Prudential Insurance Company of America, The v. Blanton et al

Filing 22

Order. Defendant Lisa's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14 ) granted; Defendant Lisa's motion to release life insurance and annuity proceeds paid into the Court (Doc. 13 ) granted; Defendant Michael's request for stay denied. Judge James G. Carr on 8/7/2015.(G,D)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

The Prudential Insurance
Company of America,

Case No. 3:14CV2343

Plaintiff
v.

ORDER

Lisa A. Blanton, et al.,
Defendants

This is an interpleader action involving disposition of $57,189.56 of life-insurance
and an annuity of $2,092.93 from policies plaintiff Prudential Life Insurance Company of
America (Prudential) issued to Catherine Sackrider. Ms. Sackrider’s daughter, Lisa
Blanton (Lisa), is the sole named beneficiary, but Ms. Sackrider’s brother, Michael
Baranek (Michael), claiming Lisa caused her mother’s death, contends he is entitled to
the contested funds.
Pending are Lisa’s motions for summary judgment (Doc. 14) and to release the
life-insurance and annuity proceeds paid into the court’s registry (Doc. 13). For the
following reasons, I grant Lisa’s motions.
Background
On November 9, 2012, Sackrider died in Sylvania, Ohio. The authorities ruled her
death a homicide. Sylvania Township Police Department Detective Jake Albright has
designated Lisa as a “person of interest” in the homicide investigation.

In December, 2012, Lisa claimed the funds at issue.
Because Lisa was a person of interest in the homicide investigation, Prudential
was unsure whether she was entitled to receive the proceeds. Consequently, Prudential
filed this interpleader action. The parties eventually consented to have Prudential deposit
the proceeds in an interest-bearing account with the court’s registry, and to my dismissal,
with prejudice, of Prudential as a party. (Docs. 10, 11).
Michael opposes summary judgment, claiming that Ohio’s “Slayer Statute,”
O.R.C. § 2105.19(A), bars Lisa from receiving the proceeds because she is responsible
for her mother’s death.
Standard of Review
A party is entitled to summary judgment on motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
where the opposing party fails to show the existence of an essential element for which
that party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The movant must initially show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.
Once the movant meets that initial burden, the “burden shifts to the nonmoving
party [to] set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Rule 56(e)
“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings” and submit
admissible evidence supporting its position. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 324.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, I accept the opponent’s evidence as
true and construe all evidence in the opponent’s favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). The movant can prevail only if the materials

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offered in support of the motion show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex,
supra, 477 U.S. at 323.
Discussion
A. Ohio’s Slayer Statute
Ohio’s Slayer Statute provides:
no person who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or is found guilty by
reason of insanity of a violation of or complicity in the violation of
sections 2903.01 [aggravated murder], 2903.02 [murder], or 2903.03
[voluntary manslaughter] of the Revised Code . . . shall in any way benefit
by the death.
O.R.C. § 2105.19(A).
Ohio common law also provides “that no one should be allowed to profit from his
[or her] own wrongful conduct.” Shrader v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 20 Ohio
St. 3d 41, 44 (1985). Under Shrader, the Slayer Statute “eliminate[s] the necessity to
prove that the beneficiary of a policy of life insurance committed such an act, when the
beneficiary has been convicted of or has pled guilty to one of the specifically enumerated
homicide offenses.” Id. at 44.
The court also held that the Slayer Statute cannot be “construed to be the
exclusive method to determine whether a person should be barred from recovering as a
beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the life of a decedent alleged to have been
killed by the beneficiary.” Id. Rather, “the identity of a person who intentionally and
feloniously caused the death of another can be established in a civil proceeding in order
to prevent the wrongdoer from receiving the proceeds of the deceased’s life insurance
policy.” Id. at 48.

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B. Lisa’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Lisa has not been indicted, plead guilty to, or been convicted of murder,
aggravated murder, or voluntary manslaughter in connection with the decedent’s
homicide.
Thus, she is entitled to summary judgment unless Michael can show there is
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Lisa intentionally and feloniously
caused her mother’s death.
Michael contends this case must go to a jury because there is a factual dispute as
to whether Lisa is criminally responsible for her mother’s death. He relies on an affidavit
from Detective Albright stating that Albright continues to consider Lisa a “person of
interest” in the decedent’s homicide. For these reasons, Michael contends, summary
judgment is unwarranted.
In his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Michael stresses that,
“[e]ven if a conviction is never obtained or [Lisa] is cleared as a suspect, this does not
preclude [him] from presenting evidence and seeking to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that [Lisa] maliciously and intentionally killed her mother.” (Doc. 20 at 5).
Michael’s theory is correct: as the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Shrader,
supra, 20 Ohio St. 3d at 48, a party may attempt to establish, in an interpleader action
like this case, that the beneficiary is criminally responsible for the decedent’s death, and
thus ineligible to recover the proceeds of the decedent’s life-insurance policy.
But Michael has failed to present any evidence that would enable a reasonable
jury to find that Lisa intentionally and feloniously caused her mother’s death. Instead,
Michael points only to Detective Albright’s statement that Lisa is a “person of interest” in

