Langlois v. Coleman
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order: The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Knepp recommending dismissal of petitioner's pending Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1 ) is accepted. Magis trate Judge Knepp correctly determined that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Further, for the reasons stated herein and in the Report and Recommendation, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b). Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 9/20/16. (LC,S) re 9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Mark Langlois,
Petitioner,
Vs.
John Coleman, Warden,
Respondent.
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CASE NO. 3:15 CV 579
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge James R. Knepp, II (Doc. 9) recommending that this Court dismiss petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner has filed Objections to the Report and
Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Report and Recommendation is
ACCEPTED.
Standard of Review
Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts provides that the district court reviews de novo those portions of a report of a
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magistrate judge to which a specific objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52
(1985). The judge may accept, reject, or modify any proposed finding or recommendation.
Discussion
The January term of the 2011 Lucas County Grand Jury indicted petitioner on one
count of aggravated murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01(A) and (F), and one
count of murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(B), along with firearms
specifications as to each count. The indictment related to a murder that occurred on January
27, 2011, at petitioner’s place of employment, Forklifts of Toledo. A jury found him guilty of
both murder counts and the firearm specifications. On November 29, 2011, the trial court
merged the murder counts and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of
parole, consecutive to a mandatory three year term on the firearm specifications. The factual
and procedural history of the state-court proceedings are summarized in Magistrate Knepp’s
Report and Recommendation. (R&R at 2-7).
Petitioner filed his petition in this Court on March 25, 2015, raising one ground for
relief:
Expert testimony comparing tool marks on shell casings is not scientifically
sound and cannot be presented as scientific expert testimony, because the
theory underlying such comparison has not been adequately tested, the
methods for comparison are not capable of proper peer review, and the error
rate is unknown. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). Mr. Langlois was therefore denied the effective assistance of counsel
when counsel failed to move for exclusion of this scientifically uncertain and
unsound expert testimony. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Magistrate Knepp determined that, to the extent petitioner’s ground for relief is based
on Daubert, it is not cognizable in federal habeas because the admission of the ballistics
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evidence did not create an unfair process that violated petitioner’s fundamental rights. (R&R
at 8-10). To the extent petitioner’s ground for relief is based on Strickland, Magistrate Knepp
concluded that counsel’s choice to cross-examine the expert rather than request a Daubert
hearing was not inadequate representation. He also determined that the state appellate court’s
finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance because counsel
thoroughly questioned the basis of the experts’ ballistics conclusions was entitled to
deference. Magistrate Knepp therefore recommended denying the petition. (R&R at 11-15).
Petitioner objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that the admission of the ballistics
evidence did not affect his fundamental rights. He argues that “the admission of the evidence
linking the crime scene evidence to Mr. Langlois’ gun in absolute terms and with a degree of
absolute certainty created an unfair process.” This Court disagrees. “[E]rrors in application of
state law, especially with regard to the admissibility of evidence, are usually not cognizable in
federal habeas corpus.” Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir.); see also Coleman v.
Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir.2001) (“Because this is an appeal from a habeas corpus
decision and not an appeal from Coleman’s state conviction, we do not pass upon ‘errors in
the application of state law, especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of
evidence.’”). Habeas relief is only available where an error of state law results in the denial of
fundamental fairness. Walker, 703 F.2d at 962. “[C]ourts ‘have defined the category of
infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.’” Wright v. Dallman, 999 F.2d
174, 178 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668,
107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)). A state court evidentiary ruling does not constitute a due process
violation unless it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
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of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43, 116
S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996)).
In this case, the admission of the ballistics evidence was not contrary to clearly
established Supreme Court precedent. While petitioner cites several cases where courts have
imposed certain conditions on the admission of ballistics evidence, he has cited no Supreme
Court precedent (or any federal court precedent) holding that a state violates due process by
permitting an expert to give testimony regarding ballistics evidence. See Norris v. Schotten,
146 F.3d 314, 335 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Appellant’s next claim concerns the reliability or fairness
of the scientific evidence presented through the testimony of Mitchell. Appellant relies
primarily on Daubert...; however, we agree with the district court that Daubert concerned the
Federal Rules of Evidence which is not relevant to appellant’s [state] conviction.”) Moreover,
as the appellate court noted, the type of microscopic comparison testing addressed by the
State’s experts was “a generally accepted method of forensic analysis” at the time of
petitioner’s trial. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. 9, at 25-27) (citing Ohio cases holding that methodology used
by experts was generally accepted and reliable).
In addition, the appellate court’s findings that the witnesses were properly qualified
experts whose testimony was helpful to the jury and who relied on widely-accepted methods
are entitled to deference and supported by the record. So, too, is the court’s conclusion that
neither witness opined in absolute terms or to a degree of “absolute certainty.” See, e.g., Doc.
5-3 at 594 (“Q: And did you reach any conclusions within a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty as to whether or not that shell casing from the crime scene matched your test fires,
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being all from Exhibit 31, the 9 millimeter Glock?”)1; id. at 577 (“A: [W]hen you’re
comparing two projectiles, you’re looking at the microscopic striations, and you can
have...difficult comparisons, very easy ones. Depending on the direction of the light and how
you rotate the projectiles around, there’s a lot of variables.”).
Petitioner’s objections regarding Magistrate Knepp’s rejection of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim are also not well-taken. Petitioner argues that trial counsel should
have moved to preclude the expert’s testimony in a Daubert hearing rather than challenging it
through cross examination. The Court agrees with the magistrate that this argument does not
meet petitioner’s extremely high burden of showing that the state appellate court’s application
of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. The Supreme Court recently noted that, “[i]n
many instances, cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert’s
presentation.” Harrington v. Richter, 52 U.S. 86, 111 (2011). Indeed, Daubert itself
recognizes that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Here, the state appellate court’s finding
that defense counsel “thoroughly questioned the basis for the experts’ ballistics conclusions”
is entitled to deference. (Doc. 5-1, Ex. 9, at 36-37). Counsel’s decision to rely on this
questioning–which drew attention to possible weaknesses in the experts’ conclusions–rather
than to challenge the experts through a Daubert hearing was a tactical decision. The state
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While petitioner argues that the a ballistics expert should be required to testify “to
a reasonable degree of ballistics certainty,” he has cited no case holding that the
fundamental fairness of a trial is affected when a ballistics expert is permitted to
testify to a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty” instead.
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appellate court’s refusal to second-guess counsel’s strategy was a reasonable application of
Strickland.2
Finally, petitioner has not shown that the result of the proceeding would have been
different if counsel had challenged the State’s ballistics expert in a Daubert hearing. As such,
he cannot meet his heightened burden of showing that the state appellate court’s conclusion
that counsel’s performance did not prejudice petitioner was an unreasonable application of
Strickland.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above and in the Report and Recommendation, the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Knepp recommending dismissal of petitioner’s pending
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is accepted.
Magistrate Judge Knepp correctly determined that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus. Further, for the reasons stated herein and in the Report and Recommendation, the
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not
be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b).
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In his objections, petitioner cites a recent Supreme Court case, Hinton v.
Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (per curiam), where the Court held that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to hire an appropriate expert to
challenge the State’s ballistics expert at trial. But Hinton’s holding was very
narrow and not applicable to this case: “The only inadequate assistance of counsel
here was the inexcusable mistake of law–the unreasonable failure to understand
the resources that state law made available to him–that caused counsel to employ
an expert that he himself deemed inadequate.” Id. at 1089 (emphasis in original).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 9/20/16
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