Cline v. Cruise et al

Filing 9

Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendant Croft is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), and Defendant Croft is dismissed from this case. The action shall proceed against Defendant Cruise on th e Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. The Clerk's Office shall forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of this Order in the documents to be served upon Defendant Cruise. Further, this Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), an appeal from its decision dismissing Defendant Croft could not be taken in good faith. Judge Jack Zouhary on 1/7/2015. (D,L)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Corey A. Cline,

Case No. 3:14 CV 1678
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

-vsJUDGE JACK ZOUHARY
Bill Cruise, etc. et al.,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Corey Cline files this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking monetary damages
against North Central Correctional Institution (“NCCI”) Sergeant Bill Cruise and Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction Chief Inspector Gary Croft. Plaintiff alleges Cruise used excessive
force in removing handcuffs, and Croft denied Plaintiff due process by failing to inform him of the
results of his use-of-force complaint against Cruise.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a former inmate at NCCI, alleges Cruise came to his cell on February 28, 2014 to
remove one of his cell mates, inmate Graham. Officers handcuff all the inmates in the cell when any
inmate in the cell requires extraction. Pursuant to this practice, Cruise handcuffed the inmates in the
cell, including Plaintiff, and asked them to step out into the hallway. When Graham was removed,
Plaintiff was asked to step back into the cell. He complied and placed his hands through the food slot

in the door for Cruise to remove the handcuffs. Plaintiff alleges Cruise grabbed his thumb, bent it
back and continued to apply pressure to it. Officer Skeens approached the cell to investigate the
commotion and took over the task of removing the handcuffs. Plaintiff contends his wrist and hand
were bruised, and extremely painful. Plaintiff filed a use-of-force complaint against Cruise. Cruise
filed a conduct report against Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not indicate the charges brought against him,
nor the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. He claims he was not told the results of the use-offorce investigation.
Plaintiff asserts two Section 1983 claims for relief. First, he claims he was subjected to
excessive force by Cruise. Second, he claims Croft denied him due process when he did not disclose
to Plaintiff the resolution of his use-of-force complaint.
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327–28 (1989). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from suit or
when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Id. An action has
no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,
a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains “enough fact to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff's

2

obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a complaint need
not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Excessive Force
Plaintiff’s first claim is for use of excessive force. The Eighth Amendment imposes a
constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment
may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Eighth Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by
prison officials that involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d
950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework for
courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true,
establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is measured in response
to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). Routine
discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. A plaintiff must also establish a subjective element
showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 9. Only deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement
will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized
by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the

3

Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
In the excessive-force context, society’s expectations are heightened. When prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are
violated. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. That
is not to say that every hostile touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. See
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8–10. When analyzing a claim for use of excessive force, the court must
determine whether the officer acted in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or whether
he acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 8.

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts to state a claim plausible on
its face to surpass 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads enough
factual content to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference a defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Based on the allegations in the
Complaint, Plaintiff has met this basic pleading requirement for his excessive-force claim against
Defendant Cruise.
Due Process
The same cannot be said for his due process claim against Defendant Croft. The Due Process
Clause prohibits a state from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” By its terms, procedural due process protections apply only to the deprivation of liberty or
property interests. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Plaintiff has no protected
interest in participating in the use-of-force investigation against an officer beyond filing a complaint.
Howard ex rel. Estate of Howard v. Bayes, 457 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2006). This is an internal
investigation of prison personnel which may or may not result in discipline to the officer in question.

4

While Plaintiff may receive some satisfaction from knowing Cruise received disciplinary action, the
benefit a third party may receive from having someone else investigated or prosecuted does not trigger
protections under the Due Process Clause. Id. Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Croft
is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Croft is dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and Defendant Croft is dismissed from this case. This action shall proceed
against Defendant Cruise on the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. The Clerk’s Office shall
forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy
of this Order in the documents to be served upon Defendant Cruise.
Further, this Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an appeal from its decision
dismissing Defendant Croft could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
January 7, 2015

5