Donnal v. Perez et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Perez, Edwards, Pederson, and Factor under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). This Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This case shall proceed solely on the Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Patel aka Patell. The Clerk's Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of this Order in the documents to be served upon Defendant. Judge Jack Zouhary on 11/30/2015. (D,L)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Edward Eugene Donnal,
Case No. 3:15 CV 1550
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
-vsJUDGE JACK ZOUHARY
Dr. Carlos Perez, et al.,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Edward Eugene Donnal filed this Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Allen Correctional Institution (“ACI”) staff: Dr. Carlos Perez, Health Care Administrator Kristine
Edwards, Dr. Patel aka Patell, Nurse Amy Pederson, and Inspector Joann Factor. Plaintiff alleges
these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. He seeks monetary damages.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff submitted a health care request form complaining of shortness of breath and
sweating while walking. He was called to Inmate Health Services on Monday, February 17, 2014
where Nurse Pederson examined him. She acknowledged she was not a doctor, noting Plaintiff may
have congestive heart failure and referred him to see Dr. Perez (Doc. 1 at 4).
Two days later, on Wednesday, February 19, 2014, Plaintiff received a pass to see Dr. Perez.
Plaintiff arrived at 10:15 AM, but was told to return after lunch. Later that afternoon, while Dr.
Perez was seeing other patients, Plaintiff complained to a corrections officer that Plaintiff had been
waiting to see the doctor since 10:15 AM. The corrections officer found a nurse who took Plaintiff’s
vital signs at 4:00 PM. He did not see Dr. Perez, but instead saw Dr. Patel soon afterward. Plaintiff
reiterated to the doctor that he was having difficulty breathing, and was experiencing discomfort in
his left chest. When asked if he had a family history of blood clots, Plaintiff indicated his father and
twin brother both suffered from them. Patel ordered a chest x-ray and blood work. Plaintiff states
he had a chest x-ray on February 20, 2014 but did not get the blood test at that time (id. at 5–6).
Five days after he received a chest x-ray, Plaintiff had a heart attack. He alleges he was
unconscious for five or six minutes and those around him were unable to detect breathing or a pulse
(id. at 6). He was taken by ambulance to St. Rita’s Hospital, where he was transferred to The Ohio
State Medical Center. There, Plaintiff received a CAT scan that revealed a double pulmonary
embolism. Plaintiff had surgery and spent two days in the Intensive Care Unit (id. at 8–9). He
claims he received a pass for a blood test only after he returned from the hospital.
Plaintiff claims Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. He
states his complaints of chest pains and shortness of breath should have alerted a medical
professional that he was having a heart attack or had blood clots in his lungs. He contends his heart
sustained damage and he will continue to have chest pain for the remainder of his life. He claims
Inspector Factor denied his grievance.
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is required
to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted or lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
An action has no arguable basis in law when defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims
a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. An action has no arguable
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factual basis when the allegations are “delusional” or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
This Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accept all
factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements.” Id. at 555. A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but its “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. This Court is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A claim is plausible when a complaint contains “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). In
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court remarked that “having stripped
[inmates] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the
government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. at 833. The
Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring “prison officials . . . ensure . . . inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and . . . ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.’” Id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).
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This, however, does not mandate a prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience during his or
her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346). Prisoners are not entitled to unlimited access to the medical treatment of their choice,
see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect the amenities, conveniences
and services of a good hotel,” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988). In sum, the
Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional minimum protection against conditions of confinement
that constitute health threats, but does not address conditions that cause the prisoner to feel merely
uncomfortable, aggravated, or annoyed. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (requiring extreme or grave
deprivation).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework for
courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. First, Plaintiff must plead facts which, if true,
establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is measured in
response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine discomforts of
prison life do not suffice. Id. at 9. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or extreme
deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. Second, Plaintiff must establish a subjective element showing the prison officials
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by
obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the
Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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In the context of a claim regarding medical treatment, an inmate must show two elements
to demonstrate a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. First, Plaintiff must show he was
suffering from a “serious” medical need. If he establishes he was suffering from a serious medical
need, he must demonstrate the prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the serious medical
need, not merely negligent in diagnosing his condition or treating it. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack from two pulmonary embolisms. This qualifies
as a serious medical condition. This Court thus turns it attention to whether one or more Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his condition, not merely negligent in his treatment.
To show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must
allege facts to suggest each official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health
or safety. The official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Brown v. Bargery,
207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff names Dr. Perez as a Defendant based on the fact that Perez kept him waiting from
10:15 AM until 4:00 PM. Plaintiff, however, did not see Dr. Perez and was not examined by him.
Plaintiff does not allege enough facts to suggest Dr. Perez was fully aware of the risk of serious
harm. Nurse Pederson wrote in the chart her impression that he was suffering from congestive heart
failure. There is no allegation Dr. Perez even saw the chart. Moreover, he would be at best,
negligent for failing to fully comprehend the severity of the situation.
Similarly, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to suggest the Health Care Administrator
or the Institutional Inspector were aware of Plaintiff’s health issues before he was hospitalized.
Plaintiff’s allegations against these Defendants pertain to their respective roles in the grievance
process. Without more, responding to a grievance or otherwise participating in the grievance
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procedure is insufficient to trigger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d.
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff claims Nurse Pederson examined him and incorrectly speculated he was suffering
from congestive heart failure. She nevertheless scheduled him to see the doctor the next day. While
her note about congestive heart failure in his file may have contributed to the confusion and delay
in seeing the doctor promptly the next day, the allegations in the pleading do not suggest that she
was aware he was suffering from something more serious and refused him medical care.
That leaves Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Patel. Patel examined Plaintiff and correctly
surmised he had blood clots in his lungs. He ordered a chest x-ray but did not ensure that the blood
work order went through at the same time. He apparently did not follow up with Plaintiff or arrange
for him to seek more immediate medical attention. Of course, the actual medical records may tell
a different story. On the face of the Complaint, however, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim
against Dr. Patel for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Perez, Edwards, Pederson, and Factor are dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal
from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This case shall proceed solely on the Eighth
Amendment claim against Dr. Patel aka Patell. The Clerk’s Office is directed to forward the
appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of this
Order in the documents to be served upon Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
November 30, 2015
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