Tomas-Pedro et al v. Holden

Filing 60

Order granting Defendant's Motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 50 ). Judge James G. Carr on 9/15/2021. (D,TM)

Case: 3:18-cv-01136-JGC Doc #: 60 Filed: 09/15/21 1 of 25. PageID #: 1465

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Tomas Tomas-Pedro, et al.,

Case No. 3:18-CV-01136-JGC

Plaintiffs
ORDER

v.
Trooper Bryan Holden,
Defendant.

This is civil rights case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs, three Guatemalan
citizens, assert constitutional claims against an Ohio state trooper in connection with a traffic
stop that ultimately led to Border Patrol detaining them.
Following the traffic stop, the government placed the plaintiffs in removal proceedings,
and at least one has since been deported to Guatemala.
Plaintiffs argue that the defendant, Trooper Bryan Holden, pulled them over without
probable cause, prolonged the traffic stop, and did so because they are Hispanic, in violation of
plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant Holden asserts that he pulled
them over for following too closely behind the vehicle in front of them, which is a violation of
Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.34.
Pending is defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 50). For the reasons
described below, I grant the motion.
Background
On May 23, 2016, plaintiffs Tomas Tomas-Pedro, Manuel Xol-Mo, and Williams Xol-

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Mo were traveling eastbound on I-80 in Sandusky County, Ohio. (Doc. 50-2, pgID 429; Doc. 506, pgID 826-27). Tomas-Pedro and Manuel Xol-Mo had traveled to Ohio to pick up Williams
Xol-Mo and were on their way back to New York. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 826). Tomas-Pedro was
driving the car. (Id., pgID 826-27; Doc. 50-2, pgID 417-18). Manuel and Williams Xol-Mo, who
are brothers, were passengers. (Doc. 51-2, pgID 1157).
Defendant Holden, a trooper with the Ohio State Highway Patrol, was patrolling the area
that day. (Doc. 50-1, pgID 301). He was on co-patrol with a United States Border Patrol agent,
Santiago Mateo. 1 Id.
Defendant Holden and Agent Mateo were sitting in a highway crossover when defendant
Holden claims that he saw Tomas-Pedro following too closely behind the vehicle in front of
him. 2 (Doc. 50-2, pgID 429). Tomas-Pedro was traveling at about 65 miles per hour, and
conditions were clear. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 830; Doc. 51-3, pgID 1160). At about 11:44 AM,
defendant Holden pulled out of the crossover, activated his overhead lights, and stopped
plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Doc. 51-1, pgID 1155).
Plaintiffs dispute that Tomas-Pedro was following too closely behind another vehicle.
Tomas-Pedro first testified that there were no cars in front of him in the same lane when
1

The co-patrol between the United States Border Patrol and the Ohio State Highway Patrol is
part of Operation Quick Hatch. This operation aims to “detect, interdict, and apprehend those
engaged in human and contraband trafficking.” (Doc. 51-5, pgID 1168). Its mission statement
further explains that it is intended to mitigate “the unlawful movement of undocumented aliens
and other contraband.” (Id., pgID 1169). The partnership allows the Ohio State Highway Patrol
to benefit from Border Patrol’s additional resources, including supplementary criminal and
immigration databases. (Doc. 50-1, pgID 301-02).
2

The applicable Ohio law provides: “The operator of a motor vehicle [. . . ] shall not follow
another vehicle [ . . . ] more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the
speed of such vehicle [ . . . ] and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4511.34. The Sixth Circuit has accepted the rule of thumb that to be in compliance
with this law, a vehicle should be at least one car length behind the vehicle in front of it for every
ten miles per hour it is traveling. United States v. Bonilla, 357 F. App’x 693, 695 (6th Cir. 2009).
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defendant Holden pulled him over. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 866-67). He then testified that he could not
remember whether there were any cars in front of him in the same lane but estimated that the
closest car in front of him was nine or ten meters away. (Id., pgID 898-900). He stated several
times that he was not following too closely behind another vehicle. (Id., pgID 865-66, 965).
Manuel Xol-Mo, who was sitting in the passenger seat, testified that there were cars
traveling in front of Tomas-Pedro in the same lane but that Tomas-Pedro was not following too
closely behind those cars. (Doc. 50-7, pgID 992-93, 1015).
Williams Xol-Mo was asleep at the time that defendant Holden pulled over the car and
therefore could not testify about what occurred. (Doc. 50-8, pgID 1096).
After stopping plaintiffs’ car, defendant Holden got out of his vehicle and motioned for
Tomas-Pedro to walk toward him. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 834). Tomas-Pedro complied and stood
behind plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Id., pgID 835-37). Agent Mateo was within earshot. 3 (Id., pgID 83839; Doc. 50-2, pgID 433-34).
Defendant Holden informed Tomas-Pedro that he stopped him for following too closely
behind another vehicle. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 835). He asked Tomas-Pedro for his driver’s license
and insurance. (Id., pgID 836; Doc. 50-2, pgID 434-35). Tomas-Pedro admitted that he did not
have a driver’s license but stated that he had an identification card from the Guatemalan
consulate. (Id.).
About two minutes into the stop, Agent Mateo began translating for defendant Holden.
(Doc. 50-6, pgID 837). While Tomas-Pedro testified that he could understand about 75 percent

