Turk v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

Order. Magistrate Judge's R&R (Doc. 22 ) adopted as order of this court; Commissioner's decision affirmed. Judge James G. Carr on 8/14/2015. (G,D)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Deborah Turk,

Case No. 3:14CV539
Plaintiff
v.

ORDER

Carolyn W. Colvin,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant

This is a Social Security case in which the plaintiff, Deborah Turk, appeals from the
Commissioner’s decision granting in part and denying in part her claim for benefits.
An administrative law judge ruled Turk became disabled, by virtue of multiple ruptured
discs, osteoarthritis, severe hypertension, and migraines, on June 23, 2012. Although the ALJ
therefore awarded Turk benefits as of that date, she rejected Turk’s contention she had been disabled
since her alleged onset date, in March, 2005.
Pending is Magistrate Judge Limbert’s Report and Recommendation, which recommends
affirming the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 22).
The Magistrate Judge found the ALJ gave good reasons for discounting the severe workrelated limitations Turk’s treating physician, Dr. Julie Bryan, had imposed. Magistrate Judge Limbert
also concluded the ALJ adequately explained why Turk was not disabled for any twelve-month
period between March, 2005 and June 23, 2012.

Turk, through counsel, has filed what she styles an “objection” to the R&R, but which is in
fact merely a verbatim reproduction of the merits brief she submitted to the Magistrate Judge,
supplemented with two assertions that “Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s report and
recommendation.” (Doc. 23 at 18, 21).
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), a party must file specific written
objections to trigger de novo review by the district court.” Janney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL
1117826, *1 (N.D. Ohio). “As the party disappointed with the Magistrate Judge’s work, [Turk] had
a duty to pinpoint those portions of the [R&R] that the district court must specifically consider.”
Enyart v. Coleman, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1069 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
Parties who “fail to make specific objections do so at their own peril.” Cowherd v. Million,
380 F.3d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 2004).
Here, as in Janney, supra, 2014 WL 1117826, at *1, I conclude Turk’s failure to raise
“specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,” and her filing of an
objection that “merely repeats her [merits] brief word for word” constitutes a waiver of any
objections to the R&R. Accord Hawkins v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3221855, *1 (W.D. Ky.) (copying and
pasting merits brief into document titled “Objection” “does not constitute an objection” for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) or Rule 72(b)).
Even assuming Turk had not waived her objections to the R&R, I conclude she has not
shown a basis for reversing the Commissioner’s decision.
The core of Turk’s argument before Magistrate Judge Limbert was the ALJ should have
given Dr. Bryan’s opinion controlling weight. E.g., Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234,
242 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining treating-physician rule).
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Dr. Bryan had opined Turk: 1) had “very limited concentration”; 2) was “not able to sit for
more than 30 minutes”; 3) was “not able to stand for more than 5 minutes”; and 4) was “not able to
lift, carry or handle objects.” (Doc. 23 at 17). According to Turk, the medical evidence reasonably
supported Bryan’s opinion that Turk’s back impairments and chronic headaches justified severe
work-related limitations that precluded gainful employment.
As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, however, the ALJ gave detailed reasons for
rejecting this opinion.
For one thing, the ALJ had discussed the “x-ray and MRI findings showing [only] minimal
to moderate degenerative changes in the thoracic spine and mild degenerative changes in the lumbar
spine.” (Doc. 22 at 18-19; see also Tr. 24, 261). For another, the ALJ had catalogued the broader
evidentiary basis on which she relied in discrediting Dr. Bryan’s opinions, including Turk’s normal
echocardiogram and her uninterrupted series of normal CT and MRA (magnetic resonance
angiogram) scans. (Tr. 23-24, 286, 303, 422, 471, 529, 531).
Likewise, while the ALJ recognized Turk had complained of chronic headaches, she cited
medical evidence tending to support her conclusion that Turk’s “limitations in concentration and
effects of her medications are accommodated by the assessed [RFC].” (Id. at 26). That evidence
included, inter alia, the normal MRA scans of Turk’s brain and a 2007 MRI showing negative
results. (Id.).
Finally, it is undisputed the ALJ made significant accommodations for Turk’s impairments
when, in crafting her RFC, the ALJ limited Turk to sedentary work with a Standard Vocational Pace
of 1 or 2 that she could perform while seated or standing. (Id. at 22).
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“Tr. _” indicates a citation to the administrative record.
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For all these reasons none of which, to repeat, Turk’s “objection” meaningfully addresses
the Magistrate Judge correctly determined there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision to discredit Dr. Bryan’s opinion.
Turk had also claimed the ALJ erroneously determined she was not disabled for at least a
twelve-month period between her alleged onset date (March 31, 2005) and the date on which the
ALJ determined she was disabled (June 23, 2012).
According to Turk, her impairments had “combined” to produce at least one closed period
of disability within that seven-year window. The only specific argument Turk presented to
Magistrate Judge Limbert in support of this claim was the argument the ALJ erred by discounting
Dr. Bryan’s opinion.
As both the Commissioner and the Magistrate Judge note, “the mere fact that Plaintiff was
diagnosed with multiple impairments does not entitle her to disability benefits.” (Doc. 24 at 2).
Rather, the question was whether, those impairments notwithstanding, Turk could perform
substantial gainful employment.
In concluding the answer was yes, the ALJ dutifully explained why Turk’s impairments,
alone and collectively, did not meet or medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Tr.
20-21). She also explained why, in her view, the medical evidence did not support Turk’s contention
that she was disabled due to coccydynia, a type of pain in the coccyx or tailbone area. (Id. at 18-19).
Finally, the ALJ prepared one of the more thorough and evidence-based RFC determinations I have
reviewed in some time.
Accordingly, I agree with the Magistrate Judge there was no error in the ALJ’s determination
Turk was not disabled between March, 2005 and June 23, 2012.
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It is, therefore
ORDERED THAT:
1.

The Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 22) be, and the same hereby is, adopted as the
order of this court; and

2.

The Commissioner’s decision be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

So ordered.
/s/ James G. Carr
Sr. U.S. District Judge

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