Eagon v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
18
Memorandum Opinion and Order affirming Commissioner's decision denying benefits. Magistrate Judge James R. Knepp, II on 10/15/15. (A,P)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
GABRIELE EAGON,
Case 3:14 CV 2342
Plaintiff,
v.
Magistrate Judge James R. Knepp, II
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff Gabriele Eagon (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against
Carolyn W. Colvin, in her capacity as Commissioner of Social Security, seeking judicial review
of the Commissioner’s decision to deny Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). This
Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 72.2(b)(1). (Doc. 12). For the
following reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on January 4, 2012. (Tr. 52). She alleged a disability
onset date of January 7, 2003 (Tr. 52), and a date last insured (“DLI”) of December 31, 2007 (Tr.
52). She applied for benefits due to the following illnesses, injuries, or conditions: chronic joint
pain, degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, and chronic inflammatory demyelinating
polyneuropathy (“CIDP”). (Tr. 52). Social Security denied Plaintiff’s claim initially (Tr. 52-63)
and upon reconsideration (Tr. 65-77). On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff requested a hearing by an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 88).
The ALJ conducted a hearing on June 13, 2013, where Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert
(“VE”) testified. (Tr. 90). Plaintiff testified that from 2003 to 2007 she experienced leg and back
pain, leg weakness, and occasional numbness in her feet and hands. (Tr. 35). She also testified
that during this time period she had difficulty walking and standing for long periods of time,
which frequently resulted in her having to lie down during the day for a couple hours at a time.
(Tr. 35). She experienced stiffness while sitting and had to get up after an hour to move around.
(Tr. 35). Plaintiff testified she used a cane on and off during this time period because of
difficulty with her balance. (Tr. 35). She stated she had pain in her feet, and difficulty holding on
to things because of pain in her hands. (Tr. 35). Plaintiff required assistance completing some
household chores, but was able to cook with the use of a stool. (Tr. 39). She estimated she was
only able to lift ten pounds. (Tr. 38). During this period, she received multiple steroid injections
which alleviated her pain for six months. (Tr. 38). Plaintiff testified that once or twice a week she
experienced generalized weakness and body aches. (Tr. 39). On those days, she spent her time
sleeping and reading. (Tr. 39).
The VE also testified at this hearing. She reviewed the vocational exhibits, listened to the
testimony, and ultimately opined Plaintiff’s past relevant work fell into four general categories:
waitress, manager (retail), data entry clerk, and job development specialist. (Tr. 48-49). These
four categories can all be performed at a range of work from sedentary to light. (Tr. 48-49). The
ALJ then asked if a hypothetical person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience could
perform Plaintiff’s past work if the person could lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently; sit with normal breaks for a total of eight hours a day; stand and walk with
normal breaks for a total of two out of eight hours a day; stand and walk for up to fifteen minutes
at a time; push and pull within the same limitations, but only occasionally operate foot controls
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with the right leg; frequently handle and finger with the left upper extremity; occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch and crawl; but should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor
ventilation as well as exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery.
(Tr. 49). The VE opined the hypothetical person would be able to perform two of Plaintiff’s past
jobs: data entry clerk and job development specialist. (Tr. 49-50). Even though Plaintiff
described these as light work, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles defines them as sedentary
work. (Tr. 48-50); DOT, Data Entry Clerk 203.582-054 (4d. Revised 1991). The VE testified that
if the hypothetical person missed at least two or three days of work a month due to her combined
impairments and resulting symptoms, she could not perform these jobs or any other jobs. (Tr.
50).
On July 19, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable Notice of Decision. (Tr. 12). He found
Plaintiff had severe impairments of right knee osteoarthritis status post lateral and medial
meniscal tears, degenerative changes of the lumbar spine, small posterior disc bulges at T6-T7
and T7-T8, osteopenia of the left hip, psoriatic arthritis, status post thyroidectomy, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). (Tr. 17). The ALJ held Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. (Tr. 18).
