Reed v. Lazaroff
Filing
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Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/2/14 setting for the grounds for grounds for denial and dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Related Doc. 1 ) (M,G)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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MARVIN D. REED,
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Petitioner,
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vs.
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WARDEN A. LAZAROFF,
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Respondent.
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CASE NO. 3:14-CV-00701
OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No.1 ]
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se Petitioner Marvin D. Reed filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is currently incarcerated in the Mansfield Correctional Institution, having
pled guilty in 2006 to one count of trafficking in cocaine, one count of preparation of cocaine
for sale, one count of trafficking in crack cocaine, and one count of failure to comply with the
order of a police officer. He was sentenced to twelve years incarceration and a mandatory five
years of post release control. In this Petition, he claims he is entitled to habeas relief because
the trial court did not notify him of the terms of post release control applicable to each count for
which he was convicted, and denied his Motion for Determination of Status of Proceedings.
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied and the action is dismissed.
I. Background
Petitioner was indicted in 2005 in two multi-count indictments. He pled guilty to several
counts, all felonies of the first, second, or third degree, on October 24, 2006. He was sentenced
to twelve years incarceration and a mandatory five years of post release control, which was the
longest period of post release to which he could be sentenced under the Ohio Revised Code.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence asserting grounds which are not relevant to this
Petition.
Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for Resentencing on April 14, 2011, and a Motion for
Determination of the Status of Proceedings on April 26, 2011. He argued that although the
court at sentencing informed him of the term of post release control he would serve for the first
degree felony of which he had been convicted, it failed to inform him of the terms of post
release control to which he could have been sentenced for his convictions for second and third
degree felonies. He asserted that this rendered his sentence void. He further reasoned that an
unreasonable length of time had passed since his conviction and the trial court could not now
conduct a sentencing hearing and impose a valid sentence. He argued that the court should
examine the status of his case, and release him from prison. The trial court denied the Motions.
Petitioner appealed that decision to the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals asserting
the same grounds for relief. The Court of Appeals noted that although each offense for which
Petitioner was convicted carried a term of post release control, the trial court could only
sentence him to one term of post release control pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §
2967.28(F)(4)(c), and that term was required to be the longest term offered by the statute. The
longest term of post release control applicable to Petitioner’s convictions was five years. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly notified and sentenced Petitioner to a
term of five years of post release control and was not required to notify him of every lesser
terms of post release control to which he could have been sentenced. His sentence was not void,
and he was not entitled to release due to a delay between his conviction and his sentence.
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Petitioner appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court on January 13, 2013. The
Court declined to accept jurisdiction on April 24, 2013.
Petitioner has now this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting the same two
grounds for relief:
1. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s Motion for
Sentencing.
2. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s Motion for
Determination of Status of Proceedings.
(Pet. Doc. No. 1 at 5-6). In support of each ground, he refers the Court to his brief to the Ohio
Sixth District Court of Appeals.
II. Legal Standard
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was signed into law on April 24, 1996 and applies to habeas corpus
petitions filed after that effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir.
1999). The AEDPA was enacted “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences, and ‘to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.’” Woodford, 538
U.S. at 206 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436 (2000)). Consistent with this goal,
when reviewing an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct. Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768, 774-76 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal court, therefore, may not grant habeas
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relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in any state court unless the adjudication
of the claim either: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Wilkins, 512 F.3d 768, 774 -76 (6th Cir. 2008).
A decision is contrary to clearly established law under §2254(d)(1) when it is
“diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed” to federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405
(2000). In order to have an “unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law,” the
state-court decision must be “objectively unreasonable,” not merely erroneous or incorrect. Id.
at 409. Furthermore, it must be contrary to holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to dicta.
Id. at 415.
A state court’s determination of fact will be unreasonable under §2254(d)(2) only if it
represents a “clear factual error.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528-29 (2003). In other
words, a state court’s determination of facts is unreasonable if its finding conflict with clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. “This standard requires the federal courts to give
considerable deference to state-court decisions.” Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 472 (6th
Cir.2007). AEDPA essentially requires federal courts to leave a state court judgment alone
unless the judgment in place is “based on an error grave enough to be called ‘unreasonable.’”
Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998).
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III. Analysis
Although the claims in this Petition were properly presented to the state courts, they are
not cognizable in a habeas corpus petition because they are stated solely as violations of state
law. Generally, a federal habeas court sitting in review of a state court judgment will not
second guess a state court’s decision concerning matters of state law. Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d
265, 303 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Principles of comity and finality equally command that a habeas
court can not revisit a state court's interpretation of state law, and in particular, instruct that a
habeas court accept the interpretation of state law by the highest state court on a petitioner’s
direct appeal.”). It is especially inappropriate for a federal habeas court to set aside a state
court’s ruling on an issue of state law where, as in the present situation, Ohio’s appellate courts
have already found Petitioner’s claim of a violation of his Ohio statutory rights to be meritless.
Petitioner’s claims based solely on errors of state law are not redressable through the federal
habeas process. Id.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is
denied and this action is dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases. Further, the Court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that an appeal from
this decision could not be taken in good faith, and there is no basis upon which to issue a
certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed.R.App.P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 20, 2014
s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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