Mason-Colwell v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

Order Adopting 18 Report and Recommendation and Denying Benefits. Judge Jack Zouhary on 9/14/2016. (D,L)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Valerie D. Mason-Colwell,

Case No. 3:15 CV 1790
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING BENEFITS

-vsJUDGE JACK ZOUHARY
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
The Commissioner of Social Security denied Plaintiff Valerie Mason-Colwell disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental social security income (“SSI”). Mason-Colwell timely
filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of that decision (Doc. 1). This Court has jurisdiction under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge James Knepp for a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) under Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). Following briefing (Docs. 11, 14, 17), the Magistrate Judge
recommends this Court affirm the final decision of the Commissioner denying Mason-Colwell’s claim
for DIB and SSI (Doc. 18).
This matter is now before this Court on Mason-Colwell’s Objection to the R&R (Doc. 19) and
the Commissioner’s Response (Doc. 20). This Court has reviewed de novo the Magistrate Judge’s
findings in accordance with Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1981) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) & (C). For the reasons below, this Court adopts the R&R and denies the claim for
benefits.

BACKGROUND
The R&R accurately recites the relevant factual and procedural background, which this Court
adopts (Doc. 18 at 1–18). Briefly, Mason-Colwell was fifty years old at the time of the hearing. She
has a high school education and past work experience as a hand packager and production assembler
(Tr. at 34, 58–59). She claims DIB and SSI on the basis of back and hip problems, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), type 2 diabetes, migraine headaches, sleep apnea,
hypertension, obesity, depression, anxiety, borderline intellectual functioning, and a learning disorder
(Tr. at 12, 69).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a denial of DIB or SSI, this Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions
absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has
made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Besaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Commissioner’s findings “as to any fact
if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474
F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Even if substantial evidence, or indeed
a preponderance of the evidence, supports a claimant’s position, the court cannot overturn the
Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by
the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F. 3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).

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DISCUSSION
Residual Functional Capacity Limitations
Mason-Colwell argues the ALJ’s assessment of her physical residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Mason-Colwell challenges the
ALJ’s determinations that she could walk for three hours in an eight-hour workday and occasionally
climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, and kneel (Tr. at 14). The ALJ reached these conclusions
based on the opinions of two State agency physicians and a consultative examiner. These are reliable
sources upon which to base an RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i). The ALJ afforded
“significant weight” to the opinions of the State agency physicians, but “greatest weight” to the
opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Babatunde Omamusi, based on Dr. Omamusi’s personal
observation and examination of Mason-Colwell (Tr. at 17). Accordingly, the ALJ adopted Dr.
Omamusi’s more stringent limitations in the RFC.
Mason-Colwell objects that these limitations are “absurd” and cannot be based on substantial
evidence because “a reasonable mind would not accept them.” She argues, citing Fleischer v. Astrue,
774 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ohio 2011), there is no “logical bridge” between her physical impairments
-- obesity, COPD -- and the limitations adopted by the ALJ. Mason-Colwell misinterprets Fleischer.
As that case made clear, an ALJ is required to “sufficiently explain[] his reasons” for reaching a
certain conclusion -- in other words, “to provide a ‘logical bridge between the evidence on record and
his conclusion.’” Id. at 878–79. Here, the ALJ cited three uncontested medical opinions in support
of her RFC determinations (Tr. at 17). Those opinions were consistent with Mason-Colwell’s medical
records as a whole (Tr. at 16; see Doc. 18 at 24–25). Mason-Colwell had the opportunity to present
any contrary medical opinions regarding her limitations to the ALJ; she cites no such evidence. See

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Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] lack of physical
restrictions constitutes substantial evidence for a finding of non-disability.”).
Mason-Colwell further objects that the ALJ failed to consider all of her limitations in
evaluating her RFC. She suggests (1) her impairments require more extensive breaks -- e.g., to rest,
check her blood sugar, or nebulize -- than accounted for in the RFC; (2) her history of migraines
requires a noise restriction; and (3) her combination of osteoarthritis, back pain, and hip pain supports
a sit/stand limitation. Again, Mason-Colwell identifies no medical evidence before the ALJ that
would mandate these additional limitations. Rather, these objections appear to be based on her
subjective complaints. “[A]n ALJ is not required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints and
may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability.”
Jones, 336 F.3d at 476. The ALJ found Mason-Colwell’s credibility “diminished” (Tr. at 16), and
Mason-Colwell does not contest that assessment.
Dr. Pawloski’s Opinion
Mason-Colwell argues the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of consultative examining
psychologist Dr. Brithany Pawloski. The ALJ gave “significant weight” to Dr. Pawloski’s opinion,
finding it “reasonable in light of [Mason-Colwell’s] medical records” (Tr. 19). However, the ALJ did
not adopt Dr. Pawloski’s conclusions that (1) Mason-Colwell was reliable, and (2) exposure to a work
environment could damage her mental health (Tr. at 813–14).
Mason-Colwell objects that by adopting some, but not all, of Dr. Pawloski’s opinion, the ALJ
improperly engaged in “picking and choosing.” See Wilkerson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2010 WL
817307, at *14 (S.D. Ohio 2010). Her argument misinterprets the case law. An ALJ “must consider
all the record evidence and cannot ‘pick and choose’ only the evidence that supports his position.”

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Id. (citation omitted); see also McQuin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1369674, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
2014) (“If the ‘[ALJ] failed to consider pertinent evidence, although it was available in the record,
[the] matter must be remanded for further administrative proceedings.’”) (citation omitted).
Consideration of a piece of evidence does not mean the ALJ is required to adopt it. Here, the ALJ
considered all of the record evidence, including Dr. Pawloski’s opinion, and incorporated Dr.
Pawloski’s findings into his assessment of Mason-Colwell’s RFC (Tr. at 14, 18–19, 813–14).
As correctly stated in the R&R, certain issues are reserved to the Commissioner (Doc. 18 at
21–22). These include both credibility determinations and the RFC itself. See, e.g., Allen v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Precedent in this circuit and agency rulings support
the ALJ’s conclusion that [the physician’s] opinion of [the claimant’s] credibility addresses one of
the issues reserved to the Commissioner and therefore is not a medical opinion requiring
consideration.”); Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The
responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a
physician.”). The ALJ did not err in affording substantial weight to Dr. Pawloski’s clinical findings
while declining to adopt her conclusions on dispositive issues.
CONCLUSION
Mason-Colwell’s Objection (Doc. 19) is overruled, and this Court adopts the R&R (Doc. 18).
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mason-Colwell was not disabled. The claim for
benefits is therefore denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
September 14, 2016

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