Sprague v. Lucas County Clerk of Courts et al

Filing 6

Memorandum Opinion and Order: This action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge James G. Carr on 2/24/16. (C,D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Andy Sprague,

Case No. 3:15 CV 2513
Plaintiff,

JUDGE JAMES G. CARR

v.
OPINION AND ORDER
Lucas County Clerk of Courts, et al.,
Defendants.

Pro se Plaintiff Andy Sprague filed the above-captioned action against Lucas County Clerk
of Courts Bernie Quilter, Allen Correctional Institution (“ACI”) Physician Thomas Lin, and Contract
Dentist Dr. Olzwaski.
Sprague alleges the Lucas County Clerk of Courts did not provide him with a copy of the
transcript of his criminal trial, Dr. Lin did not adequately treat his medical conditions, and Dr.
Olzwaski did not immediately provide dental care for his broken tooth. He seeks an order requiring
the State of Ohio to give him a new trial if the Court Clerk does not produce the transcript, an order
requiring his physician to restore all of his original prescriptions, and an order requiring the dentist
to pull his tooth. He also requests monetary damages.
I. Background
Sprague’s Complaint includes three separate allegations. First, he alleges he sent a letter to
the Lucas County Clerk of Courts seeking a copy of the docket and trial transcript for his 2001

criminal case. The Clerk’s Office responded by mailing his case docket to him and telling him to
contact the court reporter to order copies of the transcript. Sprague claims his conviction is invalid
if a hard copy of his transcript is not kept on file in the Clerk’s Office. He also claims he cannot
pursue other actions without the transcript.
Second, Sprague claims he has epilepsy, and asthma. He indicates that he was given a top
bunk in 2012 despite his medical conditions. He indicates that on May 23, 2015, he had an
appointment for a check-up with Dr. Lin in the Chronic Care Clinic. At the appointment, he told Dr.
Lin he needed a refill on his inhaler. Dr. Lin concluded the appointment by telling Plaintiff he would
see him in three months. Sprague contends that as he was leaving the appointment, he lost
consciousness and stopped breathing “for a good second.” (Doc. 1-3). He claims this was directly
related to Dr. Linn’s decision to discontinue his seizure medication. He alleges he was treated by
two nurses on the scene, and was taken to be monitored at the prison infirmary instead of being
transported to an outside hospital. In addition, he thought he had lupus; however, Dr. Hoover told
him he had a stomach virus called “lipis.” (Doc. 1-3).
Finally, Sprague alleges Dr. Olzwaski did not pull his broken tooth in a timely manner. He
indicates Dr. Olzwaski is a contract dentist that provides treatment to inmates at ACI.. He states he
broke his tooth on August 24, 2015. He requested an appointment to have his tooth pulled. He
finally received a pass to see the dentist on November 2, 2015. Sprague states “[s]ince the 24 of
Aug. till now they took out my tooth. I had to send formal complaint to Wildman.” (Doc. 1-5).
Sprague does not specify any particular legal claims he intends to bring. He seeks a new trial
if the Clerk of Court does not provide him with a printed copy of the transcripts of his criminal trial.
He wants me to order Dr. Lin to place him back on Dilantin and renew his prescription for an
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inhaler. Finally, he asks me to order Dr. Olzwaski to remove his broken tooth, although it appears
from the exhibits to his Complaint that the dentist removed his tooth in November 2015. He also
seeks monetary damages in the amount of $ 20,000,000.00.
II. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an
indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).
The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp.,
550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide
more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
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In reviewing a Complaint, I must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).
III. Analysis
Sprague does not specify the legal claims he intends to bring against the Defendants. He
merely alleges facts, and concludes he is entitled to relief without providing a legal basis for his
claims. To meet basic federal notice pleading requirements, a complaint must give the defendants
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds upon which they rest.
Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008).
Here, Sprague relies on me to read through his brief description of events and identify a claim
or claims under which he can recover. This is not my role. It is a plaintiff’s responsibility to identify
and organize his claims and supporting allegations into a manageable format. A court’s role is to
adjudicate disputes, not assist in asserting them.
Having said that, courts do liberally construe pro se pleadings. This requires active
interpretation of the complaint in some cases. There are, however, limits on the duty of a court in
this regard. Courts are not required to construct claims from obscure references in a pro se
Complaint. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff therefore
must make more than a fleeting reference to properly present an issue.
I have reviewed the allegations in Sprague’s pleading, and have given them the most active
interpretation possible. On his Civil Cover Sheet filed with his complaint, he indicates he is filing
a civil rights action. Civil rights actions filed against state and county officials would arise, if at all,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Sprague complains of medical and dental care, it is possible he
intended to assert claims under the Eighth Amendment against Dr. Lin and Dr. Olzwaski. In
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addition, he states he is unable to file other actions without his transcript. It is possible he is
attempting to assert a claim for denial of access to the courts under the First Amendment. To the
extent Sprague intended to bring these causes of action, his complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. To the extent he intended to assert some other cause of action, he did
not adequately identify it, and failed to meet basic notice pleading requirements.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The
Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that “prison officials ... ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and ... ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)(quoting Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
The Eighth Amendment does not, however, mandate that a prisoner be free from discomfort
or inconvenience during his or her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to the
medical treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they
“expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d
1232, 1235 (7th Cir.1988); see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999).
In sum, the Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional minimum protection against
conditions of confinement which constitute health threats, but does address those conditions which
cause the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9-10 (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
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The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework for
courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true,
establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is measured in
response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine discomforts of
prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or extreme
deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 9.
A plaintiff must also establish a subjective element showing the prison officials acted with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or
wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. Id.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective
requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
In the context of a claim regarding medical treatment, an inmate must show two elements to
demonstrate a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. He first must allege sufficient facts to
suggest he was suffering from a “serious” medical condition. Id. He then must allege that the prison
officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the serious medical need. Id.
It is clear from the foregoing that the duty to provide a certain level of health care to
incarcerated offenders under the Eighth Amendment is a limited one. “Not ‘every ache and pain or
medically recognized condition involving some discomfort can support an Eighth Amendment