3

Defendant Holden testified that he wanted Agent Mateo to be close by during traffic stops
because Border Patrol “wanted to be a part in and included in everything to see how we were
handling ourselves, including the roadside interview. So the only way to really do that was wave
the driver back so Agent Mateo could hear exactly what I was talking about and the questions I
was asking.” (Doc. 50-2, pgID 433-34).
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of defendant Holden’s words, Agent Mateo speaks fluent Spanish and could converse more
easily with Tomas-Pedro. (Id.).
Defendant Holden asked Agent Mateo to retrieve Tomas-Pedro’s wallet from the vehicle,
which he did. (Id., pgID 841). Once Agent Mateo returned with the wallet, he handed it to
defendant Holden, who removed Tomas-Pedro’s identification card. (Id., pgID 843). Defendant
Holden then asked Agent Mateo to discuss the nature of the stop with Tomas-Pedro. (Doc. 50-2,
pgID 435-36). Defendant Holden testified that he then returned to his patrol vehicle to run the
car’s registration, but Tomas-Pedro testified that he remained next to Agent Mateo. (Id.; Doc 506, pgID 846).
According to Tomas-Pedro, Agent Mateo then began asking him questions about his
immigration status. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 844). This conversation occurred about seven minutes into
the stop, at around 11:51 AM. (Id., pgID 846). Agent Mateo asked whether Tomas-Pedro was an
American citizen or if he had permission to work in the United States. (Id., pgID 845). TomasPedro responded no to both questions. (Id., pgID 845).
Agent Mateo then told Tomas-Pedro that he was placing him under arrest because he did
not have any legal status in the United States. (Id., pgID 847-51). Defendant Holden handcuffed
Tomas-Pedro and placed him in the back of the patrol vehicle. (Id.).
Agent Mateo subsequently returned to plaintiffs’ vehicle and asked Manuel Xol-Mo and
Williams Xol-Mo about their immigration status and to provide identification documents. (Doc.
50-7, pgID 1008; Doc. 50-8, pgID 1100-01). Manuel and Williams both estimate that this
occurred about twenty to twenty-five minutes after Agent Mateo retrieved Tomas-Pedro’s wallet
from the car. (Id.). After reviewing their documents, Agent Mateo ordered Manuel Xol-Mo and

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Williams Xol-Mo to exit the vehicle, handcuffed them, and detained them. (Doc. 50-7, pgID
1013-14; Doc. 50-8, pgID 1107-08).
According to the Incident Recall Report for the traffic stop, either defendant Holden or
Agent Mateo called a tow truck at 12:01 PM. (Doc. 51-1, pgID 1155). Additional Border Patrol
agents arrived on the scene at 12:18 PM. (Id.). The incident was “closed” at 12:59 PM. (Id., pgID
1156).
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 where the
opposing party fails to show the existence of an essential element for which that party bears the
burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The movant initially must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.
“[I]f the moving party seeks summary judgment on an issue for which it does not bear the burden
of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its initial burden by showing that ‘there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Lindsey v. Whirlpool Corp., 295 F.
App’x 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 325).
Once the movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Rule 56 “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified]
pleadings” and submit admissible evidence supporting its position. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at
324.
Summary judgment is proper where “in light of the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable juror could fail to return a verdict for the defendant.”
Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649, 658 (6th Cir. 2014).

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Discussion
Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows them to recover if
government officials have violated their civil rights.
In such cases, qualified immunity protects government officials from liability “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Once
the defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show
that the defendant is not entitled to such immunity. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir.
2009).
The test for application of qualified immunity is well established and contains two parts:
1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional
right,” and 2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s
alleged misconduct.” Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted). If the answer to either
of those questions is no, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Haley v. Elsmere Police
Dep’t, 452 F. App’x 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2011). If the answer to both is yes, qualified immunity
does not apply. Id.
Plaintiffs in this case assert that defendant Holden violated their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights during the traffic stop and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity for
those violations.
They argue that defendant Holden violated their Fourth Amendment rights in two ways:
1) he did not have probable cause to stop them, and 2) he impermissibly prolonged the stop
beyond its original scope to inquire about plaintiffs’ immigration status.