In regard to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ found she could
perform sedentary work with limitations. (Tr. 19). He found Plaintiff could lift and carry ten
pounds occasionally, sit with normal breaks for a total of eight hours per day, and stand and walk
with normal breaks for a total of two of eight hours per day, but could stand and walk for up to
fifteen minutes at a time. (Tr. 19). Additionally, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff could push and
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pull within those limitations, but could only occasionally operate foot controls with the right leg.
(Tr. 19). The ALJ limited Plaintiff to frequent handling and fingering with the left upper
extremity. (Tr. 19). He opined she could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 19). She could also occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found Plaintiff had to avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors,
dusts, gases, and poor ventilation, and exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights and
dangerous machinery. (Tr. 19).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the hearing decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 6); 20 CFR §§ 404.955, 404.981. Plaintiff filed this
action on October 21, 2014. (Doc. 1).
FACTUAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
Personal Background
Plaintiff was born on July 17, 1952. (Tr. 136). At the time she filed her application for
disability benefits, Plaintiff was a 59 year old woman with an associate’s degree in
microcomputer business. (Tr. 52, 286).1 She lived with her husband and son. (Tr. 40). The record
revealed she had past work experience as an data entry clerk, administrative associate, financial
aid and records specialist, job development specialist, retail store owner, and waitress. (Tr. 151,
267-74). She last worked in 2003 as an owner of an antique shop and then as a waitress. (Tr. 4243, 45). Plaintiff testified her condition worsened in 2009 when she was diagnosed with
neuropathy and CIDP. (Tr. 45-46).
1. Plaintiff was 50 years old on her alleged onset date of January 7, 2003, and 55 years old on
December 31, 2007, her DLI. (Tr. 52).
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Relevant Medical Evidence2
The Plaintiff’s medical history between 2003 and 2007 reveals evidence solely of
physical complaints and treatment; mostly of knee and back pain.3 Plaintiff’s complaints of low
back pain began in June 2003, when she presented to the emergency room for treatment. (Tr.
368). An examination revealed paravertebral tenderness at L5 and a somewhat limited range of
spine motion. (Tr. 368). Doctors treated Plaintiff with anti-inflammatory medication and a
muscle relaxant and recommended ice and heat treatment. (Tr. 368).
In October 2003, Doug Hosey, D.C., completed an initial examination/evaluation report
regarding Plaintiff’s chiropractic treatment. (Tr. 318). Plaintiff had a positive Kemp’s test
bilaterally, positive Goldthwait’s test (both lumbosacral and sacroiliac), severe lumbar
tenderness, lumbar paravertebral rigidity, severe lumbar paravertebral spasm, severe lumbar
paravertebral edema, and poor lumbar paravertebral strength. (Tr. 319-20). Dr. Hosey diagnosed
Plaintiff with lumbar intervertebral disc syndrome, disc degeneration (lumbar), radiculitis
(lumbar), and uneven leg length. (Tr. 320). Plaintiff attended regular chiropractic appointments
with Dr. Hosey in October and November 2003 for treatment of her low back pain. (Tr. 318-30).
A MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine taken in December 2003 revealed small disc bulges at
multiple levels and mild canal stenosis at L3-4 and L4-5. (Tr. 369). A few months later, in
February 2004, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Sean Logan for an evaluation. (Tr. 526). She
complained of lumbar pain with associated right leg and knee pain. (Tr. 526). Dr. Logan opined
2. Plaintiff submitted additional medical evidence from after her DLI into the record for review.
There is further discussion of the relevance of such below.
3. The ALJ relied on the findings of state agency psychological consultants in determining
Plaintiff had no severe medically determinable mental health impairments through her DLI. (Tr.
13). The record supports this determination and no further discussion is warranted.
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her pain resulted from chronic myofascial back pain and referred her for further evaluation of her
knee pain. (Tr. 527).