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claim.’” Sarah v. Thompson, No. 03–2633, 2004 WL 2203585 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) (quoting
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir.1997)).
Sprague lists three potential medical conditions and one dental condition. He states he
suffers from seizures, asthma, either lupus or a stomach virus, and has a broken tooth. While
seizures, asthma, and lupus can be serious medical conditions, it is unclear from the complaint to
what degree his tooth was broken. He does not provide any description of the tooth. While he
believed the damage to his tooth made him more vulnerable to infection, he did not provide
sufficient information to indicate whether his condition was serious or cosmetic in nature.
Moreover, even if these were serious medical conditions which affected Sprague’s immediate
health and safety, he fails to allege facts to suggest Dr. Linn or Dr. Olzwaski were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical or dental needs. An official acts with deliberate indifference when
“he acts with criminal recklessness,” a state of mind that requires that the official to “know[ ]of and
disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
Sprague claims Dr. Lin was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical conditions because
he discontinued or changed some of his medications, and did not issue a bottom bunk restriction.
Sprague does not provide any further explanation of these actions. He indicates he was seen by Dr.
Lin at the Chronic Care Clinic on May 22, 2015 for a well visit. At that appointment, they discussed
his medications, and he indicated he needed a refill on his inhaler. Dr. Lin told Sprague he would
see him in three months for a follow up visit. Sprague claims he lost consciousness as he was
leaving that appointment. He contends he was treated by two nurses on the spot and was kept in the
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infirmary for observation. One of the grievances attached to his complaint indicates he was given
a bottom bunk restriction on May 22, 2015, the day of the incident. None of these allegations
suggest Dr. Lin was deliberately indifferent to Sprague’s serious medical needs.
Sprague claims Dr. Olzwaski was deliberately indifferent to his serious dental need by failing
to pull his tooth in August 2015. He indicates Dr. Olzwaski is a contract dentist who provides dental
services at ACI. Sprague does not allege any facts suggesting Dr. Olzwaski was aware that Sprague
broke his tooth. Nor does he indicate how often the dentist is at ACI and how often he sees patients.
Sprague attaches a health services request form and an informal complaint form, in which
he requests that prison staff schedule him to see the dentist for a broken tooth. That does not equate
to actual knowledge by Dr. Olzwaski of Sprague’s condition and a conscious disregard of any danger
it posed to his health. Sprague also attaches an “inside pass” to the dentist on November 2, 2015.
He wrote on the bottom of that form that he waited from August 24 until November 2 to have his
tooth removed. None of these allegations suggest Dr. Olzwaski was deliberately indifferent to a
serious medical need of the Sprague.
Finally, Sprague fails to state a claim for denial of access to the Courts under the First
Amendment. The First Amendment protects an inmate’s right to access to the courts, “but not
necessarily his access to all the legal assistance or materials he may desire.” Tinch v. Huggins, No.
99–3436, 2000 WL 178418, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb.8, 2000) (citing Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920,
932 (6th Cir. 1985)). Inmates do not enjoy a federally protected right in free photocopying services.
Tinch, 2000 WL 178418, at *1 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Sprague has no constitutionally protected right to receive free copies of his trial
transcript and other evidence presented at trial. Swank v. Franklin Cty., No. 2:13-CV-177, 2013 WL
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1915146, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 8, 2013). The Clerk of Court did not indicate to the Sprague that
the transcript did not exist. She indicated to him that he would need to obtain it from the court
reporter.
Furthermore, to state a claim for denial of access to the courts, Sprague must allege particular
actions of the Defendant prevented him from pursuing or caused the rejection of a specific nonfrivolous direct appeal, habeas corpus petition, or civil rights actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
351 (1996). The right of access to the courts is directly related to an underlying claim, without
which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). A plaintiff must therefore “plead and prove prejudice stemming from the
asserted violation.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). In order words, he must
demonstrate “actual injury” by showing that his underlying claim was non-frivolous, and that it was
frustrated or impeded by the Defendant. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. “It follows that the underlying
cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the Complaint.”
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
In this case, Sprague was convicted in December 2001. He wrote a letter to the Lucas County
Court Clerk in 2015 asking for copies of his transcripts. She referred him to the court reporter.
There is no suggestion in the pleading that Sprague has a viable non-frivolous direct appeal, or
habeas corpus petition pending fourteen years after his conviction for which a copy of the transcript
of his criminal trial is necessary. Thus, Sprague failed to demonstrate he was denied access to the
courts.

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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED THAT this action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e).
I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.1
So ordered.

/s/ James G. Carr
Sr. U.S. District Judge

1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it could
not be taken in good faith.
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