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Plaintiffs also argue that defendant Holden violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights
by 1) stopping them because they are Hispanic, and 2) prolonging the traffic stop because they
are Hispanic.
1. Fourth Amendment
A. Probable Cause
Plaintiffs first argue that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Tomas-Pedro
was following too closely behind the vehicle in front of him, and therefore, as to whether
defendant Holden had probable cause to stop him. Plaintiffs point to the testimony of TomasPedro and Manuel Xol-Mo, in which they repeatedly state that they were not following too
closely behind any vehicles in front of them. Plaintiffs also emphasize that defendant Holden
could not recall many details of the traffic stop, including how closely Tomas-Pedro was
following the vehicle in front of him.
Defendant Holden responds that there is no dispute of material fact as to whether TomasPedro was following too closely or whether he had probable cause to make the stop. Defendant
highlights Tomas-Pedro’s testimony that he was nine or ten meters behind the cars in front of
him and Manuel Xol-Mo’s testimony that there were cars in front of them in the same lane.
Taken together, defendant argues, this testimony establishes that plaintiffs were traveling nine to
ten meters behind a car in the same lane, and therefore, they violated Ohio law. 4
It is well established that “police may make a stop when they have probable cause to
believe a civil traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th

4

Defendant represents that when considering the measurements of plaintiffs’ car specifically,
plaintiffs were traveling just over two car lengths behind the vehicle in front of them. The Ohio
statute requires one car length of distance for every ten miles per hour of speed. Given their
speed of about 65 miles per hour, plaintiffs should have been traveling six-and one-half car
lengths behind the vehicle in front of them, if there were a vehicle in the same lane.
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Cir. 2007). Probable cause means that the officer has “a reasonable ground for belief supported
by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Alexander, 528 F.
App’x 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2013). Stated otherwise, there is probable cause where “the facts and
circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345,
352 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
The subjective intent of the officer is not relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The appropriate basis for objecting to
selective enforcement of the law based on a factor such as race or ethnicity is under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Rather, the inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is one of objective
reasonableness. Id.
In a civil case involving the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the absence of probable cause. See Provience v. City of Detroit, 529 F. App’x 661, 667 (6th Cir.
2013) (plaintiff has burden in false arrest cases); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 238 (6th Cir.
2007) (plaintiff has burden in malicious prosecution cases). Plaintiffs here do not dispute that
they have the burden to show that defendant Holden did not have probable cause to stop them.
As an initial matter, I do not agree with defendant Holden that Tomas Pedro’s and
Manuel Xol-Mo’s testimony proves that their car was traveling nine to ten meters behind a car in
front of them in the same lane. While Tomas-Pedro testified that there were cars ahead that were
about nine or ten meters away, he did not say that those cars were in the same lane. Manuel
testified that there were cars in front of them in the same lane but did not testify about how far

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away those cars were. These separate pieces of testimony do not together prove that plaintiffs
were following too closely, in violation of Ohio law. Plaintiffs’ testimony is inconclusive, not
dispositive.
Regardless, as discussed above, it is not defendant Holden’s burden to show the presence
of probable cause in this civil action. 5 Rather, it is plaintiffs’ burden to show the absence of
probable cause. And I find that they cannot meet that burden.
The only evidence that plaintiffs point to in support of their position that defendant
Holden did not have probable cause is Tomas-Pedro’s and Manuel’s testimony that they were not
following too closely behind any cars. But this testimony is vague and conclusory. It does not
create a genuine issue of material fact.
Plaintiffs’ testimony amounts to an unsupported assertion that they did not violate
Section 4511.34, the Ohio statute prohibiting drivers from following too closely behind another
vehicle. It is essentially a legal conclusion.
For example, Tomas-Pedro testified that “I was not driving closer to – behind another
car.” (Doc. 50-6, pgID 865). He further testified, “there were vehicles, but they were not close”
and “‘[t]hey were far away, not close to me.” (Id., pgID 897-98).
Manuel Xol-Mo’s testimony was similarly vague. When asked what he would consider to
be following too closely, he stated, “Let’s say, yes, if he was going too close behind the other

