Local 1982 International Longshoremen's Association v. Midwest Terminals of Toledo International, Inc.

Filing 6

Memorandum Opinion: Plaintiff's motion for a Temporary Retraining Order is denied. A telephonic status is scheduled for August 31, 2017 at 1:30pm. My chambers will initiate the phone call. re 2 Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 8/16/2017. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Local 1982 International
Longshoremen’s Association,

Case No. 3:17-cv-1688

Plaintiff
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Midwest Terminals of Toledo
International, Inc.,
Defendant
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before me on Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. While this
case was initially assigned to the Honorable James G. Carr, upon finding it was related Case No.
3:12-cv-1384, he appropriately1 reassigned the case to me. (Doc. No. 4).
The present dispute arises from the related case, in which I remanded an arbitration award to
the arbitration panel for clarification. In this new filing, the Union seeks a TRO to (1) preclude
Midwest from “nominating, appointing, lobbying, or voting for any individual to, now or in the
future, serve on the Joint Grievance Committee with respect to the arbitration award issued on April
16, 2012 between the parties”; and (2) to “remove Fred Deichert from the joint Grievance
Committee with respect to the grievance award.” (Doc. No. 2).

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Local Rule 3.1(b)(3).

On August 14, 2017, I held a status conference, on the record, with counsel for the parties.
I have reviewed the motion and have considered the arguments of counsel during the status
conference in making my determination.
DISCUSSION
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), I examine and weigh the following factors to determine the
propriety of a TRO: (1) whether the moving party has shown a strong likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3)
whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the
public interest would be served by issuing the injunction. Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban County
Government, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002); McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 119
F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A trial court is vested with discretion in an application for a
TRO. First Technology Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 1993).
I find the Plaintiff has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The Plaintiff
contends it can demonstrate Mr. Deichert’s appointment violates the CBA’s grievance and
arbitration provision because he is conflicted from serving on the Joint Grievance Committee. The
Plaintiff cites to violation of the Master Agreement on this issue.
In the Master Settlement Agreement, the operative language is contained in the Step 2
process as follows:
In the event the grievance is not satisfactorily settled in Step 1, or in the
event a party should file a grievance of general application relating to the
interpretation or application of the Master Agreement, then the matter shall be
referred in writing within ten days to a Joint Grievance Committee consisting of one
(1) representative designated by the GLDC-ACD/ILA and one (1) representative
designated by the Employer. . . .

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(Doc. No. 1-1, p. 15). There is nothing in this language or elsewhere in the Agreement which
provides any clarity or guidance as to the designation of a representative other than the stated
designation by each respective group. Plaintiff argued that past practice history supports its
position. In light, however, of the express language of the Master Settlement Agreement, I find such
an argument unpersuasive.
I further find the Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable harm. The current dispute finds
the parties at Step 2 of the grievance procedure. There is one more step to the grievance procedure
before advancement to the arbitration process. As the grievance and arbitration process is not yet
completed, I cannot find the Plaintiff has yet exhausted its contractual remedies.
With regard to the final two factors, I find they also weigh in favor of denying the TRO.
With the language in the Master Settlement Agreement, it is not in the public interest for this Court
to intrude on the grievance and arbitration process.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I deny Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. (Doc. No. 2). A telephonic
status is scheduled for August 31, 2017 at 1:30pm. My chambers will initiate the phone call.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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