Taylor v. Moore et al

Filing 17

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and Taylor's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. re 12 . Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 3/6/2015. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Robert C. Taylor,

Case No. 3:14-cv-00823
Plaintiff

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Paul A. Moore, et al.,
Defendants

On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff Robert Taylor filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
and other relief against Defendants Paul Moore and Kinsale Capital Partners, LLC. (Doc. No. 1).
Approximately 20 months earlier, Moore had filed a complaint in an Illinois state court, asserting
Taylor owed him a substantial commission arising out of certain business dealings between the two.
Taylor asserts Moore’s cause of action arises out of Illinois law, while Taylor believes federal law
governs. (Doc. No. 1 at 6). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Taylor’s complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, because venue is improper or under the doctrine of
abstention. (Doc. No. 12). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted.
“[T]he circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a
concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited
than the circumstances appropriate for abstention.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S.,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The Colorado River doctrine applies where the concurrent state and federal
actions are parallel. Crawley v. Hamilton Cnty. Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Romine v.

Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1998) (“‘[E]xact parallelism’ is not required; ‘[i]t is
enough if the two proceedings are substantially similar.’”) (quoting Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d
1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989)). I conclude the Taylor and Moore actions are substantially similar and
therefore parallel, as Taylor’s complaint draws on the same set of facts as Moore’s lawsuit in Illinois
and the cases involve the same parties.
The Supreme Court has identified eight factors district courts must consider in deciding
whether to defer to a state court’s concurrent jurisdiction: (1) whether the state court has assumed
jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties;
(3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether
the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect
the federal plaintiff’s rights; (7) the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the
presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction. Romine, 160 F.3d at 340-41 (6th Cir. 1998). A
district court must carefully balance these factors as they apply in a given case. Id. at 341.
The only factor which weighs conclusively against dismissal is the fact that the case does not
involve a claim to property. See id. at 341.
Taylor’s principal contention is that the state court action is inadequate to protect his rights,
as he admits “[t]he purpose of this action is to ensure that a state court does not incorrectly interpret
and fail to apply federal law.” (Doc. No. 15 at 21). Taylor does not attempt to offer any explanation
for his disparaging presumption that the Illinois court will intentionally ignore federal law and
misapply state law. “The legitimacy of the court system in the eyes of the public and fairness to the
individual litigants also are endangered by duplicative suits that are the product of gamemanship or
that result in conflicting adjudications.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 341 (quoting Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant
Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1985)). Taylor’s accusation loses further credibility in light of
his claim that “[n]o substantial activity has occurred” in the Illinois lawsuit except for the taking of
Taylor’s deposition and the setting of procedural deadlines, including a July 2015 trial date. Taylor
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fails to identify any action or inaction by the Illinois court which conceivably could support his
assertions.
The federal forum would be less convenient to the parties, as Taylor alleges Moore is a
citizen of Illinois and Kinsale Capital is an Illinois limited liability company. (Doc. No. 1 at 2).
Conversely, only Taylor’s attorneys, and the escrow agent they used, are based in Toledo, Ohio.
Moreover, Taylor’s arguments concerning deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum ring hollow in
light of his apparent attempt to obtain a new forum nearly two years after Moore first filed suit in
Illinois. (See Doc. No. 15 at 23-26).
Contrary to Taylor’s assertion, there plainly is a substantial risk of piecemeal litigation here.
(See Doc. No. 15 at 21). “Piecemeal litigation occurs when different courts adjudicate the identical
issue, thereby duplicating judicial effort and potentially rendering conflicting results.” Romine, 160
F.3d at 341. Taylor does not seek an injunction prohibiting the Illinois court from proceeding with
the litigation before it. Nor does there appear to be any legal basis for such a hypothetical request.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283; Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011).
The Illinois court obtained jurisdiction first, as Moore filed suit in July 2012. Thus, this
factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Lastly, I will analyze the fifth and eighth factors together. The parties dispute the source of
governing law. It is true “‘the presence of federal law issues must always be a major consideration
weighing against surrender’ of federal jurisdiction in deference to state proceedings.” Romine, 160
F.3d at 342 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)). It also
is true, however, that the source-of-law factor has “less significance” when the jurisdiction of the
state and federal courts to enforce the federal law is concurrent. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25.
Taylor can raise federal law without hindrance in the Illinois state court.
In sum, “[t]here can be no legitimate contention that the . . . state courts are incapable of
safeguarding [Taylor’s] rights.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 342. For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to
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dismiss is granted and Taylor’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Colorado
River doctrine.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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