5

While plaintiffs are correct that defendant Holden does not remember many specific details
about the traffic stop, there is evidence in the record supporting his determination of probable
cause. First, there is the citation that defendant Holden issued to Tomas-Pedro for a violation of
Section 4511.34. (Doc. 51-3, pgID 1160). Additionally, defendant Holden testified that he recalls
stopping the plaintiffs for following too closely. (Doc. 50-2, pgID 429-30). He also testified to
the rule of thumb that he routinely applies in making stops for following too closely – that there
should be at least one car length of space for every ten miles per hour that the car is traveling.
(Id., pgID 527).
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vehicle. But no, he was not close.” (Doc. 50-7, pgID 1015). Manuel also testified that TomasPedro was “going okay” and his distance was “[t]he normal, when the cars travel ahead and
behind.” (Id., pgID 993, 1015).
Plaintiffs cite to a case from this district, Thomas v. Arnold, 696 F. Supp. 2d 882 (N.D.
Ohio 2010) (Zouhary, J.), in support of their argument that there is a genuine issue of material
fact here.
In Thomas, a police officer stopped the plaintiffs for crossing over the white line on the
highway. The plaintiffs sued under Section 1983, alleging that the officer did not have probable
cause to make the stop and instead pulled them over because of their race. There was conflicting
testimony concerning whether the plaintiffs crossed the white line – the officer testified that they
did, and the plaintiffs testified that they did not. Id. at 886. The court denied summary judgment,
holding that because there was conflicting testimony on the existence of the underlying violation,
there was a dispute of material fact. Id. at 887.
But Thomas is distinguishable from the current case. In Thomas, the parties’ testimony
was based in fact. The plaintiffs either did or did not cross the line, and that is a fact that a lay
witness can ascertain. Here, however, plaintiffs’ testimony is not based in fact. When plaintiffs
testified that they were not following too closely behind a vehicle in front of them, they
expressed a conclusion. They essentially asserted that they were not following another vehicle
closer than is required by Ohio law, and therefore, they did not violate Ohio law. This is not a
factual statement like the ones made in Thomas.
The Sixth Circuit recognized this distinction between fact and conclusion in United States
v. Dukes, 257 F. App’x 855 (6th Cir. 2007). That case, like this one, involved an alleged
violation of Section 4511.34, the Ohio law for following too closely. The district court found that

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‘“if Defendant, in her own estimation, believed that, under the circumstances, she was providing
enough room between herself and the semi in front of her,’ she would be in compliance with the
statute.” Id. at 858 (citing United States v. Dukes, 444 F. Supp. 2d 822, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2006)).
The Sixth Circuit held that this determination was erroneous, stating that “[n]o case concludes
that a driver’s opinion of her own reaction time is the sole determination of a violation; indeed,
this subjective assessment of a violation would preclude an officer from ever knowing if
someone was breaking the law.” Id.
Like in Dukes, plaintiffs’ testimony here amounts to a subjective assessment of a
violation. Such testimony is not factual and therefore is insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.
As defendant correctly asserts, plaintiffs “must come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at
252.
For the reasons discussed above, I find that there is insufficient evidence upon which a
jury reasonably could find that defendant Holden lacked probable cause for the traffic stop.
Therefore, I grant summary judgment as to this Fourth Amendment claim.
B. Prolongation of the Stop
Plaintiffs also claim that defendant Holden violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
unlawfully prolonging the traffic stop to inquire about their immigration status. Plaintiffs argue
that defendant’s prolongation of the stop was unconstitutional because 1) it does not take thirty-

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four to fifty minutes to issue a citation for following too closely, 2) defendant Holden did not do
any additional investigation that would have justified the lengthened detention, and 3) defendant
Holden did not uncover any new facts during the stop that would have led him to suspect that
plaintiffs committed a new criminal offense. (Doc. 51, pgID 1149).
Defendant responds that the duration of the stop was constitutional because plaintiffs’
own actions and admissions expanded its scope. He argues that once Tomas-Pedro produced
only a Guatemalan identification card, the nature of the stop changed. This new information gave
Agent Mateo reason to investigate Tomas-Pedro’s immigration status, and he admitted that he
did not have legal status in the United States. Subsequently, Manuel Xol-Mo also admitted that
he was not legally in the country, and Williams Xol-Mo presented an expired visa. According to
defendant, these admissions provided justification to expand the stop and detain the plaintiffs.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[s]topping and detaining a motorist constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Bell, 555 F. 3d 535, 539
(6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a seizure such as a traffic stop is
lawful at its inception, it “can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution
unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” United States v. Everett, 601
F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
To determine whether police conduct during a traffic stop is reasonable, I look to the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry requires that detentions be “limited
in [both] scope and duration.” Everett, supra, 601 F.3d at 488 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Accordingly, “the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period

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of time,” and the stop must “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.” Id. at 488-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The law generally prohibits police officers from detaining a motorist longer than is
necessary to issue a traffic citation. Bell, supra, 555 F.3d at 539. But they can do so if
“something that occurred during the stop caused the officer to have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” 6 United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.
1999). Additionally, “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop [ . . . ] do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
Ultimately, “the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness,” and
an evaluation of reasonableness is “fact-bound, context-dependent,” and case-specific. Everett,
supra, 601 F.3d at 493-94. Accordingly, the central issue here is whether “the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the stop indicates that the duration of the stop as a whole [ . . . ] was
reasonable.” Id. at 494.
Here, it is undisputed that defendant Holden initiated the traffic stop at 11:44 AM. He
first asked Tomas-Pedro for his driver’s license and insurance, which is a typical line of
questioning during a traffic stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)
(ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop include “checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s

