Sterling v. Lima Police Department et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, but this action is dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). I further certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 12/18/2017. (S,AL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
R. Todd Sterling,
Case No. 3:17-cv-334
Plaintiff
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Lima Police Department, et al.,
Defendants
Plaintiff R. Todd Sterling, acting pro se and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, initiated this
action by filing a “Memorandum” complaining about proceedings in a civil case he previously filed
against the Defendants in the Allen County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 1.) The
Plaintiff’s Memorandum asserts no specific federal claims and seeks no specific relief. The Plaintiff
simply asserts in his Memorandum that he “wishes to inform the court of the outrageous
circumstances that [he] had to undergo” in the state-court case. (Id. at 1.) He sets forth a list of his
complaints, including complaints about discovery and other rulings in the state-court case. (See id.at
1-2.)
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), federal
district courts are expressly required to screen all in forma pauperis actions, and to dismiss before
service any such action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To
survive dismissal, a pro se complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (holding that the dismissal standards
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articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) govern dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Further,
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have an independent obligation to dismiss an
action “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
I must dismiss this action because the Plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to
allege any federal cause of action over which this Court may assert subject-matter jurisdiction.
Further, “the Rooker–Feldman doctrine denies federal jurisdiction to ‘cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted,
but this action is dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). I further
certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in
good faith.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
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