Johnson v. Floure et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). I certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 5/24/2016. (S,AL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Aaron Lee Johnson,
Case No. 3:15-cv-0961
Plaintiff
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
A. Floure, RN., et al.,
Defendants
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Pro se Plaintiff Aaron Lee Johnson filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lucas
County Jail Director of Nursing A. Floure, Lucas County Jail Nursing Assistant Jane Doe #1, Lucas
County Jail Nurse Practitioner Jane Doe #2, Lucas County Jail Nurse Jane Doe #3, Lucas County
Jail Nurse Jane Doe #4, Lucas County Jail Nurse Jane Doe #5, Lucas County Jail Doctor John Doe
#1, and Lucas County Jail Doctor John Doe #2. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was
inadvertently given medication intended for another inmate with the same name. He asserts the
Defendants were negligent and committed malpractice in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He
seeks $ 1,500,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Lucas County Jail in November 2014. He reported to the
infirmary complaining of a rash on his arm on November 10, 2014. At that time, Jane Doe #2
advised him he would be administered an ointment during the evening pill call. He received the
ointment for a week but then his treatment stopped. He returned to the infirmary and asked for
another prescription for the ointment. He received the confirmation of his medical request and Jane
Doe #1 called his name during the evening pill call. Jane Doe #1 checked his wrist band to confirm
his identification. Instead of receiving the ointment he expected, he was handed pills. He asked
Jane Doe #1 about the medication and indicated he was expecting to receive an ointment. She said
she did not have a medical slip for the cream but looked again at his wristband and indicated that the
pills were for him. He took these pills for several days and began to experience blurry vision, loss of
balance, severe muscle pain, sudden body tremors, hallucinations, and insomnia. He was eventually
hospitalized for two days. At that time, he discovered he had been receiving psychotropic
medications prescribed for another inmate at the jail with the same name. When the error was
discovered, the jail medical staff discontinued the medications and prescribed new medications to
counteract the negative effects of the medications he had received. Plaintiff claims the Defendants
were negligent and committed medical malpractice in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an in
forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler
v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.
1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause
of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the
complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
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A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not
required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers
legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this
pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). In Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court remarked that “having stripped [inmates] of
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government
and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. at 833. The Eighth
Amendment protects inmates by requiring that “prison officials ... ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and ... ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates.’ ” Id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). This,
however, does not mandate that a prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience during his or
her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to the medical treatment of their choice,
see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect the amenities, conveniences and
services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); see Thaddeus-X v.
Blatter,175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). In sum, the Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional
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minimum protection against conditions of confinement which constitute health threats, but does
address those conditions which cause the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which cause
aggravation or annoyance. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework for
courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true,
establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is measured in
response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine discomforts of
prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or extreme
deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must also establish a subjective element showing the prison
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized
by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the
Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
In the context of a claim regarding medical treatment, an inmate must show two elements to
demonstrate a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights: 1) that he was suffering from a “serious”
medical need; and 2) that the prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the serious medical
need. Id. It is clear from the foregoing that the duty to provide a certain level of health care to
incarcerated offenders under the Eighth Amendment is a limited one. “Not ‘every ache and pain or
medically recognized condition involving some discomfort can support an Eighth Amendment
claim.’” Sarah v. Thompson, No. 03–2633, 2004 WL 2203585 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) (quoting
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997)). In this case, Plaintiff sustained an injury that
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was sufficiently serious. I must then proceed to inquire whether the Defendants exhibited deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s medical condition.
Plaintiff first claims the Defendants were negligent and committed malpractice by
dispensing medication to him that was intended for another inmate at the jail with the same name.
Each inmate has a wristband that includes not only the inmate’s name, but also his date of birth and
his prisoner identification number. While the inmates shared the same name, a comparison of the
dates of birth or the prisoner identification numbers would have shown the medication was not
intended for Plaintiff.
To satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must allege
facts to show that prison officials knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference to his health or
safety. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere
negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. An inmate must show that prison officials had “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). This standard is met if “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Mere negligence will not suffice. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 835-36. Consequently, allegations of medical malpractice, negligent diagnosis, or negligent
treatment, such as those asserted by Plaintiff, fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after they became aware he received the wrong
medication. They immediately discontinued the medications and took him to the Rescue Crisis
Center where he was hospitalized. He was given new medications to counteract the effects of the
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wrong medications. He has not alleged that the Defendants disregarded a serious risk to his health
after they became aware of the error with his medications.
CONCLUSION
Having considered and examined the pro se Plaintiff’s pleadings to determine their legal
viability, I conclude Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This action is
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). I certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.1
So Ordered.
s/Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
1
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is
not taken in good faith.
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