Buess v. Obama et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: this action is dismissed for failing to state a federal claim for relief. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not betaken in good faith. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 9/29/2014. (S,AL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
David Lee Buess,
Plaintiff,
v.
Barack Obama, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 3:14cv1493
Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick
MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER
Pro se plaintiff David Lee Buess filed the above-captioned action against President Barack
Obama, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Hancock Federal Credit Union, William C. Cobb,
Department of Treasury Financial Management Services, Social Security Administration, and
Department of Treasury Secretary Lew. The action is captioned as a “Rule 55 Default Judgment.”
On August 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed another document captioned Default Judgment. (Doc.
No. 4.) Because the second document is almost identical to the first, except for the relief Plaintiff
seeks to recover, the document is construed as an Amended Complaint. Henceforth, the court will
refer solely to the Amended Complaint. See B & H Medical, LLC v. ABP Admin., Inc., 526 F.3d 257,
268 n.8 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Drake v. City of Detroit, 266 Fed. Appx. 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2008))
(stating that a prior “complaint is a nullity, because an amended complaint supersedes all prior
complaints”). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed.
Plaintiff describes himself as “david-lee; family of buess (non-corporation) a man.” (Doc.
No. 4 at 1.) He then lists four “Public Notices” declaring various legal theories that have no basis in
fact or law. The Notices are followed by a “True Bill and Invoice” seeking a sum certain in payment
for a default judgment to which Plaintiff believes he is entitled. To that end, he avers the following:
1
Whereas the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE failed to answer
summons in the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, COUNTY OF
HANCOCK STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2008 cv 454 Judge
REGINOLD J ROUTSON a default judgment is herein demanded.
Judge Routson refused to rule on motion for default a fraud upon
the plaintiff and the court. Obstruction of Justice.
(Doc. No. 4 at 4.)
The remainder of the pleading is devoted to Plaintiff’s assertions that the Defendants
conspired to steal his property without due process of law. I presume the property at issue involves
Plaintiff’s earnings because he proffers various definitions of “income” to support his theory that
“wages” are not considered income. From this, he concludes Congress cannot enforce any law
defining income.
Citing “U.S. v. Constantine,” Plaintiff further believes the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS
is unconstitutional.1 Therefore, he surmises that any attempt to assess taxes against him is a violation
of the law.
In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against the Defendants and to have
“any and all tax levies and liens . . . immediately expunged, terminated, nul [sic] and void on face, ab
inito [sic].” (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) Finally, he seeks an order directing the Defendants to “pay forward .
. . $298,361,101.34 . . . in lawful money per 12 USC 48 Statute 337 and or gold and silver in
accordance with Bill and Invoice herein attached.” Id.
I.
INITIAL REVIEW
1
This is presumably a reference to United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). In November, 1934, the
respondent was indicted in the District Court for Northern Alabama on charges of conducting the business of a retail
dealer in malt liquor contrary to the laws of the state , without having paid the special excise tax of $1,000 imposed by
section 701 of the Revenue Act of 1926. Pursuant to a stipulation of facts, the court found the respondent had a
restaurant in Birmingham, where he conducted the business of a retail dealer in malt liquors containing more than onehalf of one percent alcohol, contrary to the laws of the state and of the city; and, had not paid the $1,000 tax. The Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on the ground that the section became inoperative upon the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed.
2
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a “district court may, at any time,
sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn,
183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous
Supreme Court cases for the proposition that patently frivolous claims divest the district court of
jurisdiction); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question
jurisdiction is divested by obviously frivolous and unsubstantial claims).
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
A complaint may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without
service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e)
and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177,
1179 (6th Cir. 1985).
A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See
Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not
required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full-blown claims
from sentence fragments. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). To do so
would “require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and]
would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278.
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Legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and this Court is not
required to accept unwarranted factual inferences. See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10,
12 (6th Cir. 1987); see also, Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1971) (conclusory section 1983
claim dismissed). Even liberally construed, the Complaint does not contain allegations reasonably
suggesting Plaintiff might have a valid federal claim. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d
716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal
conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed for failing to state a federal claim for relief. The
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.2
So Ordered.
s/Jeffrey J. Helmick____
United States District Judge
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is
not taken in good faith.”
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