In early 2004 Dr. Tremains from Northwest Ohio Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, Inc.
wrote a letter describing treatment of Plaintiff’s right knee pain. (Tr. 335). Plaintiff complained
of painful popping and catching and occasional swelling. (Tr. 335). An examination of the right
knee revealed mild effusion, positive squat test, medial joint line tenderness, positive patellar
grind, positive inhibition with tilt to a neutral position, and a mildly antalgic gait. (Tr. 335). Xrays of the right knee revealed medial compartment arthritis. (Tr. 335). Dr. Tremains diagnosed
Plaintiff with medial compartment arthritis, chondromalacia patella, and a possible medial
meniscus tear. (Tr. 335). He recommended a MRI for further evaluation. (Tr. 335). A MRI of the
right knee revealed complex degenerative tears of the medial and lateral meniscuses,
chondromalacia of the medial compartment, osteoarthritic change throughout the medial
compartment, and a Baker’s cyst. (Tr. 336). Dr. Tremains further diagnosed Plaintiff with right
knee osteoarthritis, and medial and lateral meniscal tears. (Tr. 334). He treated Plaintiff with an
injection and recommended Plaintiff use a walking cane for long distances. (Tr. 334). At this
time the record reveals Plaintiff was preparing for international travel. (Tr. 334).
The following month, in April 2004, Plaintiff underwent a right knee arthroscopy with
chondral debridement in the trochlear groove and partial medial and lateral meniscectomies. (Tr.
515-16). At a follow-up appointment two weeks after the surgery, Plaintiff had full range of
motion, minimal pain, and no significant calf tenderness. (Tr. 333). At a six week follow-up
appointment, Plaintiff had some achy stiff pain, but was slowly improving. (Tr. 332). She had a
full range of motion with negative squat test, small Baker’s cyst, and mild tenderness. (Tr. 332).
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Plaintiff returned to the emergency room with complaints of low back pain in September
2004. (Tr. 366). An examination revealed nonspecific tenderness of the lumbar spine, and right
paralumbar musculoskeletal tightness and spasm. (Tr. 366). The same month a MRI of Plaintiff’s
lumbar spine revealed mild to moderate spinal canal stenosis at L2-3, L3-4, and L4-5. (Tr. 371).
In October 2004, Dr. Lakshmipathy treated Plaintiff for complaints of severe bilateral
lower back pain and leg pain, more severe on the left side than the right side. (Tr. 405). Dr.
Lakshmipathy recommended a prescription for neurogenic pain medication and diagnostic facet
injections at L4-5 and L5-S1. (Tr. 405). Twice in May 2005, Plaintiff presented to the emergency
room for treatment of low back pain. (Tr. 359-65). On both occasions doctors treated her with
intravenous pain medication. (Tr. 359-65). The same month, a MRI of the Plaintiff’s lumbar
spine showed no changes from a prior MRI. (Tr. 372). There were no new disc bulges or
herniation, and no direct nerve root impingement on any of the right-sided nerve roots. (Tr. 37273).
At the end of May 2005, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Bakos for treatment of her chronic low
back pain with radiation to her right thigh and groin. (Tr. 389). Dr. Bakos performed a physical
examination and opined Plaintiff demonstrated positive facet loading maneuvers, especially with
extension and right lateral bending, and decreased pinprick sensation in the L4-5 distribution on
the right. (Tr. 389). Plaintiff’s motor strength and reflexes appeared to be intact throughout. (Tr.
389). She agreed to proceed with a facet injection and a lumbar epidural steroid injection. (Tr.
389). Dr. Bakos also prescribed neuropathic pain medication. (Tr. 389).
In July 2005, Dr. Bakos examined Plaintiff and noted she had numbness and allodynia to
pinprick in her upper right leg, but the examination was otherwise within normal limits. (Tr.
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393). Dr. Bakos recommended a femoral nerve block and continued a prescription for pain
medication. (Tr. 393).
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Bakos in December 2005, and reported doing fairly well since
the injections with the exception of some new pain in the thoracic region. (Tr. 394). Dr. Bakos
ordered a thoracic spine MRI (Tr. 394), which revealed small disc bulges at T6-7 and T7-8, but
no evidence of canal stenosis or neural foraminal narrowing (Tr. 374). He later administered a
thoracic epidural steroid injection at T7-8. (Tr. 836). Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Bakos the
following month and reported decreased back pain since the injection. (Tr. 395). She complained
of some tingling in fingers on her right hand. (Tr. 395). Dr. Bakos prescribed narcotic and
neuropathic pain medication and a trial TENS unit. (Tr. 395). He also suggested stretching
exercises to reduce the pain. (Tr. 395).