6

“Reasonable suspicion requires specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the continued detention of a motorist.”
Bell, supra, 555 F.3d at 540. It is “more than an ill-defined hunch” and “must be based upon a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person ... of criminal activity.” Id.
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registration and proof of insurance.”). Tomas-Pedro responded that he did not have a driver’s
license but had a Guatemalan identification card.
At about 11:46 AM, two minutes into the stop, defendant Holden asked Agent Mateo to
begin translating because he and Tomas-Pedro were having difficulty communicating. Defendant
Holden then asked Agent Mateo to retrieve Tomas-Pedro’s identification card from the vehicle,
as he had still not seen proof of the driver’s identity.
By about 11:51 AM, seven minutes into the stop, Tomas-Pedro had admitted that he did
not have legal status in the United States.
Plaintiffs focus in their briefs on the length of the traffic stop as a whole, arguing that it
does not take thirty-four to fifty minutes to cite a driver for following too closely. However, they
fail to address that Tomas-Pedro admitted he did not have legal status only seven minutes into
the traffic stop, a much shorter time frame.
And while there is no period of time for a traffic stop that is per se reasonable or
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, plaintiffs continually rely on the testimony of
defendant Holden that a traffic stop for following too closely generally lasts fifteen to twenty
minutes. Seven minutes is less than half of that time.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that defendant Holden asked the plaintiffs
about their immigration status. It was Agent Mateo who began to question plaintiffs about their
status once Tomas-Pedro produced a Guatemalan identification card. Defendant Holden simply
asked Tomas-Pedro for his identification and insurance and informed him that he pulled him
over for following too closely behind another car.

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Plaintiffs have failed to identify any cases establishing that Agent Mateo did not have the
authority to question plaintiffs about their immigration status, especially after none produced
documents indicating that they were legally present in the United States. 7
Plaintiffs highlight several cases that they argue clearly establish that defendant Holden
unconstitutionality prolonged the traffic stop. They first cite to United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d
569 (6th Cir. 2008). In that case, a police officer pulled over the defendant for a traffic violation
and proceeded to ask him a series of questions about his immigration status after he produced
only a Mexican driver’s license. Id. at 571. There, the government argued that the police officer
had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in a drug-related crime. Therefore,
the officer was justified in prolonging the stop to investigate that suspicion. Id. at 574.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and instead, prolonged the stop to investigate the defendant’s immigration
status. 8 Id. at 575.

7

Plaintiffs emphasize that it was defendant Holden, not Agent Mateo, who placed Tomas-Pedro
in handcuffs. They also highlight that defendant Holden placed Tomas-Pedro in the back of his
highway patrol vehicle. In emphasizing these points, plaintiffs argue that it was defendant
Holden who placed Tomas-Pedro under arrest for violating the immigration laws, he does not
have the authority to do so, and therefore, his arrest was unconstitutional. But Tomas-Pedro
testified that it was Agent Mateo who told him that he was placing him under arrest, not
defendant Holden. (Doc. 50-6, pgID 847). And plaintiffs fail to present any authority
establishing that Tomas-Pedro’s arrest was unconstitutional simply because defendant Holden
was the person who handcuffed him.
8

At the time of the stop, the officer mistakenly believed that the defendant could not legally
drive in Tennessee with a Mexican driver’s license. Urrieta, supra, 520 F.3d at 575. But the
government later conceded that he, in fact, could. Id. at 574. Therefore, the fact that the
defendant produced a Mexican driver’s license could not be a basis to extend the detention. Id. In
discussing these issues, the court also noted that the officer did not have authority under
Tennessee law to enforce violations of civil immigration law, as he seemed to be doing in that
case. Id.
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While some of the underlying facts are similar to the current case, Urrieta is
distinguishable in several important ways. First, the Urrieta opinion deals chiefly with whether
the police officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in a drug-related
crime. That is not at issue here. Furthermore, in Urrieta, the defendant produced a valid Mexican
driver’s license, whereas plaintiff Tomas-Pedro produced a Guatemalan identification card that
was not a driver’s license.
Most significantly, the person who questioned and detained the defendant in Urrieta was
the police officer initiating the stop. Tennessee law is clear that he did not have authority to
enforce civil immigration laws, and he was not on patrol with any individuals who had that
authority. This stands in contrast to the current case. Plaintiffs here do not contend that defendant
Holden asked them any questions about their immigration status. Rather, it appears that he only
asked them for identification and insurance. Agent Mateo, whose duty it is to enforce the
immigration laws, was the person who questioned plaintiffs about their status in the United
States and ultimately communicated to them that he was placing them under arrest.
Therefore, Urrieta does not clearly establish that defendant Holden unconstitutionally
prolonged plaintiffs’ detention.
Plaintiffs also point to Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) for the proposition
that it violates the Fourth Amendment for state law enforcement to enforce civil immigration
laws. But Arizona dealt chiefly with preemption of several state laws related to immigration
violations, and the Court did not conduct a Fourth Amendment analysis. This case is
distinguishable on that basis alone.
The Court opined that it is generally not a crime for a removable individual to remain in
the United States and that a police officer will normally not have the “usual predicate for an