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the homicide investigation. Albright’s affidavit does not explain how he reaches that
conclusion, much less set forth any factual basis from which a jury could reasonably infer
Lisa is criminally responsible for her mother’s death. As Lisa points out in her reply,
there could be many reasons why the authorities designate an individual a “person of
interest.” While such official designation may raise some suspicion, suspicion is not
proof.
Michael also relies on Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Paumier, 2013 WL 3927774
(N.D. Ohio) (Lioi, J.), as authority for denying Lisa’s motion.
That case was an interpleader action in which three parties – all persons of interest
in a homicide – made claims for the decedent’s life insurance proceeds. Id. Two of the
parties moved for summary judgment. The court denied their motions because there was
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those parties caused the decedent’s death.
Id., at *4.
My colleague, District Judge Sara Lioi, likened the case to Shrader, 20 Ohio St.
3d at 44, where disputed evidence showed Shrader may have had marks on his hands near
the time of his wife’s murder. Just as in Shrader, supra, where the nonmoving party
presented specific evidence supporting an inference that the beneficiary had killed the
named insured, Judge Lioi found there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding
the beneficiaries were criminally responsible for the decedent’s death. Paumier, supra,
2013 WL 3927774, at *3.
Here – as in Shrader and Paumier – whether the named beneficiary intentionally
and feloniously caused the decedent’s death is highly disputed.

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But this case is distinguishable because Michael has provided no evidence from
which a reasonable jury could infer Lisa is criminally responsible for her mother’s death.
For that reason, Lisa is entitled to summary judgment.
C. Michael’s Request for a Stay
Alternatively, Michael requests a stay of this case pending the completion of the
homicide investigation and any ensuing criminal proceeding.
A district court has “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its
power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997).
But there is “no requirement that a civil proceeding be stayed pending the
outcome of criminal proceedings.” F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 627
(6th Cir. 2014). District courts may weigh a number of factors in deciding whether to stay
a civil case pending criminal proceedings:
1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those
presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the
defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs
[nonmoving party] in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the
prejudice to plaintiffs [nonmoving party] caused by the delay; 4) the
private interests of and burden on the defendants [moving party]; 5) the
interests of the courts; 6) the public interest; 7) the extent to which the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are implicated; and 8) whether
granting the stay will further the interest in economical use of judicial time
and resources.
Id.
Michael has the burden of demonstrating that “there is pressing need for delay
and that neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order.”
Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir.
1977).

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Here, as in F.T.C., where the court noted “there ha[d] yet to be a criminal case or
even an indictment filed,” supra, 767 F.3d at 627, the overlap of issues between a
potential criminal case and this civil case favors neither party.
The lack of an indictment favors denying the stay. Aside from the fact that more
than thirty months has passed since the homicide, the present record, with its mere
allusion to Lisa’s status as a person of interest, suggests that ultimate charge and
conviction are far from certain. As in N.Y. Life Ins. & Annuity Corp. v. Gerth, 2013 WL
4014987, at *1 (M.D. Fla.), in which eighteen months had passed without an arrest or
charge, “a stay of this action is inappropriate because [the defendant] has not been
charged or indicted with respect to his mother’s murder.” Id., at *2.
The third and fourth F.T.C. factors – prejudice to the nonmoving party weighed
against the interest of the party seeking the stay strongly favors denial. In F.T.C., the
court noted that the nonmoving parties were “desperate to recover their lost funds as
quickly as possible.” 767 F.3d at 629. Lisa’s situation is presumably the same.
In response, Michael contends that allowing Lisa to have the funds before
questions about her culpability are resolved risks dissipation of the proceeds once they
are in Lisa’s hands. This may be true with regard to the life insurance, but may be less so,
depending on the terms of the annuity, with regard to that benefit.
In any event, given the lapse of time without any significant progress toward an
adjudicative assessment of Lisa’s nominally alleged guilt, the actual, continuing prejudice
to Lisa from withholding the proceeds outweighs the risk to Michael of dissipation of the
proceeds.

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The fifth F.T.C. factor, the interests of the courts, is neutral. The sixth factor, the
public interest, favors a stay, but only modestly so. Prosecution and conviction of the
guilty are fundamental public concerns. Were there some meaningful evidence of Lisa’s
guilt and, by now, a prosecution underway, the public interest in staying these
proceedings would be substantial. But neither of those considerations exists here.
Consequently, denying the stay best serves a countervailing public interest – the just and
speedy resolution of disputes.
The seventh F.T.C. factor – effect on Lisa’s Fifth Amendment rights – would
favor a stay if she were seeking the remedy. But she is not, so she is presumably and, in
light of her status as only a person of interest, understandably unconcerned about any risk
in this case to her Fifth Amendment rights. That being so, this factor favors denying the
stay.
The final F.T.C. factor – judicial economy – favors denying the stay. Under all the
present circumstances keeping things in limbo makes little sense.
I conclude, accordingly, that the factors favoring denying the stay clearly
outweigh those favoring granting the stay.
Conclusion
The putative proof of Lisa’s culpability for the death giving rise to her claim to
the proceeds at issue is slight in the extreme. The passage of time with no improvement
in the extent of any such proof has been substantial. Her mother, no doubt, wanted her to
have the insurance proceeds immediately and the annuity for its term. Granting a stay and
continuing this proceeding for some indeterminate period frustrates that intent.
It is, accordingly,

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ORDERED THAT:
1.

Defendant Lisa’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) be, and the
same hereby is, granted;

2.

Defendant Lisa’s Motion to Release Life Insurance and Annuity Proceeds
Paid into the Court (Doc. 13) be, and the same hereby is, granted; and

3.

Defendant Michael’s request for a stay be, and the same hereby is, denied.

So ordered.

/s/ James G. Carr
Sr. U.S. District Judge

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