In February 2006, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Jeffery McMath for treatment of painful left
trigger thumb and received an injection. (Tr. 460). Later that month she returned to Dr. Bakos for
follow-up and complained of pain in both knees. (Tr. 396). Dr. Bakos noted she had no
deterioration with activities of daily living compared to her last visit and, in fact, had improved
sleep while using the TENS unit. (Tr. 396).
Plaintiff underwent bilateral L4-5 and L5-S1 lumbar facet injections in March 2006 (Tr.
398), and again in April 2006 at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1 (Tr. 832). She reported excellent relief
and pain of only one to two on a ten point scale. (Tr. 399). She walked easier and decreased her
consumption of pain medication. (Tr. 399). Dr. Bakos opined Plaintiff had a very good response
to diagnostic injections. (Tr. 399). He noted she demonstrated decreased stiffness and guarding,
and an almost normal gait without any antalgic features. (Tr. 399).
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Plaintiff underwent a caudal epidural steroid injection in June 2006. (Tr. 400). The same
month a bone density study revealed osteopenia of the left hip with an increased fracture risk.
(Tr. 401). In the middle of June she returned to Dr. Bakos with complaints of increased low back
pain radiating down her left leg. (Tr. 454). Gait testing revealed no focal weakness or difficulty.
(Tr. 454). Dr. Bakos opined she suffered from an aggravation of chronic pain and recommended
a series of caudal epidural steroid injections in addition to a prescription for neuropathic pain
medication. (Tr. 454). Plaintiff again underwent caudal epidural steroid injections in June and
July 2006. (Tr. 400, 902). During a follow-up appointment with Dr. Bakos, Plaintiff expressed
satisfaction with the results of the injections and remarked she was able to do more since the
injections. (Tr. 419). Her pain was almost absent at rest and only noticeable with increased
standing, walking, and transitioning. (Tr. 419).
In late August and early September of 2006, Plaintiff underwent a sleep study which
revealed severe obstructive sleep apnea, moderate periodic limb movements in sleep, and
inadequate sleep hygiene due to caffeine and nicotine. (Tr. 749-52). Dr. Atwell recommended
behavioral therapy consisting of weight reduction, caffeine education and nicotine cessation, and
the use of a CPAP device. (Tr. 752).
Plaintiff presented to Dr. Bakos in March 2007 with chronic low back pain with radiation
to the gluteal area and bilateral knee pain. (Tr. 420). An examination revealed palpation
tenderness and mild stiffness in the lumbosacral area, and an antalgic gait. (Tr. 420). Dr. Bakos
noted both knees showed osteoarthritic changes and crepitus to palpation. (Tr. 420). Plaintiff
received knee injections, which provided her with very good relief. (Tr. 420).
In August 2007, Plaintiff underwent a series of x-rays. An x-ray of Plaintiff’s lumbar
spine revealed degenerative changes, especially at L1-2 and L2-3. (Tr. 447). X-rays of Plaintiff’s
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bilateral feet showed mild degenerative changes and small plantar spurs. (Tr. 446). Hand x-rays
revealed mild degenerative changes and a possible small cyst in a finger on her left hand. (Tr.
445). There was no definite evidence of psoriatic arthropathy. (Tr. 445).
Plaintiff presented additional medical evidence dated after her DLI. The ALJ determined
a detailed discussion of medical records after her DLI is not appropriate, and this Court agrees.
When determining eligibility for DIB “evidence of disability obtained after the expiration of
insured status is generally of little probative value.” Strong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 88 F. App’x
841, 845 (6th Cir. 2004).4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the denial of Social Security benefits, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply
the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Besaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). The Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” McClanahan v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Even if substantial
evidence or indeed a preponderance of the evidence supports a claimant’s position, the Court
cannot overturn “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the
ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
4. The relevance of this additional evidence is discussed more in depth below.
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STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
Eligibility for DIB is predicated on the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a),
1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Commissioner follows a five-step evaluation process – found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 – to
determine if a claimant is disabled:
1.