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arrest” if he or she stops an individual solely based on possible removability. Id. at 407.
However, this discussion assumes that the police officer is the person making the arrest. As I
discussed above, defendant Holden was not alone during the traffic stop. He was accompanied
by a Border Patrol officer whose duty it is to enforce the immigration laws. Therefore, Arizona is
inapposite and does not clearly establish a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, courts in this Circuit have held that even where immigration officials are
not initially present, police officers may prolong a traffic stop until Border Patrol arrives.
In Gomez Alvarado v. Beard, No. 3:18 CV 589, 2020 WL 516284, at *3 (N.D. Ohio)
(Zouhary, J.), the court found that it was not a violation of clearly established law to detain three
individuals and their children for about ninety minutes until Border Patrol arrived. These
individuals were fishing without a license, did not produce sufficient identification, and
subsequently admitted that they were in the country illegally.
And in Lazcano v. Morrow, No. 1:18-CV-02784, 2020 WL 4754340, at *7 (N.D. Ohio)
(Barker, J.), the court held that it was not a violation of clearly established law to hold several
individuals for sixteen minutes until Border Patrol arrived. In that case, the driver did not have a
license, and the officer testified that he needed Border Patrol to verify the driver’s identity since
they have a more advanced computer system.
Although these cases differ from the current one in that Border Patrol was not initially
involved in the stop, that distinction works against plaintiffs. With Border Patrol already on the
scene, there was no need for defendant Holden to hold plaintiffs until Border Patrol arrived. To
the contrary, Agent Mateo began questioning Tomas-Pedro about his immigration status almost
immediately after Tomas-Pedro failed to produce any documents giving him legal status in the

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United States, only seven minutes into the traffic stop. In Gomez Alvarado and Lazcano, the
plaintiffs waited ninety and sixteen minutes respectively.
Plaintiffs also highlight the amount of time that Manuel and Williams Xol-Mo waited
until Agent Mateo began questioning them. Both of them testified that he did not begin
questioning them until about twenty or twenty-five minutes after he retrieved Tomas-Pedro’s
wallet from the car. 9 Since Agent Mateo retrieved the wallet about seven minutes into the stop,
that means that according to Manuel and Williams Xol-Mo, he began questioning them about
twenty-seven to thirty-two minutes into the stop.
The Incident Recall Report, on the other hand, notes that someone called a tow truck at
12:01 PM, seventeen minutes into the stop. (Doc. 51-1, pgID 1155). Defendant Holden asserts
that neither he nor Agent Mateo would have called a tow truck if any of the three plaintiffs could
have driven the car away. It then follows, defendant argues, that he and Agent Mateo were aware
of the plaintiffs’ illegal status seventeen minutes into the stop and only then called the tow truck.
Whether Agent Mateo began questioning Manuel and Williams Xol-Mo thirty-two or
seventeen minutes into the stop, plaintiffs have not presented authority clearly establishing that
this was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. While defendant Holden testified that it
normally takes him fifteen to twenty minutes to issue a citation for following too closely, this
was not a normal traffic stop. The nature of the stop changed once Tomas-Pedro could not
produce any documents establishing legal status in the United States.
When that occurred, Agent Mateo had a duty to investigate further, which he did by
asking additional questions and ultimately placing Tomas-Pedro under arrest. After discussing

9

When Agent Mateo retrieved Tomas-Pedro’s wallet, he instructed Manuel and Williams XolMo to stay in the car. (Doc. 50-7, pgID 1005). They were not free to leave.
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the situation with Tomas-Pedro, Agent Mateo made his way back to the car to question Manuel
and Williams. He then discovered that neither had proof of legal status in the United States.
As previously discussed, the ultimate inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. Here, it would not have been reasonable to allow any of the plaintiffs to drive
away without knowing whether they possessed valid driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs do not argue
otherwise. Accordingly, Manuel and Williams had to wait in the car until Agent Mateo finished
questioning Tomas-Pedro, given that Agent Mateo was the only officer who spoke Spanish. 10
And while it took some time for defendant Holden and Agent Mateo to investigate the
situation, there is no evidence suggesting that they engaged in irrelevant lines of questioning or
unnecessarily expanded the scope of the stop. They responded to the situation as it unfolded and
evolved.
For the reasons discussed above, I find that there is insufficient evidence upon which a
jury could reasonably find that defendant Holden unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop.
Therefore, I must grant summary judgment on this Fourth Amendment claim.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs also bring a claim for selective enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. They argue that defendant Holden violated their rights because he 1)
stopped them because they are Hispanic and 2) prolonged their detention because they are
Hispanic.

