Jackson v. Turner et al

Filing 6

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing 1 the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. This Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Jack Zouhary on 3/31/2015. (D,L)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Marcus Jackson,

Case No. 3:14 CV 2042
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT

-vs-

JUDGE JACK ZOUHARY

Neil Turner, Warden, et al.,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Marcus Jackson, a state prisoner incarcerated in the North Central
Correctional Complex, sues a dozen prison employees, seeking damages and injunctive relief. He
names as Defendants Warden Neil Turner, Sargeant Moore, Mrs. Curry, Mr. Shepfield, Mr. Ryan,
Mr. Hall, M.C. McLaughlin, M.C. McThesney, “Nurse,” and three Doctors (Wilson, Stine, and
Burkes). For the reasons below, this Court dismisses the Complaint (Doc. 1).
BACKGROUND
Jackson alleges Defendants denied him constitutional “conditions of treatment and
confinement” (Doc. 1 at 3). Jackson claims Defendants provided “improper medical care and
treatment” for his hearing problem; though he has a daily pass to obtain ear drops, Defendants
wrongly diagnosed him as not being hearing impaired and denied him treatment in a “hearing
program” as well as other “medications & test[s]” (id. at 3–4); and he was subjected to other
“inhumane conditions” of confinement, complaining generally of overcrowding, “the bath rooms

and kitchen,” and “[b]ad food with bacteria and germs and [salmonella] poisoning and E Coli” (id.
at 4–5). He concludes Defendants are “clearly failing” to protect him from other inmates as the
“gym and bed area [are] very open to attacks” (id. at 5). Jackson states Defendants daily violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and complains generally about inmate-on-inmate
violence without identifying when any such incident occurred or that he was the victim of any such
violence (id. at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when that claim lacks
“plausibility in th[e] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be
sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level, assuming all the allegations in the
complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual
allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must contain sufficient factual content “to give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint, this Court
must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
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“[D]amage claims against governmental officials alleged to arise from violations of
constitutional rights cannot be founded upon conclusory, vague or general allegations, but must . . .
allege facts that show the existence of the asserted constitutional rights violation recited in the
complaint and what each defendant did to violate the asserted right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg.
Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).
DISCUSSION
For his Eighth Amendment claims, Jackson must allege facts “establish[ing] the existence
of a sufficiently serious medical need. Seriousness is measured objectively, in response to
contemporary standards of decency.” Reilly v. Vadlamaudi, 680 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). He must also “show that prison officials have a sufficiently culpable state of mind in
denying medical care” or other constitutionally adequate living conditions. Jones v. Muskegon
County, 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). The “plaintiff must [allege]
that the official: (1) subjectively knew of a risk to the inmate’s health, (2) drew the inference that
a substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and (3) consciously disregarded that risk.” Id.
Jackson’s claims fail for at least four reasons. First, he only names in the Complaint a string
of Defendants without alleging any facts that show how each Defendant deprived Jackson of his
constitutional rights. Second, and relatedly, the Complaint’s allegations are fatally vague and
conclusory; Jackson fills the majority of the Complaint with legal conclusions unsupported by
factual allegations. Third, with respect to Jackson’s complaints about medical care, his allegations
do not support a plausible inference that he suffers from a serious medical need, or that any
Defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. The Complaint refers only to Jackson’s hearing
problems, for which he received treatment. Where, as here, “a prisoner has received some medical
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attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant
to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir.1976). Fourth, Jackson has not alleged a
plausible ADA claim. The ADA bars a public entity from excluding a disabled person from
“services, programs, or activities” on the basis of the person’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Jackson has not plausibly alleged that he is a “a qualified individual” with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA, or that Defendants discriminated against him because of that disability.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court dismisses the Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. This Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal
from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
March 31, 2015

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