Was claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2.
Did claimant have a medically determinable impairment, or a combination
of impairments, that is “severe,” which is defined as one which
substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work
activities?
3.
Does the severe impairment meet one of the listed impairments?
4.
What is claimant’s RFC and can claimant perform past relevant work?
5.
Can claimant do any other work considering her RFC, age, education, and
work experience?
Under this five-step sequential analysis, the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps
One through Four. Walters, 127 F.3d at 529. The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five
to establish whether the claimant has the RFC to perform available work in the national
economy. Id. The Commissioner considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work
experience to determine if the claimant could perform other work. Id. Only if a claimant satisfies
each element of the analysis, including inability to do other work, and meets the duration
requirements, is she determined to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f); see also Walters,
127 F.3d at 529.
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because it is not
supported by the substantial weight of the evidence, or in the alternative, remanded5 for further
consideration. (Doc. 14, at 1-2). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his determination
of Plaintiff’s RFC by failing to adequately account for (1) Plaintiff’s pain; (2) medical evidence
dated after Plaintiff’s DLI; and (3) application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. (Doc. 14,
at 14).
Pain and Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff argues the Commissioner erred by failing to adequately account for her
complaints of pain which either independently or in combination with her other impairments
rendered her disabled. (Doc. 14, at 16). She correctly asserts that, in some instances, pain alone
may support a claim of disability. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984). Pain
symptoms, however, can be difficult to quantify, so the determination often turns to Plaintiff’s
credibility. Hickey-Haynes v. Barnhart, 116 F. App’x 718, 726-27 (6th Cir. 2004); See also SSR
82-58, 1982 WL 31378, *1 (“Because of their subjective characteristics and the absence of any
reliable techniques for measurement, symptoms are difficult to prove, disprove, or quantify.”).
An ALJ may take Plaintiff’s credibility into account when making a determination regarding the
severity of her pain complaints. Hickey-Haynes, 116 F. App’x at 726-27. In order to make a
determination regarding a claimant’s credibility an ALJ considers the following factors:
(i) [A claimant’s] daily activities;
5. Plaintiff correctly asserts that remand is not proper unless a plaintiff shows good cause for
failing to incorporate new and material evidence. (Doc. 14, at 2; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v.
Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993). However, Plaintiff fails to elaborate at all, and
therefore, fails to meet her burden under the sentence six remand, so the Court will not consider
this argument.
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(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [a claimant’s] pain or other
symptoms;
(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication [Plaintiff]
take[s] or ha[s] taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than medication, [a claimant] receive[s] or ha[s] received for
relief of [Plaintiff’s] pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] use or ha[s] used to relieve [a claimant’s] pain or
other symptoms; and
(vii) Other factors concerning [Plaintiff’s] functional limitations and restrictions
due to pain or other symptoms.
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
“Discounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate where an ALJ finds
contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other evidence.” Walters,
127 F.3d at 531. Here, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s complaints of weakness, numbness, and
fatigue, and ultimately determined Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms. (Tr. 14-15). However, he also determined “the
allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
consistent with the evidence as a whole, persuasive or credible to the extent they are inconsistent
with this [RFC] finding.” (Tr. 14-15).
The ALJ’s credibility determination is afforded great weight by the reviewing court.
Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). In fact, this Court’s review is
“limited to evaluating whether or not the ALJ’s explanations for partially discrediting [claimant’s
testimony] are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Jones, 336 F.3d
at 476. Additionally, the Court may not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence . .
. ” Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Here, in determining the credibility of Plaintiff’s pain complaints, the ALJ reviewed the
medical records, a pain questionnaire, and Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing. (Tr. 14-15). He
found some of the symptoms, including weakness and fatigue, of which Plaintiff complained in
the questionnaire and during her testimony, were not fully consistent with the medical evidence.
(Tr. 17). The Court finds there is substantial evidence in the record to support this determination.
There are not significant complaints of weakness and fatigue in the record during the proscribed
period. The ALJ, moreover, found the record revealed Plaintiff’s pain and symptoms were not
exacerbated until more than a year after her DLI. (Tr. 17). The record supports this conclusion.