10

Once defendant Holden determined that none of the plaintiffs had valid driver’s licenses, he
would have taken them into custody in any event. Due to concerns for the safety of plaintiffs,
defendant Holden would have transported them, as is customary according to my experience, to
the closest Ohio State Highway Patrol post.
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In support, plaintiffs highlight that defendant Holden was co-patrolling with a Border
Patrol agent, defendant Holden quickly asked Agent Mateo to translate even though he was able
to communicate with Tomas-Pedro, defendant Holden did not run plaintiffs’ information in his
computer, and defendant Holden testified that he would normally be able to see a driver before
pulling him or her over.
Defendant Holden responds that plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements of a
selective enforcement claim because they have not presented evidence that he did not stop
similarly situated drivers outside the plaintiffs’ protected category. Additionally, plaintiffs cannot
show that defendant Holden’s actions had a discriminatory purpose or effect.
To establish a claim for selective enforcement, plaintiffs must satisfy the following
elements:
First, [an official] must single out a person belonging to an
identifiable group, such as those of a particular race or religion, or a
group exercising constitutional rights, for prosecution even though
he has decided not to prosecute persons not belonging to that group
in similar situations. Second, [the official] must initiate the
prosecution with a discriminatory purpose. Finally, the prosecution
must have a discriminatory effect on the group which the defendant
belongs to.
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000).
This standard is a “demanding one.” Conrad v. City of Berea, 243 F. Supp. 3d 896, 902
(N.D. Ohio 2017) (Gwin, J.). “[T]here is a strong presumption that the state actors have properly
discharged their official duties, and to overcome that presumption the plaintiff must present clear
evidence to the contrary.” Gardenhire, supra, 205 F.3d at 319.
Regarding the first prong, the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that “it is an absolute
requirement that the plaintiff make at least a prima facie showing that similarly situated persons
outside her category were not prosecuted.” Id. In this case, plaintiffs must make an initial
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showing that defendant Holden treated similarly situated non-Hispanic individuals differently
than he treated plaintiffs with respect to any aspect of the traffic stop. In essence, plaintiffs must
provide support for their contention that defendant Holden either stopped plaintiffs or prolonged
the stop because they are Hispanic.
Plaintiffs have failed to do so. In their briefing, plaintiffs focus on suspicious aspects of
the stop that they argue show defendant Holden was acting in a discriminatory manner toward
plaintiffs. However, they do not discuss how defendant Holden treated any individuals other than
plaintiffs. This failure of proof is fatal to plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim.
With respect to defendant Holden’s decision to stop plaintiffs for following too closely,
plaintiffs do not present any admissible evidence showing that he would not have stopped a nonHispanic driver under the same circumstances. For example, there is no evidence that defendant
Holden stopped Hispanic drivers for following too closely more frequently than non-Hispanic
drivers. Or that he stopped Hispanic drivers more frequently for traffic violations in general than
he stopped non-Hispanic drivers. 11
And with respect to plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant Holden unnecessarily prolonged
the stop, they likewise do not address any similarly situated individuals who were treated

11

Plaintiffs did submit evidence allegedly showing that 8.9% of defendant Holden’s traffic stops
were of Hispanic individuals while only 4.2% of other officers’ traffic stops in the same district
were of Hispanic individuals. (Doc. 57, pgID 1272). Plaintiffs argue that these statistics show
defendant Holden was 2.1 times more likely to stop a Hispanic individual than other officers in
his district were. Id. However, plaintiffs’ submission was untimely, and I excluded it. (Minutes
of Oral Argument Hearing, June 30, 2021). After summary judgment briefing had closed, I asked
each party to submit a list of case citations related to several specific legal issues. Plaintiffs
instead submitted a supplemental brief, attaching for the first time statistical evidence that they
argue supports their selective enforcement claim. Not only was this evidence outside the scope of
my request, but plaintiffs also submitted it more than a year after summary judgment briefing
was complete.
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differently. They do not provide any evidence showing that traffic stops of Hispanic individuals
are longer in duration than traffic stops of non-Hispanic individuals, for example.
As outlined above, plaintiffs rely on the circumstances of the stop to argue that plaintiffs’
ethnicity motivated defendant Holden to stop them. But the law is clear that plaintiffs must point
to dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals. Courts routinely reject selective
enforcement claims where plaintiffs failed to provide such evidence. See, e.g., Cunningham v.
Sisk, 136 F. App’x 771, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment where
plaintiff “proffered nothing to suggest that similarly situated people (speeders) of different races
were treated differently in terms of arrest or search or the issuance of traffic citations”); Lazcano,
supra, 2020 WL 4754340, at *1 (granting summary judgment where plaintiffs did not present
evidence of similarly situated individuals and instead relied on the fact that defendant started
following their car only after observing the driver’s ethnicity).
Plaintiffs argue that a Sixth Circuit decision, Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio
State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002), compels me to deny summary judgment on
their selective enforcement claim. In that case, a police officer stopped two lawful permanent
residents for driving with a faulty headlight. He then ordered them out of the car, walked a drugsniffing dog around the car, demanded to see their green cards after they had both produced state
identification cards, and retained their green cards for several days. The plaintiffs argued that the
officer only inquired into their immigration status because they appeared Hispanic.
Because the Sixth Circuit heard the case on an interlocutory appeal, it had to assume the
plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support their selective enforcement claim. Id. at 537.

