Brucker et al v. CBS Corporation et al
Filing
107
Memorandum Opinion and Order: Crane's Motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 95 ), is granted. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 2/12/2018. (R,Ke)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Harold Brucker, et al.,
Case No. 3:16-cv-206
Plaintiffs
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CBS Corporation, et al.,
Defendants
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Crane Co. moves for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. (Doc.
No. 95). Remaining Plaintiff Christine Brucker filed a memorandum in opposition, (Doc. No. 98),
and Crane replied, (Doc. No. 103).
II.
BACKGROUND
While serving in the Navy from 1960 to 1967, Harold Brucker was exposed to asbestos
aboard the USS Salisbury and the USS John R. Craig. Many years later, in 2015, Mr. Brucker was
diagnosed with pleural mesothelioma likely due to his exposure. 1 On January 28, 2016, he filed suit
against several manufacturers of products to which he was exposed during his service, products
which he alleged contained asbestos. Crane was one of these manufacturers.
III.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of “informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
1
Mr. Brucker succumbed to his illness on April 23, 2016.
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence
supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant’s claim. Id. at 323-25.
Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). It is not sufficient “simply [to] show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings” and
present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also
Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment must be entered
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322.
IV.
DISCUSSION
Crane moves for summary judgment of the maritime law 2 strict liability and negligence
claims. For these claims to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must show: “(1) [Harold Brucker]
was exposed to [Crane’s] product, and (2) the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury
he suffered.” Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005).
Crane cannot be held liable for asbestos-containing products “attached or connected” to its
product which it neither made nor sold. Id. at 495 (quoting Stark v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 21 F.
App’x 371, 381 (6th Cir. 2001)). Although Plaintiff urges me to apply one of the fact-specific
standards used by other courts to this bare-metal defense, the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule is
controlling here. See, e.g., Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 3:12-cv-724, 2015 WL 7258518, at *4-*5
2
The parties agree that maritime law governs here. (Doc. No. 98 at 20).
2
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2015); see also In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 235,239
(3d. Cir. 2017) (distinguishing the bright-line rule applied by courts such as the Sixth Circuit from
fact-specific standards applied by other courts).
In this case, Plaintiff sets forth no evidence to raise Harold Brucker’s possible exposure to
Crane asbestos-containing products to anything more than a “metaphysical doubt.” Further,
Plaintiff makes no attempt to prove exposure to Crane asbestos-containing products was a
substantial factor in causing Harold Brucker’s mesothelioma. See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492 (“[A]
mere showing that defendant's product was present somewhere at plaintiff's place of work is
insufficient. Rather, where a plaintiff relies on proof of exposure to establish that a product was a
substantial factor in causing injury, the plaintiff must show a high enough level of exposure that an
inference that the asbestos was a substantial factor in the injury is more than conjectural.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, because Plaintiff cannot establish Harold Brucker
was exposed – much less substantially exposed – to asbestos-containing products manufactured or
distributed by Crane, summary judgment must be awarded to Crane.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Crane’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
3
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