an
impairment, though not listed, equals a listed impairment, only by presenting “medical
findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the most similar listed impairment.”33 Coats
has not met that test.
Thus, the matter actually before me essentially involves the basic question of whether
the Commissioner’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. As noted, that standard
involves reading the record holistically and accepting the Commissioner’s decision if it is
based on evidence in the record that reasonable minds would support.
32
Coats does argue that the ALJ should not have dismissed the one-sentence,
conclusory opinion of his treating primary care physician, Dr. Anuradha Rameneni, as having
no weight. That statement – that Coats is unable to work due to his medical problems for
12 months or more – was discounted by the ALJ because the ultimate determination of
disability is a matter reserved for the Commissioner under the regulations and because
Dr. Rameneni’s single sentence was not supported by any treatment records. Nothing in that
decision is contrary to the mandate of the good reasons requirement of the treating physician
rule since the ALJ offered adequate reasons on the record, capable of meaningful judicial
review, for not affording the conclusory remark by Dr. Rameneni any weight. See, Allen v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). Indeed, courts have found that such
single sentence conclusions on disability do not constitute a “medical opinion” at all under
the regulations and is so not implicated by the good reasons requirement of the treating
physician rule. Dunlap v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 509 F. App’x 472, 476 (6th Cir. 2012).
33
Lee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F. App’x 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sullivan
v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990) (emphasis in original).
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Here, the foundation for the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Section 1.04 and Coats’s
ability to ambulate effectively, while not precisely articulated in the context of an analysis
of that Section, can nevertheless be located in the opinion itself where the ALJ summarized
evidence from an examining physician showing that Coats was able to walk on tiptoes and
heels and with a normal gait.34 Moreover, the ALJ noted that Coats received only a single
treatment for pain on his right side but did not seek further such treatment.35 Thus, while
accepting that Coats had some limitations related to ambulation, the ALJ concluded that it
was not as severe as Coats alleged.36
Absent more, this evidence and articulation is sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence in support of the Commissioner’s finding that Coats did not meet the listing at
Section 1.04.
As to Section 12.04, the ALJ’s opinion37 contains reference to the opinion of state
reviewing psychologist Paul Tangeman, Ph.D., which specifically found that Coats did not
meet the “C” criteria of Section 12.04.38 Again, while it would be preferable for the ALJ to
have more directly stated that Dr. Tangeman’s opinion is a basis for finding the “C” criteria
not met in this case, the ALJ’s decision does contain a reference to this opinion that, read
34
Tr. at 21.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 23.
38
Tr. at 101-02.
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holistically within the decision itself, can establish that this opinion was a basis for the ALJ’s
finding. And an ALJ may rely on the finding of a reviewing medical source for the
conclusion that a claimant does not meet a listing.39
Thus, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Coats did not
meet the listing at Section 12.04.
Finally, to the extent that Coats now asserts that the RFC is incorrect in not including
a limitation that he would need to be off-task for 20 percent of the workday,40 although the
record does show that the ALJ posed this limitation to the VE as a hypothetical question, no
source or no evidence in the record supports a finding that Coats would need to be off-task
for that amount of time. Coats’s attempt to rely on the one-sentence conclusory statement of
Dr. Rameneni for this position is flawed for the reasons given earlier.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reason stated above, I find that substantial evidence supports the
finding of the Commissioner that Coats had no disability. The denial of Coats’s applications
is, therefore, affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 9, 2014
39
See, Lee, 529 F. App’x at 712.
40
s/ William H. Baughman, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
ECF # 17 at 19.
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