After a review of the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ did have substantial evidence to
support his credibility determination.
Relevance of Evidence after DLI
Plaintiff argues medical evidence dated after her DLI is pertinent to the extent it reveals
the continuity and severity of impairments that existed before the DLI. (Doc. 14, at 14).
Eligibility for DIB, however, must be established during the relevant time period; thus, the
medical evidence submitted after the DLI is of minimal relevance to determining disability
during the relevant time period. See Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990); see
also Strong, 88 F. App’x at 845.
Plaintiff alleges this case involves misdiagnosis. (Tr. 31). She argues she suffered from
CIDP before the alleged onset date, but was not diagnosed with this condition until much later.
(Doc. 14, at 15). Accordingly, she asks this Court to give greater weight to medical evidence
dated after the DLI. Even though Plaintiff’s diagnosis came after her DLI, she must still show
her symptoms, regardless of the diagnosis, were severe enough to establish disability before her
DLI. Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[D]isability is
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determined by the functional limitations imposed by a condition, not the mere diagnosis of it.”)
Plaintiff, through counsel, noted this condition is “characterized by a history weakness,
numbness, tingling, pain, difficulty walking, burning pain in the extremities, onset of back or
neck pain radiating down the extremities usually diagnosed as radiculopathy.” (Tr. 31).
While medical evidence after the DLI was not discussed in detail in the ALJ’s opinion, he
did review and consider this evidence. (Tr. 17). He determined the records immediately after the
DLI did not contain evidence of significant worsening that could reasonably relate back to the
prescribed period. (Tr. 17). The ALJ found, therefore, the record did not support a finding of
CIDP as a severe impairment through the Plaintiff’s DLI. (Tr. 13). Plaintiff did briefly complain
of tingling in her fingers in January 2006 (Tr. 395) and radiculopathy (Tr. 320, 389, 420, 454),
but, overall, the record reveals substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination.
Additionally, Plaintiff frequently had a positive response to treatment and medication. (Tr. 333,
332, 394, 395, 396, 399, 419, 420). A detailed review of the medical records after the Plaintiff’s
DLI, therefore, is not warranted or necessary.
Application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in not utilizing the Medical-Vocational Guideline
201.10. (Doc. 14, at 14-15). An ALJ may find a disability by applying the guidelines, also known
as the “grids”. The grids dictate a finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” based on a claimant’s
exertional limitations, age, education, and prior work experience. Cole v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 820 F.2d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 1987); Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667
F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1981). The grids eliminate the need for calling a VE to the hearing. Hurt
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 816 F.2d 1141, 1143 (6th Cir. 1987).
15
As an initial matter, Plaintiff identified grid 201.10 as descriptive of her condition. (Doc.
14, at 14-15; Doc. 17, at 4). However, 201.10 specifically refers to a claimant with a “limited or
less” education. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Plaintiff has an associate’s degree and
does not qualify under this section. (Tr. 286). Additionally, and more importantly, an ALJ can
only apply the grids if it is determined a claimant cannot perform her past relevant work. Cole,
820 F.2d at 771. That is not the case here. After hearing testimony from the VE, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff could perform two of her past jobs, albeit at a lower exertional level. (Tr.
18).
A claimant’s RFC is essentially “the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ is required to consider all symptoms and the extent to which
those symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence. § 416.929. The
determination of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c); Poe v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining
a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5.
The record reveals substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding regarding Plaintiff’s
RFC. The record shows Plaintiff often responded well to treatment. During the relevant disability
period she often had greatly reduced pain with steroid injections, including a six month period of
pain reduction, and improved sleep with the use of a TENS unit. (Tr. 38, 333, 332, 394, 395,
396, 399, 419, 420). The record reveals an ability to perform activities of daily living, including
household chores, driving, and traveling. (Tr. 37-38, 334, 396). In conclusion, there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination in regard to Plaintiff’s RFC.
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CONCLUSION
Following a review of the arguments presented, the record, and the applicable law, this
Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and resulted from application
of the correct legal standard. Therefore, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/James R. Knepp II
United States Magistrate Judge
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