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That is, the court assumed that the officers treated Hispanic drivers differently than non-Hispanic
drivers. 12 Id.
This opinion is not particularly instructive here because the question before me is the
question that the Sixth Circuit had to assume the answer to – whether plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence that defendant Holden treated Hispanic drivers differently than non-Hispanic
drivers.
However, in the district court opinion, Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State
Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff'd and remanded, 308 F.3d 523 (6th
Cir. 2002), I addressed the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence. I found that there was
sufficient evidence that the defendants treated Hispanic drivers differently than non-Hispanic
drivers because several defendants “testified that, in their experience, they would refer Hispanic
motorists to the Border Patrol when, in precisely the same circumstances, they would not refer
someone who was white (i.e., not of Hispanic appearance).” Id. at 735.
While plaintiffs attempt to analogize these cases by pointing to various portions of
defendant Holden’s and Agent Mateo’s depositions, their testimony is not comparable. Plaintiffs
highlight Agent Mateo’s testimony that highway patrol officers might ask for his help with
identification because he speaks Spanish and his testimony that they have asked him to help
identify both non-English speakers and English speakers, but the English speakers were
immigrants. (Doc. 50-5, pgID 712). Plaintiffs also point to defendant Holden’s testimony that he
does not recall specific instances in which he called Border Patrol to help identify a white person
when he was not on co-patrol. (Doc. 50-2, pgID 495-96).

12

The main question on appeal was whether the plaintiffs had to show that the officers targeted
them solely because of their Hispanic appearance. Farm Labor, supra, 308 F.3d at 537. The
court held that they did not. Id. at 539.
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But Agent Mateo’s testimony does not shed any light on whether defendant Holden treats
Hispanic and non-Hispanic drivers differently. The testimony relates to Agent Mateo’s
experiences overall and not defendant Holden specifically. Plaintiffs bring this case against
defendant Holden, not Agent Mateo or the Ohio State Highway Patrol generally. Therefore, they
must show that defendant Holden treated the two groups differently, and this testimony does not
address that issue.
Furthermore, defendant Holden’s testimony regarding his calls to Border Patrol does not
establish that he treated Hispanic and non-Hispanic drivers differently. Another court in this
district dealt with a similar argument. In Lazcano, supra, 2020 WL 4754340, at *10, the
plaintiffs relied on the defendant officer’s testimony that he did not remember ever calling
Border Patrol when white or black suspects were involved. However, the defendant also testified
that he did not remember whether every time he called Border Patrol, the person involved was
Latino. The court found that this testimony only established that the defendant could not
remember whether his calls to Border Patrol involved individuals of any specific racial or ethnic
group.
Similarly, defendant Holden stated only that he cannot remember whether he ever called
Border Patrol to identify a white person while he was not on co-patrol. This testimony only
establishes that he cannot recall whether his calls to Border Patrol involved individuals of any
particular racial or ethnic group. It does not establish that he only called Border Patrol for
Hispanic individuals.
The testimony involved in Farm Labor was much more explicit. There, one of the
defendants testified that “when he found Hispanic passengers hiding under a blanket, he called
the Border Patrol, but that if he found white people hiding under a blanket, he would not.” Farm

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Labor, supra, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 736. Another testified that “he would not call the Border Patrol
regarding a motorist ‘unless [he] would think that they would probably be Hispanic in nature.’”
Id. And another officer testified that “she once had contacted the Border Patrol after coming
across two Hispanic men whose car had broken down, but that she wouldn’t do the same for a
white man.” Id.
This testimony reveals obvious different treatment between Hispanic and non-Hispanic
individuals, unlike the testimony that plaintiffs highlight in this case.
Because plaintiffs have failed to produce any admissible evidence that defendant Holden
treated Hispanic drivers differently than non-Hispanic drivers, they cannot make out a claim of
selective enforcement. Therefore, I must grant summary judgment on their Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
Conclusion
As to both of their claims, plaintiffs have failed to point to material facts in the record, or
disputes relating to such facts, sufficient to overcome defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
To be sure, the burden of proof as to their Fourth Amendment claim and the stringent legal
standard as to their discriminatory enforcement claim make defeating the defendant’s motion
difficult. Despite the stringency of these doctrines, they are controlling.
It is, therefore,
ORDERED THAT defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 50) be, and the same
hereby is granted.

So ordered.
James G. Carr
Sr. U.S. District Judge
25